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ABSTRACT
Prior to 194-7 approximately one-third of the 
Indian sub-continent was broken up into 655 Indian States 
which were ruled by princes of varying rank. In the 
process of consolidating their empire in India the 
British had, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, deprived the princes of the power to conduct 
external relations with each other or with foreign powers. 
Internally the princes were theoretically independent 
but their sovereignty in this respect was in practice 
restricted by the paramountcy of the Imperial power.
Many of the princes resented the manner in which the 
British used this paramountcy to justify intervening in 
their domestic affairs. During the nineteenth century 
the British had maintained the princes basically as an 
administrative convenience and as a source of revenue.
By the opening of the twentieth century, however, the 
British had come to regard the princes as potential 
political allies against the growth of nationalism in 
India. In order that the princes would willingly serve 
as allies the British adopted a policy of non-interference 
in their domestic affairs. In practice such intervention 
was reduced to an absolute minimum and would only be 
contemplated in cases of gross misgovernment.
This thesis is concerned with how well the 
princes performed as Imperial allies. Two major themes 
su?e investigated. First, the position of the princes 
within an All-India constitutional framework. Here the
scheme for an All-India Federation is examined in 
relation to its origins and ultimate demise in 1959 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The second theme concerns the 
policy of non-interference. While it operated, admin­
istrative standards in the states deteriorated rapidly.
By the late 1950*s many of them had become obvious target 
for nationalist attack. The British belatedly realised 
that the non-interference policy had failed to make worth 
while allies of the princes. On the contrary, they had 
become a serious liability because of it. In vain the 
British attempted to reverse the trends of the previous 
thirty years but their efforts were interrupted by the 
second world war and could not be resumed once it was 
over (Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 6).
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
(1) The Indian States - Political Geography.
Prior to 194-7, two-fifths of the Indian sub­
continent was not British territory and two-ninths of 
its inhabitants were not British subjects. This 
territory was broken up into a large number of individual 
states which displayed an extraordinary diversity in terms 
of size, population and resources. The states were 
governed by hereditary princes who owed allegiance to 
the British Crown as suzerain. The princes were not 
permitted to enter external relations with foreign powers. 
In their internal affairs they exercised varying degrees 
of authority but their sovereignty in this respect was 
in all cases limited by the control exercised by the 
Paramount Power.
Excluding those of the North-West Frontier 
Province and Baluchistan, the states were thus classified
i
by the Indian States Committee in 1929:
1. Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-1929»
Class of State, No, Area in Population Revenue
Estate etc. Square in crores
______________________________ Miles__________________ of rupees
1. States the 108 514,886 59,847,186 42.16
rulers of which 
are members of 
the Chamber of 
Princes in their 
own right.
2. States the 127 76,846 8,004,114 2.89
rulers of which 
are represented 
in the Chamber 
of Princes by 
12 members of 
their Order 
selected by 
themselves.
3. Estates, Jagirs 327 6,406 801,674 .74
and others.
The total area covered by this classification
was 598,138 square miles with a population of 68,652,974.
At one end of the scale stood Hyderabad with an area of
82,698 square miles, as large as England and Scotland, and
with a population of over 14 million. At the other end
was the tiny Kathiawar estate of Veja-no-ness with an area
2of .29 of a square mile and with a population of 184.
The whole range of the scale was covered between these two 
extremes but in general, statistics indicate the insignif­
icance of the overwhelming majority of the states. There 
were only twenty-eight with a population of over 500,000,
1. PIC. 1931-50, Coll. 11 File 4, No.4, Descriptive 
note on the Indian States, 1931*
with the first eight of these accounting for half the 
total population, area and revenue of all twenty-eight. 
Hyderabad alone accounted for one-sixth of these totals.
Equally remarkable was the irregular geographical 
distribution of the states. In one region, for example, 
Rajputana, the states were few and of comparatively large 
size, while in others, such as Central and Western India, 
they were petty and very numerous. The explanation of 
these irregularities lies partly in the policies pursued 
by the British at various times and partly in the course 
of events over which they had no control. In some parts 
of India a stronger power had made a clean sweep of 
upstarts and petty ancient dynasties before the British 
advanced. During the second half of the eighteenth 
century the ground had been cleared in the south of India 
by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawab of the Carnatic and 
the Muslim usurper of Mysore. When therefore the Carnatic 
fell under British control and Tipu Sultan was finally 
overthrown in 1799? large united territories had to be 
disposed of either by annexation or, as in the case of 
Mysore, by restitution to a former dynasty. Here the 
work of consolidation had been accomplished by others 
before the British became involved. The situation was 
different in Central and Western India. This was 
Maratha country but the authority of their nominal head, 
the Peshwa,, had been steadily weakened during the early
3. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11 File 5, No.912/1951, Appendix B 
of documents issued by the Nawab of Bhopal concerning 
questions relating to the Indian States which emerged 
from the First Round Table Conference.
years of the nineteenth century with the result that 
territories were constantly changing rulers right up 
until the moment when the Marathas were finally defeated 
by Mountstuart Elphinstone at the battle of Kirki in 
1817• During these early years British policy had of 
necessity been one of non-intervention in the affairs 
of the states but the subsequent ravages caused by the 
campaigns of marauding Pindaris obliged the Governor- 
General, Lord Hastings, to abandon this policy for one 
of political settlement.- In the interests of peace 
and stability, and also because these regions contained 
little arable land capable of yielding taxable crops, 
the disturbed areas of Central and Western India were 
not brought under direct British control. Instead 
Hastings acknowledged the status quo as it then existed. 
There i^ras no general enquiry into titles, nor was pause 
given for the consolidation of states by the will of the 
strongest: existing acquisitions were recognized once
and for all. The consequent plethora of numerous petty 
states in Central and Western India stood in marked 
contrast to the situation in Rajputana where, despite 
Maratha and Pindari intrusions, seventeen proud states 
with an ancient lineage had preserved their separate 
political existence. The chief of these were Udaipur 
(Jlewar], Jodhpur (Marwa^, Jaipur and Bikaner.^
4. See below p* 18.
5. The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol.iv, Oxford,
i w r p V " S 2 :-------- ------------ ---------
The national characteristics of the states
displayed the same diversity. Much of Rajputana was
desert while in the deep south Travancore enjoyed a
tropical luxuriance. Hyderabad and Mysore were rich
in mineral resources contrasting in their wealth with
the poverty of the hill states of the Punjab and the
humble resources of the agriculturalists in Kathiawar.
Equally diverse were the varieties of population and
religion. The primitive and mostly animistic tribes
of the Assam states and Manipur on the Burmese frontier
contrasted with the wealthy Muslim nobles of Hyderabad
and the proud chieftains of Rajputana. In Kashmir
there was a Hindu prince ruling over a large Muslim
7
population, in Hyderabad and Junagadh the reverse.'
Many of the states exhibited feudal conditions.
The essential features of Mughal administration remained 
in force in Hyderabad until the state was integrated into 
the Indian Union in 1948. Land was divided into two 
categories: Khalsa and non-khalsa. In the khalsa
areas the land revenue and various administrative depart­
ments were centrally administered. The non-khalsa areas 
consisted of numerous estates or jagirs, the incumbents 
of which were known as jagirdars, who exercised considerable 
authority in judicial and police administration. Some 
thirty-two jagirs had their own police forces and enjoyed 
judicial powers. The most important jagirdars were the 
Paigah Amirs. The Paigah jagirs comprised twenty-three
6. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11 Pile 4, No.4. Descriptive 
note on the Indian States, 1931*
7. ibid.
talukas or districts covering an area of 41,134 square 
miles with a population of over one million. They were 
created by Asaf Jah, the former Mughal subahdar, or 
governor of the Deccan who founded the Osmania dynasty 
in Hyderabad in 1713* After a bitter succession dispute 
in 1877 the original Paigah jagirs were divided between 
three principal claimants who subsequently enjoyed 
separate titles and became the most important families 
in Hyderabad after the ruling dynasty. In Mughal times 
jagirdars had been military commanders. They were not 
the proprietors of the soil but were assigned the right 
to collect the state revenues from a specified area in 
lieu of a salary from the royal treasury. Asaf Jah had 
constituted the Paigahs in this manner during his struggle 
with the Marathas. However, the last Nizam of Hyderabad 
encountered frequent difficulties in getting the jagirdars 
to accept this position. On more than one occasion he 
had to issue a Firman, or government mandate, declaring 
that the jagirdars were not entitled to occupancy rights 
over the lands within their jagirs, except in cases where 
they could prove that by their own initiative they had 
brought waste land under cultivation and were cultivating
O
it themselves or through their servants.
Feudal concepts were widespread in the states 
of Central India and Rajputana. In Central India 
numerous minor Rajput chiefs, known as thakurs, existed
8. GOI, FPD. No.58 - Political (Secret) 1944, Nos.lr7, 
Enclosure to No.6, Settlement Operations in Jagir 
Areas in the Hyderabad State.
as feudatories of the great Maratha princes, Scindia
in Gwalior and Holkar in Indore. The thakurs were often
descendants of nobles who ruled the territory before it
was conquered by the invading Marathas and their relations
with their new overlords - insubordination on the one hand
and undue repression on the other - were frequently a
q
bitter source of discontent. A different situation 
obtained in Rajputana. Here the states were traditionally 
regarded as the property of a territorial nobility, not 
the individual prince who was only "primus inter pares".
In certain states the powers of the nobility were 
considerable. In Udaipur twenty-eight principal nobles 
commanded the subsidiary allegiance of nearly one-third 
of the population and their estates comprised just over 
half the. area of the entire state.^
In a few states embryonic representative instit­
utions had emerged during the early years of the twentieth 
century. In Mysore and Travancore, the two premier states 
in south India, and also in Baroda in western India, 
legislative councils had been established. Their functions 
were limited to the technical duties of discussing, 
suggesting amendments to and recommending for the ruler*s 
adoption bills introduced by his government.3"'1' Mysore 
and Travancore also possessed representative assemblies, 
the object of which in Travancore was described as being
9* For an account of this conflict between Maratha over­
lords and Rajput feudatories in Central India, see 
Sir Michael 0*Dwyer, India as I knew it: 1885-1925,
London, 1925, pp. Vi'S-??*
10. GOI, FPD. Secret-Internal, May 1922, Nos.1-35, 
Enclosure to No.3, Wilkinson to Holland, 18 May 1921.
11. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.13, File 14, pt.l. No.8182/1929, 
representative institutions of government in Indian 
States.
"to allow duly elected representatives to bring before
12the Darbar the needs and requirements of the country." 
Elsewhere the prevailing system of government was auto­
cracy modified only by the varying degrees of authority 
exercised by feudatories and nobles in certain states.
Laws were a conglomeration of local customs, enactments 
based on British Indian models and personal decrees of 
the princes. They could be modified or withdrawn at 
the discretion of the prince. There were no independent 
judicial systems and the princes permitted no appeals to 
an authority higher than themselves. No security of 
tenure existed for state officials; administrators, 
judges and ministers were appointed and dismissed according 
to the whim of the prince.
(2) The Indian States - Paramountcy.
For the purposes of political control and the
conduct of their relations with the paramount power, the
states were divided into two categories: those that had
direct relations with the Crown through the Government of
India and those whose relations were, in the first instance,
1-5with provincial governments. ^ Relations with the first
12. ibid.
13* The first category was enlarged at the expense of 
the second in consequence of the Government of 
India Act of 1919 which inaugurated the experiment 
of dyarchy in the provinces. The process continued 
as provincial governments became more autonomous, 
see below, Chapter 3.
category were conducted through officers of the political 
branch of the Foreign and Political Department. The 
department had originated in September 1783 as the 
'Secret and Political Department', a Mr. Edward Hay 
being appointed Secretary. From 1784 to 1842 it was 
divided into three branches: secret, political and
foreign. In May 1843 the title of the department was 
changed to that of 'Foreign department'. In January 
1914 it was again divided, this time into two, and 
renamed the ' Foreign and Political Department'. A 
separate Political Secretary was created to deal with 
the states as the work of supervising foreign affairs, 
frontier matters and the states had become too much for 
a single secretary. There was, however, only one pool 
of officers, some one hundred and eighty in number, for 
both branches. Recruitment to the political branch was 
by selection, seventy per cent being recruited from the 
Indian Army and thirty per cent from the Indian Civil 
Service. Indian Civil Service officers were taken after 
four years service while in the case of military officers, 
candidates with university commissions or those who dis­
played evidence of exceptional linguistic ability were 
14favoured. The second category of states conducted 
relations with the provincial governments of Assam, Bengal,
14. For details about the organisation of the Political 
Department, see an undated note by Harcourt Butler, 
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India between 
1908 and 1910, "Reorganisation of the Foreign Office 
and Political Department", Butler Collection, No.67; 
Sir Arthur Lothian's "Note on the Foreign and 
Political Department of the Government of India", 
1962, Lothian Collection No.6, and T.C. Co@n, The 
Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect' Rule,
London, 1971i esp. chapter 8.
Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Burma, the Central Provinces,
15Madras, the Punjab and the United Provinces. ^ '
One of the most controversial issues concerning 
the Indian States was the extent to which the paramountcy 
exercised over them by the British Government was capable 
of precise definition. The British persistently maintained 
that this was impossible. They argued that the treaties, 
engagements and sanads they had concluded with the Indian 
States could never be regarded as definitive simply because 
no such agreement could survive indefinitely in its original 
form. For the British paramountcy was not a static 
function performing well defined rights and observing 
mutually agreed obligations, but a concept of growth that 
had developed according to the changing needs and circum­
stances of the time. Sir William Lee-Warner, a leading 
authority on paramountcy at the turn of the century, wrote:
"Even if the whole body of Indian treaties, 
engagements and sanads were carefully compiled, 
with a view to extracting from them a complete 
catalogue of the obligations or duties that 
might be held to be common to all, the list 
would be incomplete.
In order to accommodate changing needs and circumstances 
a body of political practice or usage was steadily built 
up. There can be little doubt that such usage as 
existed was employed primarily to promote Imperial 
interests and to supply Imperial needs. Whenever a 
fresh law was introduced into British India which required
15. For the allocation of political officers to 
particular states, see below Chapter 3*
16. Sir William Lee-Warner, The Native States of India, 
revised 2nd edition, London, 1910, p.201.
co-operative action by a state embedded in British 
territory, some addition had necessarily to be made 
to the rules of conduct which regulated the relations 
of that state with the British Government. The legit­
imacy of this procedure could not be denied if the 
addition was made only with the state concerned but it 
was often the case that the new principles established 
in the relations with the one state were subsequently 
taken to apply to them all:
"Whenever a general principle called for the 
conclusion of a fresh agreement with a single 
state whose attitude compelled the British 
authority to reduce its relations to writing, 
the occasion was taken not to revise the whole 
body of treaties but to declare the principle 
and its reasons in a single treaty."^
This procedure was particularly in evidence during the 
second half of the nineteenth century when the economic 
consolidation of India made necessary the co-operation 
of the states in such vital questions as the construction 
of railways, roads and canals and the development of 
customs, currency, salt and opium policy.
Thus for the British the terms of the original 
treaties and engagements were not the final arbiter, nor 
even a dependable guide in most cases to the operative 
political relation existing between themselves and the 
Indian States. Usage, in a constant state of develop­
ment and interpreted ultimately by the Political Depart­
ment which supervised the states, regulated that relation. 
In effect this meant that "the full extent of British
17. ibid., p. 38
interference in the Home Departments of the states has
-1 Q
never heen and never can be defined.”
In consequence of their paramountcy one major
right claimed by the British was that of intervening in
the affairs of a state if they thought its ruler guilty
of misgovernment. This right was rarely exercised during
the first treaty period between Britain and the states
which extended from 1730, the date of the earliest known 
19treaty, ' to 1813 when the power of the French in India 
was broken. During this period British policy was 
referred to as one of "Ring-Fence." The East India 
Company was barely struggling for existence and there­
fore adopted a policy of non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of the states and recoiled from the expense and
danger of extending its treaties beyond the ring-fence
20of its own territorial acquisitions.
It was towards the end of the second treaty 
period, from 1814 to 1837* when larger schemes of empire 
began to dominate British policy, that the right to 
intervene to correct misgovernment was more frequently 
exercised. The Charter Act of 1833 abolished the 
Company's trading activities and the latter assumed the 
functions of the Government of India with a Governor- 
General at its head. In 1841 the Court of Directors 
authorized the then Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough,
18. ibid, p. 312.
19• Treaty with Sawantwadi, a small state in the Bombay 
Presidency.
20. Lee-Warner, op.cit., p. 58.
Mto persevere in the one clear and direct course of
abandoning no Just and honourable accession of territory 
21or revenue." To achieve this objective the Company
could no longer pursue the policy of "tolerating for a
22 23period what we deem misrule," which Sir John Malcolm ^
had advocated as recently as 1830. Consequently the
penalty for continued misrule was now drastic: a ruler
could find himself at war with the British, the invariable
result of which was the annexation of his state to British
India. The state of Coorg was annexed in 1834- on the
plea of maladministration and, after a short campaign,
24Sind suffered a similar fate in 1843. With a similar
25objective in mind Lord Dalhousie ^ took advantage of the 
"Doctrine of Lapse" to annex Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi, 
Jambalpur and Bhagat. The climax of this expansionist 
policy came in 1856 when the state of Oudh was annexed 
on the grounds of misrule. The following year witnessed 
the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny. One of the underlying 
causes of this episode was the discontent among the dis­
banded elements of the armies of those states which had 
been annexed; it being estimated that in Oudh alone these 
totalled 40,000 men.^7
21. V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the 
Indian States, Calcutta, p.8.
22. Lee-Warner, op.cit., p. 14.
23. Governor of Bombay 1827-1831.
24. Menon, op.cit., p.8.
25. Governor-General, 1848-1856.
26. Annexation of the states upon the failure of 
direct heirs.
27* Menon, op.cit., p.9.
In the aftermath of the mutiny the policy 
of wholesale annexations was seen by the British as a 
rather costly error and summarily dispensed with. More­
over it was apparent that most of the princes had remained 
loyal during the revolt and had in some cases offered 
active assistance in its suppression. The potential of 
the Indian States as a political force in support of 
British rule was immediately seized upon by the home 
authorities. The Secretary of State, Lord Stately, 
urged the new Governor-General, Lord Canning, to spare
no effort in rewarding "those native allies who have
PRreally stood by us." The latter needed no prompting 
and remarked in an official letter to Sir Charles Wood, 
who had succeeded Stanely at the India Office in June 
1859> that the "safety of our rule is increased not
diminished by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well
2Q
affected to us." y During the revolt, patches of
native government like Gwalior, Hyderabad, Rampur,
Rewa and Patiala had, according to Canning, "served as
breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have
30swept over us."v He believed that "should the day 
come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, 
or when the interests of England elsewhere may require 
that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary 
risks, one of our best mainstays will be found in these 
Native States.
28. Stanely to Canning, 2 August 1858, cited in
T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India
1857-1870* Princeton, 19^5* P*222.
29* PCI, 1792-1874, Vol.85, Foreign Department, Letter 
No.43A to S/S, 30 April 1860.
30. ibid.
31. ibid.
In order to perpetuate the dynasties of the
states, Canning dispensed with the Doctrine of Lapse
32and bestowed "Adoption S a n a d s u p o n  all rulers above 
the rank of Jagirdar who guaranteed to abide by the 
sentiments of loyalty and fidelity expressed in their 
treaties. The sanads recognized the prerogative of 
these rulers to adopt successors according to the 
family custom on the failure of natural heirs to their 
thrones.^ Lavish territorial and monetary rewards were 
also bestowed upon those rulers who had proved their 
loyalty. The Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior received land 
worth an annual income of three lakhs of rupees, Ranpur 
land worth one lakh while Patiala and Jind received Jagirs 
worth over two lakhs each. In 1861 a special order of 
knighthood was instituted known as the 'Star of India' 
and the rulers of Baroda, Bhopal, Gwalior, Indore,
34-Patiala and Rampur all became its honoured recipients.
Consequent upon the recognition of the right 
of adoption however, Canning's letter contained another 
principle of yet deeper significance:
32. A title deed or Charter. In the context of the 
relationship between the British Government and 
the Indian States a sanad has been defined as a 
"document of title embodying a clear and distinct 
statement of a formal expression of the terms of 
an agreement." Menon, op.cit., p. 302.
33* The terms of the Adoption Sanad granted to the 
Gaekwar of Baroda in 1862 can be found in 
C.H. Philips (ed), The Evolution of India and 
Pakistan, 1858-194-7! Select Documents, London, 
I9'627'p.416.-----  -------------
34-. Metcalf, op.cit., pp. 223-4-
"The proposed measure will not debar the
Government of India from stepping in to set 
right such serious abuses in a native 
Government as may threaten any part of the 
country with anarchy or disturbance, nor 
from assuming temporary charge of a Native 
State when there shall be sufficient reason 
to do so."^
Thus it is clear that while the mutiny had come as a 
profound shock to the British, it was a shock to their 
complacency rather than to their self-confidence. They 
were convinced that it was specific mistakes rather than 
inherent weakness in their rule which had caused the 
revolt. As far as the states were concerned the mistake 
had been to annex them but the reasons for this course of 
action in the cases of Coorg, Sind and Oudh could still 
be Justified. The shock of the mutiny had not therefore 
altered British resolve to intervene in a state to check 
misrule. Indeed as Canning also emphasised that the 
rulers must improve their administrations and that the 
Government of India had an obligation to the subjects of 
the states as well as their rulers, it became more clear 
after the mutiny that "intervention in Native States to 
cure their administrations would now become, more so than 
in the past, a moral imperative of British Imperial policy 
in India.
At first British remonstrances to erring states 
were extremely mild. Petty interference would be irrit­
ating to the rulers and therefore, where possible, it was
35* PCI. 1792-1874, Vol.85, Foreign Department Letter 
No.43A to S/S, 30 April 1860.
36. For an analysis of Canning’s policy towards the
states, see B. Qanungo, "A Study of British Relations 
with the Native States of India, 1858-1862", Journal 
of Asian Studies, xxvi, 2 (February 1967) pp. 251-65*
considered "better "to guide and influence and lead him
37when necessary, and not to drive him This
tolerance did not survive long. Viceroys "began to 
assume a more dictatorial tone and lecture the rulers 
on social reform, the ideals of good government and the 
meaning of their relationship with the British Government. 
Lord Mayo, Viceroy between 1869 and 1872 told them:
MWe estimate you, not by the splendour of your 
offerings to us, nor by the pomp of your retinue, 
but by your conduct to your people at home ••.
If we support you in your power we expect in 
return good government.
Moreover, in place of the annexation of a state the 
punishment for misgovernment was now deposition of the 
ruler. The most striking case was that of the Gaekwar 
of Baroda in 1875* A commission was appointed to 
investigate complaints brought against the Baroda , 
administration and to suggest reforms. The Gaekwar 
protested that such a procedure was unwarranted by the 
relations subsisting between the British Government and 
the Baroda state. In reply he was informed that the 
government never had any intention of interfering in 
the state and that he was responsible for the admini­
stration and the welfare of his subjects. If, however, 
he should fail in his responsibilities:
Mif gross misgovernment be permitted, if 
substantial justice be not done to the subjects 
of the Baroda state, if life and property be 
not protected, or if the general welfare of
37* Lawrence to Northcote, 3 December 1867> cited in 
C.H. Philips (ed.), op.cit., p.4-17.
38. Raghubir Sinh, Indian States and the new Regime, 
Bombay, 1938, pp. 36-7*
the country and people he persistently 
neglected, the British Government will 
assuredly intervene in the manner which 
in its judgement may be best calculated 
to remove these evils and secure good 
government.
A state which was deprived of its ruler was said to be 
under "minority" administration. The Government of 
India either appointed a Council of Regency to administer 
the state or placed it under the direct charge of a 
British official. A similar situation obtained if, 
on the premature death of a ruler, his lineal or adopted 
successor was too young to assume the full reins of 
government. Minority periods were the signal for a 
marked increase in British influence within the state 
concerned and were used during the second half of the 
nineteenth century as
"a matter of deliberate policy, to level up 
the administration of states in their own 
'interests’, no doubt, but without particular 
regard for their 'traditions', and sometimes 
perhaps with not enough regard for what might 
strictly be held to be their rights.
In 1879» when Lord Lytton was Viceroy, the Government of 
India proposed the transfer of Mysore from British back 
to native rule. The administration of the state had 
been entrusted to British officials in 1831 when the 
Maharaja, Krishnaraj Vadiar, had been found guilty of 
misgovernment. After the mutiny the Maharaja petitioned
39* Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-1929?
Cmd.3302, 1929? para.23* The rulers of Tonk £1867)? 
Alirajpur [18693? Khairgarth Q874-3, Jhalawar (J896) ? 
Sukot Q.87cQ? Sakti Q8733? Porbandar Q.880, Akalkot 
0-891}? Panna 09023 and Bharatpur Q.880 were all 
deposed by the British Government, see U. Phadnis, 
Towards the Integration of the Indian States, 1919- 
194-7? London l96o, p. 11.
4-0. PSSP. 1902-31? File 2811/1917? No. 23228/1916, undated 
note by Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under Secretary 
of State at the India Office.
Canning for the restitution of his powers hut in reply
the Viceroy informed him that the removal of the British
41officials would he "disastrous". A further appeal 
hy the Maharaja to Canning's successor, Lord Lawrence, 
produced a similar response:
"Pardon me for saying that, if in the flower 
of your manhood, after experience of some 
20 years' rule, your Highness failed to 
govern your country wisely and well, what 
hope can there now he that you could do so?
In view of the fact that hy 1879 it was no 
longer a question of reinstating Krishnaraj Wadiar, hut 
his successor, Chama Rajendra Wadiar, the Government of 
India felt obliged to effect the transfer* The Lytton 
administration, however, considered that the only way to 
avoid a repetition of misgovernment in Mysore was to 
adopt a general policy wherehy at the end of minority 
periods "some reasonable limitations" would he placed 
"upon the personal power of the ruler, or of the Minister, 
to whom the administration may he entrusted."  ^ In 
preparing a draft Instrument of Transfer, the Govern­
ment of India therefore included detailed restrictions 
upon the powers of the restored prince and expressed the 
wish that they might serve as a precedent to he adopted 
towards all states emerging from minority periods. The 
new Maharaja of Mysore would he required to conform to
41. Parliamentary Papers,- Vol.LII, No.112, 1866, Papers 
relating to Mysore, Canning to Maharaja of Mysore, 
11" harc n" TB62.----
42. ibid., Lawrence to Maharaja of Mysore, 5 May 1865*
43. PSCI. 1875-1911, Vol.22, GOI, PPD. Secret Letter 
No. 124 to S/S, 22 May 1879.
y£ the advice of the Governor-General in Council on such 
matters as the management of his finances, the settlement 
and collections of his revenues, the imposition of taxes, 
the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, 
the encouragement of trade, agriculture and industry, and 
any other matters concerned with the welfare of his
)\ll
subjects and his relations with the British Government. 
Viscount Cranbrook, the Secretary of State, disallowed a 
general application of these principles because they might 
have been interpreted as an unwarranted revision of the 
treaties with the states.^ However, he did not wish to 
discourage the Viceroy from using ’’such legitimate opport­
unities as may occur for organizing the administration of 
particular Native States according to the principles you 
have laid down” and felt that the only protection for the 
princes against intervention lay in ’the gradual and
judicious extension ... of the general systemof Government
46which is applied in British India.”
of
The policy/intervening in the internal affairs 
of the states leached its zenith during the viceroyalty 
of Lord Curzon between 1899 and 1905. With his dogmatic 
belief in efficiency Curzon attempted not only to implement 
higher administrative standards in British India but also 
to cajole the states into adopting comparable standards.
44. Lee-Warner, op.cit., p. 178. These restrictions 
came into force m  Mysore when the state was 
restored to princely rule in 1881.
45. PSCI. 1875-1911* Vol. 524, Political Despatch
No. 102 to GGC, 25 September 1879*
46. ibid.
Many of the princes exasperated Curzon, particularly 
those who indulged in outrageous behaviour during their 
travels abroad. The exploits in this respect of princes 
such as the young Maharaja of Puddokotai led the 
Viceroy to exclaim of the princes in general:
"For what are they, for the most part, but 
a set of unruly and ignorant and rather 
indisciplined schoolboys?"^
One of the few princes who gained his admiration was the
Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior; ’’much the most remarkable
48and promising of all the native chiefs.” The reason
for this esteem was that in Scindia, Curzon detected a
resemblance to himself. The Maharaja's rare ability
to achieve a high degree of efficiency by personally
supervizing every department of his administration led
the Viceroy to remark: "In his remorseless propensity
for looking into everything and probing it to the bottom,
49he rather reminds me of your humble servant.”
Curzon's policy towards the states was based
upon the contention that:
"Their duty is one, not of passive acceptance 
of an established place in the Imperial system, 
but of active and vigorous co-operation in the 
discharge of its onerous responsibilities.
47. Curzon to Hamilton, 29 August 1900, Curzon Collection, 
No. 159.
48. Curzon to Hamilton, 26 November 1899> Curzon 
Collection, No. 158.
49. ibid.
50. Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After, London, 
1911, p. 212.
He thus devised schemes intended to make the princes
realize that the Government expected more of them than
that they should concern themselves with the luxuries
of palace life or extravagant sojourns in the European
capitals. His most significant proposal was one, first
suggested during the campaigns of the Boer War, which
subsequently enabled princes to obtain commissions in
the Indian Army. A beginning was made in May 1905 when
the heir to the Maharaja of Jaipur and the Maharaja of
Bhavnagar were granted commissions having served a three
51year probationary period as cadets.^ For Curzon the
primary objective of the scheme was to give to the princes
"an occupation in fact which will save them from the
bejewelled and frivolous idleness in which they may
52otherwise be tempted to surrender their l i v e s . Y e t  
as Curzon himself realized it would take many years to 
educate the princes in their responsibilities. In 
perhaps his most profound utterance on the states the 
Viceroy declared:
"There is not a day in my life in which I do not 
say to myself, "What is going to happen in this 
country 20 years, or 50 years hence?1 And I 
say with the proudest conviction that any Viceroy 
or any Government that adopted the attitude of 
letting all these Princes and Chiefs run to their 
own ruin, would be heaping up immeasurable 
disaster in the future.",-.
51. For details of the scheme, see I.A. Butt, "Lord 
Curzon and the Indian States, 1899-1905" unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1965 > Chapter 2.
52. Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy upon 
Commissions for Native Officers, 4 June 1900,
Curzon Collection, No.255*
55* Curzon to Hamilton, 29 August 1900, Curzon Collection, 
No. 159.
In view of Curzon1 s attitude it is necessary
finally to consider whether the princes had any positive
attributes for the British Raj as the nineteenth century
drew to a close. In fact three such attributes can be
identified. First, they gave military support when it
was requested either in the form of contingents of troops,
paid for out of their own revenues, or annual cash 
54-tributes. Secondly, it was felt that because the 
princes were native rulers they had a certain legitimacy 
in the eyes of their subjects which the British as aliens 
could not claim. This was one of the lessons the British 
had learned from the conflagration of 1857:
"By governing a large part of India through 
hereditary rulers whose rank gives them a 
claim on the general regard of the people 
and strikes their imagination, and whose 
measures are generally understood by their 
subjects, instead of by a British official, 
whose tendency is consciously or unconsciously, 
to press upon the people Western ideas which 
are foreign to them and to their habits of 
thought, we have attained to a system, which 
allows local institutions to evolve themselves 
indigenously under the protecting and 
restraining influence of the wider principles 
of which the Supreme Government is the guardian.
The third attribute was one of administrative convenience:
"...the relief to the Government of India of 
being able to hand over the direct administration 
of more than 70 millions of people or approx­
imately one-fourth of the entire population •.. 
is great and overwhelming, and will be more and 
more realized as time passes and the strain upon 
the centre grows."^
54. Mysore paid the largest cash tribute, Rs. 24—  lakhs 
per annum.
55. PSCI, 1875-19U1 Vol. 163» No.69V1904-, undated 
Foreign Office Note on Sir William Lee-Warner's 
chapter on Native States for the new Imperial 
Gazetteer of India.
56. ibid.
It was in this latter sense, and not with any
idea of using the states as counterweights to the growth
of nationalism in British India, that Curzon declared
himself to be "one of those who consider that the
maintenance of the Native States and of the Chiefs is
essential to the durability of British rule in this
country."^ Yet at the same time the Viceroy was
convinced that the princes themselves were "killing the
system" and that the time would come "unless some higher
standard is introduced, when their subjects will turn
round, and implore to be relieved from the extravagance
58and oppression of their rulers."^ Thus for Curzon, 
unless higher standards of government were adopted in 
the states, the second and third attributes of the 
princes would be rendered meaningless. However the 
Viceroy’s subsequent reflections on the effect that the 
adoption of these standards would have upon the status of 
the princes was just one of the reasons why they were 
never enforced.
57. Curzon to the Queen, 12 September 1900, Curzon 
Collection, No.135*
58. ibid.
CHAPTER 2.
REMOVING THE ISOLATION; 1904-1920.
The first decade of the twentieth century is 
a landmark in the relationship between the Paramount 
Power and the Indian States, It witnessed the emergence 
of various factors which began gradually to reduce the 
subservience of the states and assign to them a much 
more modern and politically orientated role within the 
context of the Indian Empire.
Curzon*s ideas were partly responsible for 
the new direction in policy towards the states. In 
1902 Sir William Lee-Warner had been appointed to the 
India Council in London. In view of the fact that he 
was an expert on paramountcy with practical experience 
of the states^" he became a member of the Secretary of 
State's Political Committee. In February 1903, Lee- 
Warner wrote a draft chapter for inclusion in the Imperial 
Gazetteer in which he made frequent use of the terms
2
"sovereign” and "sovereignty", when describing the states. 
Curzon objected because he considered that both these 
expressions belonged to a by-gone age. In a minute 
written in February 1904 the Viceroy recorded his opinion
"that of the total attributes or functions of 
sovereignty not only the great majority, but 
also many of the most vital are no longer
1* Lee-Warner had served as a political officer in 
Mysore and Kolhapur.
2. PSCI. 1875-1911, Vol. 163, No• 694/1904, "The Native 
States", draft of a chapter for the Imperial Gazetteer 
by W. Lee-Warner, 28 February 1903*
enjoyed by the Native States and that to speak 
of them as sovereignties, or of their rulers 
as sovereigns, without any qualification, is 
therefore to employ language in excess of that 
which is Justified by the facts.”^
One of Lee-Warner's colleagues on the Political 
Committee, Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, had to admit that terms 
like sovereign, when used out of context, could give rise 
to some misunderstanding. Sir Arthur Godley, the Under­
secretary of State, agreed and revised the draft in order
to give less prominence to the expression and its 
5
derivations.
However the matter did not rest there. Curzon 
had taken the opportunity in his minute to express his 
ideas on how future developments would affect the status 
of the princes. According to the Viceroy, the present 
trend of British policy would eventually lead to the 
extinction of the princes in their existing form. His 
views caused such consternation in the India Office that 
they merit extensive quotation here:
"For many years, therefore, it has been the 
practice of the Government of India to desist 
from the use of phrases implying a recognition 
of the sovereignty or sovereign rights of the 
Indian chiefs. In so acting the Government
3. ibid., Curzon's minute, 29 February 1904. Curzon 
was not only irritated by the activities of some of 
the princes when they travelled abroad but also by 
the spectacle of what he described as English ladies 
"of the highest rank" curtseying before them and 
treating them as if they were royalty. While he 
was Viceroy he attempted to put an end to this by 
curbing the amount of time some of the princes spent 
away from their states.
4. ibid.» Fitzpatrick's minute, 28 May 1904.
5. ibid., Godley's revised draft.
has not only heen urging desistence from a 
practice that is now historically obsolete 
and inapplicable, but it has been, perhaps 
not always with full consciousness, lending 
its ratification to a change of status that 
has been proceeding silently but uninter­
ruptedly throughout the past half century, 
and which, in my Judgement, will some day 
insensibly transform the Indian Ruling Chiefs 
into an aristocracy of rank and prestige, 
differing only from the hereditary nobility 
of ancient countries in the West, in the 
superiority of its prerogatives, dignities 
and wealth. If the Indian Chiefs are to be 
maintained as sovereigns, I doubt their 
capacity for parmanejat survival; for the 
exercise of the rights commonly associated 
with sovereignty will be found, as time passes, 
to be increasingly incompatible with the 
future development of the Indian Empire. If, 
on the other hand, they are preserved as 
Ruling Chiefs, secure in their privileges 
and rights, and gradually more and more 
associated with the Government of the Empire, 
they will lose nothing in public estimation 
or in personal prestige, while adding to the 
stability of the Imperial fabric. No change 
or departure of policy is required. It is 
merely essential that we should continue to 
go forward not back."g
Curzon had not completely abandoned the reasons for 
maintaining the states. It was not a question of 
abolishing them, nor was it a question of substituting 
native for British rule. The states would still be 
governed by hereditary rulers enjoying loyalty and respect 
from their subjects and they would still relieve the 
British of some of the burden of administration. How­
ever, Curzon1 s conception of the "future development of 
the Indian Empire" was one in which Britain would hold 
India perpetually in trust. He saw his principal task 
as maintaining the "rule of Justice, bringing peace and
6. ibid., Curzon*s minute, 29 February 1904.
7
order and good government."( He expected those who 
ruled the states to do the same but his experience as 
Viceroy had convinced him that the majority of the princes 
were quite unfitted for the task. He therefore considered 
that unless the princes were deprived of their absolute 
or sovereign status, they would be incapable either of 
commanding the loyalty of their subjects or of assisting 
in the government of the country in the desired manner.
This reasoning did not appeal to Fitzpatrick 
in London. He thought Curzon*s sentiments Mso revolutionary 
and so fraught with dangerous consequences” that it would 
be ”quite impossible for the Secretary of State to pass
Q
them over without remark.” He envisaged some "gradual 
and insensible process" whereby the princes would actually 
become "British subjects in the proper sense." He 
recognized that the extension of railways, telegraphs, 
canals and commerce had encroached upon the autonomy of 
the princes and also that the government was under a moral 
obligation, if it guaranteed the existence of a state, 
to protect the subjects of that state from gross abuses 
of power by its prince. He also appreciated that as 
"Civilization and enlightenment extend over the whole 
country" the government felt more obliged to promote the 
administration of the states, not only by giving advice 
to princes but also, when a minority occurred, "by doing 
our best to train the young Chief and get things in better 
order for him by the time he attains his majority". However,
7. Curzon*s speech, 20 July 1904-, cited in G. Bennet (ed.), 
The Concept of Empire from Burke to Attlee, 1774— 194-7, 
London, 1953, pp. 54-5-54-8.
8. PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol.163, No.694/1904-, Fitzpatrick's 
minute, 28 May 1904-.
according to Fitzpatrick this was as far as it could go:
”... we have in the course of the last forty 
years pretty nearly reached the limit to which, 
if Native rule is to he maintained at all, our 
interference can he properly pushed."^
Fitzpatrick predicted dire consequences if Curzon*s ideas 
were allowed to stand. What, he asked, would happen if 
there was only one sovereign in India in the form of the 
British Crown and the princes were reduced to nohles or 
aristocrats exercising some sort of hereditary office 
under the government -
11... where would our responsibility for all 
they might do end. We should he inundated 
with applications to interfere in the admin­
istration of the States; we should constantly 
find that the Chief was doing something which, 
though it might not call for our interference 
if it was done hy a ruler acting in the 
exercise of his own sovereign rights, could 
not he tolerated in a functionary acting in 
the name of and under the authority of His 
Majesty; and the ultimate result would he 
that we should have to put in a minister of
our own choosing who would conduct the
administration under the control of our 
political officer, the Native Chief heing, 
for all practical purposes, placed on the 
shelf.M10
Instead of easing the hurden of administration, Fitzpatrick 
therefore believed that Curzon's ideas would witness an 
enormous increase in the government's own responsibilities. 
He suggested that the government should accept the inevit­
ability, and indeed take advantage of the fact that "an
administration conducted hy hereditary rulers of the class 
here in question must in most cases fall very far short in 
various respects of our ideas and standards."
9. ibid.
10. ibid.
Of even more concern to Fitzpatrick was his 
prediction of the likely political impact of Curzon*s 
ideas. He considered that it was not a question of 
maintaining the loyalty of the subjects of the states 
to their princes but rather a question of maintaining 
the loyalty of the princes to the British. He could 
hardly agree with Curzon that no policy change would 
be involved and believed that it would be impossible to 
disguise the change from the princes:
"The Chiefs and their advisers are quick 
to scent anything of the kind, and, even 
if they were not, there are persons by no 
means friendly to us who would be only too 
eager to draw their attention to
In this respect Fitzpatrick paralleled the likely 
implications of Curzon*s ideas with the actual consequences 
of those put into effect by Dalhousie. The contrast was 
poignant. Curzon Justified his views on the grounds that 
it was essential to go forward not back, yet for Fitzpatrick 
these same views might put the clock back fifty years and 
result in another revolt.
Fitzpatrick's views were endorsed by the Political
12Committee but never officially communicated to Curzon.
In the past the India Office had endured many painful 
confrontations with the formidable incumbent of Government 
House and Sir Arthur Godley informed St. John Brodrick,. 
the Secretary of State, that it "might cause some unnecessary 
friction, and it is a good general principle not to send
11. ibid.
12. ibid., Political Committee Resolution, 7 June 1904.
to India the comments of individuals upon papers on
their way through this office, unless for some special 
15reason."  ^ In view of the gravity of the situation
expressed hy Fitzpatrick it would he difficult to imagine
a more special reason hut no doubt the India Office
consoled itself with the thought that Curzon would not
be around long enough to implement his ideas. It was
only when Sir Louis Dane, the Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India, assumed thatCurzon's minute had 
14been approved that Godley replied to the effect that 
the India Office did not look favourably on a policy of 
"reducing the Native Princes to the status of glorified 
N o b e l e m e n . C l e a r l y  the India Office was now in 
favour of less rather than more interference in the 
affairs of the states. With the resignation of Curzon 
in November 1905 certain other factors in India meant 
that a beginning could be made in this direction.
The most important factor was the rise of 
militant nationalism in Bengal and Western India.
Curzon had done so much to inflame this movement by 
partitioning Bengal in 1905* The growth of extremism, 
however, was not only a challenge to the British; it 
was also a challenge to the essentially moderate policies 
of the early Indian National Congress. The liberal
13* ibid., Godley to Brodrick, 51 October 1904.
14. ibid., Dane to Lee-Warner, 31 August 1904.
15* ibid., Godley to Dane, 4 November 1904.
John Morley, who had assumed office as Secretary of
State in December 1905 > recognized the quandary of the
position of the moderates in the Congress and urged the
need to conciliate them in order Mto draw the teeth of
16the extremists.1 Lord Minto, Curzon1 s successor, 
appreciated the need but did not share Morley's confidence 
that the Congress could become "a power for good."^7 
Accordingly he sought more loyal allies and found the 
princes to be the likeliest possibility. As early as 
May 1906 the Viceroy suggested that a "Council of Princes"
could function as a "possible counterpoise to Congress
18aims." It was during the five years of Minto1s 
viceroyalty, especially after January 1908 when Harcourt 
Butler became Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
India, that some British officials began seriously to 
consider the princes as counterweights to the forces of 
Indian nationalism:
16. Morley to Minto, 11 October 1906, Morley Collection, 
No .1.
17* Minto to Morley, 28 May 1906, Morley Collection No.8.
18. ibid., Morley assumed that when Curzon had suggested 
a Council of Princes in July 1905 the former Viceroy 
had had a similar consideration in mind. Curzon, 
however, never had any intention of using the princes 
for this purpose. He had intended that the Council 
would deal only with the subject of the contribution 
made by the states to the Imperial Service Troops 
scheme. He resigned before he could implement his 
idea, see Curzon to the King, 12 July 1905? Curzon 
Collection, No. 136 and Morley to Minto, 22 June 
1906, Morley Collection No.l.
"We are only, I take it, at the beginning 
of an anti-British movement which is a 
permanent factor now in Indian politics ...
Surely it is beyond measure important to 
strengthen the position of the chiefs and 
attach them to our side."-^
Again:
"The ruling chiefs exist by our sufferance: 
and any attack upon us is an attack upon 
them. If we go under they will go under 
with us."^q
Many princes did in fact identify themselves strongly
with the Imperial cause during the troubles associated
with the partition of Bengal. The Government of India
and the Bombay government co-operated with the Maharaja
of Kolhapur in attempting to replace Brahmins, whom the
British equated with extremism, by Marathas and other
21non-Brahmins in the administration of the state. Such
efforts led in August 1909 to an exchange of letters
between Minto and some leading princes in order to co-
22ordinate policy on methods of suppressing sedition.
Yet despite the advice and support rendered by 
the princes it would take time before old traditions could 
be dissipated. Minto's proposal of a Council of Princes 
met with formidable opposition. One of the Viceroy's 
principal advisers, Sir Denzil Ibbetson, the Lieutenant 
Governor of the Punjab, believed that it would be dangerous 
to establish a Council of Princes. He reasoned that if
19. GOI. FPD. Confidential B, Internal Branch, Section A 
1911* No. 3, Butler's note, 11 March 1909.
20. ibid., Note by H.V. Cobb, Eesident and AGG to Baroda, 
TTTpril 1909.
21. I.F.S. Copland, "The Maharaja of Kolhapur and the non 
Brahmin movement, 1902-1910", Modern Asian Studies,
7, 2 (April 1975), pp. 209-225.
22. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, March 1910, Nos.42-45, 
Measures desirable to prevent the spread of sedition 
in Native States.
the princes were allowed to confer they might be
px
encouraged to unite against the government.  ^ Even 
Morley shared this concern:
"What would the Council discuss? What 
power of directing or influencing the 
executive? How far could they be allowed 
to look into the secrets of government.
Would they not try to find them out? In 
your Foreign Department, they would be sure 
to try for a finger in the pie?"^
A reforms committee appointed by Minto thought that a
Council of Princes would be too narrow and recommended
instead periodic discussions with selected princes who
could, on occasion, be associated with leading landlords
from British India. ' Accordingly, Minto considered the
26alternative of an Imperial Advisory Council but again
objections were raised. The princes of the larger states,
particularly Hyderabad, Mysore and Baroda, refused to
contemplate sitting with their inferiors, whether they
27be the British Indian gentry or other princes. ( Moreover 
many political officers could not see the point of giving 
the states a voice in the administration of the country 
and argued that they could themselves provide the necessary
po
information just as well as any Advisory Council. The 
Viceroy then reverted to his original proposal of a Council
23. S.R. Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist
Movement, 19Q5-l9l0, Oxford, 19&4-, p. 156.
24-. Morley to Minto, 22 June 1906, Morley Collection No.l.
25* Wasti, op.cit., p. 155*
26. Minto to Morley, 18 June 1907, Morley Collection, No.12.
27* Minto to Morley, 14 November 1907* Morley Collection No.13.
28. Minto to Morley, 26 December 1907, Morley Collection No.13.
of Princes, "small in number to begin with, to deal with 
questions affecting Native States and their relations 
with British India, for the express purpose of 
recognizing the loyalty of Ruling Chiefs and enlisting
OQ
their interest in Imperial affairs." y Morley's views 
finally resolved the debate. The Secretary of State 
now considered that such practical difficulties as expense, 
precedence and housing stood in the way of instituting a 
Council of Princes. He did not reject the idea outright 
and was prepared to allow it a trial if, after consult­
ation with the leading princes, theGovernment of India 
was able to devise an acceptable and workable scheme.
Minto, however, did not pursue the issue any further.
Yet in one respect the princes did make a
substantial, though not immediate, gain from Minto's
viceroyalty. A trend began to emerge which subsequently
assumed enormous significance, not only for the princes
and their states, but also for the future relationship
between the states and the Government of India. It was
during these five years that Curzon1s ideas were officially
discarded and replaced by a policy of non-interference.
Minto utterly despised everything that his predecessor
stood for. His early correspondence with Morley is
littered with references to how "intensely Curzon's
egotism [J can call it nothing elsep and ambitions have
shed their influence over public life in India," and how
31much "bitter native feeling" he had aroused. In
29. Minto to Morley, 12 August 1908, Morley Collection,No.17*
30. Wasti, op.cit., p. 159.
31• Minto to Morley, 20 December 1905> Morley Collection, No.9*
August 1906 he remarked that there had been 1 far too 
much petty interference with the personal affairs and 
administrations of Native Chiefs."^ A year later he 
considered that something more serious had been involved. 
As if to emphasise the point made by Fitzpatrick in 
1904 he wrote:
"If a true history of Curzon1s role is ever 
written, it will make the world wonder.
Few people at home know the legacy of bitter 
discontent he left for his successor. It is 
only this morning that I heard of a recent 
conversation with Scindia in which the latter 
got very excited, and said that the tyranny 
of Curzon's rule towards the Native Chiefs 
had been so unbearable that nothing would 
have induced them to continue to put up with 
it, and that they would have united together 
without regard to religion or caste to throw 
it off. And yet Curzon always posed as the 
greatest friend of the Native Chiefs.
Minto took Scindia's remarks at face-value. Notwith­
standing the reservations of Morley and Ibbetson over a 
Council of Princes, for the Viceroy a change in government 
policy towards the states was necessary, not only in 
recognition of their potential as political allies, but 
also to prevent them becoming political enemies.
The Viceroy unveiled the new policy in an oft- 
quoted speech he delivered at Udaipur in November 1909:
32. Minto to Morley, 29 August 1906, Morley Collection No.9*
33* Minto to Morley, 12 September 1907* Morley Collection,
No. 12. Curzon often said of his policy towards the 
states that he would be "very surprised" if it was 
received by "anything but approbation", Curzon to 
Hamilton, 29 August 1900, Curzon Collection, No.159* 
Allowance must be made for an element of exaggeration 
in Scindia's remarks, but in view of the fact that he 
was one of Curzon*s favourites, they are an interesting 
comment on the attitude of the princes towards the 
former Viceroy.
34. C.H. Philips (ed.), The Evolution of India & Pakistan, 
1858-1947: Select Documents, .London 1952, P» 4-27*
"The Governor-General in Council is opposed 
to anything like pressure on Durbars to 
introduce British methods of administration.
He prefers that reforms should emanate from 
the Durbar, and grow up in harmony with the 
traditions of the State.
The details of the policy were largely formulated by 
Minto's Foreign Secretary, Harcourt Butler.
The principles of Butler's non-interference 
stood in marked contrast to Curzon's ideas. Basically 
they consisted of a series of do's and don'ts in which 
the latter heavily outweighed the former. Political 
officers were not to interfere between the prince and 
his subjects, they were not to encourage petitions from 
the latter against the former and they were not to 
inspect the administration of the state except at the 
wish of the prince. Ideally, political officers:
"should leave well alone; the best work of
a Political Officer is very often what he
has left undone."rsr-35
Interference could only be contemplated in cases of gross 
misrule and:
"It may be stated generally that unless 
misrule reaches a pitch which violates 
the elementary laws of civilization, the 
Imperial Government will usually prefer 
to take no overt measures for enforcing 
reform: and in any case the attempt to
reform should, so long as is possible, be 
confined to personal suasion.
Butler also had strong views on the type of officer 
required to implement this policy:
34*. C.H. Phillips (ed), The Evolution of India and
Pakistan, 1858-1947: Select; Documents, London 1962,
p” 4 2 7 .
35. PIC, 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7, pt.2, No.1506/1934, 
Extracts from the introduction to the Political 
Department Manual.
36. ibid.
"We want lean and keen men on the frontier, 
and fat and good natured men in the States.
The adoption of a new policy hy the central government 
did not, however, mean that it would become immediately 
effective. The circumstances were not dissimilar from 
those which had prevented a Council of Princes being 
established. Both Minto and Butler realized that most 
political officers were still imbued with the Curzonian 
spirit. The Viceroy in fact suspected that their 
opposition to the idea of an Imperial Advisory Council 
had been influenced by fear of their direct authority 
over the princes being minimized. He admitted that 
this would probably have been the case "to the advantage, 
in my opinion, of the general position of the Native 
S t a t e s . T h e  gain made by the princes, though 
substantial, was not therefore immediately tangible.
In Butler's words:
"We are slowly introducing a new spirit, but 
the real change will come with a change of 
generation. The leopard cannot change its 
spots."59
The reappraisal of government policy towards 
the states during Minto's viceroyalty was accompanied by 
an equally significant development among the princes. A 
new type of prince, increasingly anglicized in outlook 
and social habits began to emerge. Curzon1s admini­
stration had done much to stimulate this development. In
37* T.C. Coen, The Indian Political Service: A Study
in Indirect Kule, London I9I71> P« 57*
38. Minto to Morley, 26 December 1907 > Morley 
Collection, No.13.
39- Butler to his mother, 1 October 1908, Butler
Collection, No.6.
attempting to foster a new sense of responsibility
among the princes, Curzon was largely responsible for
dismantling the traditional barriers of isolation which
had prevented a prince having an outlook wider than the
narrow confines of his own state. He considered that
the colleges which had been established in the 1870*s
and 1880's to educate the sons of the princes had not
only failed to produce the desired results but also to
inspire confidence in the princes themselves* He
assembled two educational conferences, in January 1902
and March 1904, in order that the colleges could be
constituted "not to prepare for examinations, but to
40prepare for life." Curzon's influence certainly
stimulated a revival of interest. Enrolment at the
Mayo College, Ajmer, rose from 60 in 1902 to 143 in 1906.
Between 1905 and 1906 there was an increase from 33 to
50 at the Daly College, Indore, and an increase from
4164 to 83 at the Aitchison College, Lahore. The system 
did produce some capable princes like Ganga Singh, the 
Maharaja of Bikaner, who was a product of the Mayo College. 
However, the Viceroy's ambitions did not materialize 
exactly as he would have liked. Of Ganga Singh he 
remarked:
"The young ruler has charming manners, and 
I believe an excellent disposition, but he 
is thoroughly Anglicized in taste and habits,
- almost too much so for my conception of 
what a Native Chief should be.
40. Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After, London 
1911, p. 209. 1
41. I.A. Butt*: "Lord Curzon and the Indian States, 1899- 
1905,” unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London 
1963, p.165.
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The development of these new princes reveals 
one of the greatest ironies of Curzon's administration.
If Ganga Singh did not represent his conception of what 
a prince should he, who did? Scindia stood highest in 
his esteem, hut as we have seen his regard for this prince 
was based upon conceit. Moreover it is unlikely that 
Curzon could have tolerated too many replicas of himself. 
In fact Sawai Madho Singh, who ruled Jaipur from 1880 to 
1922 came closest to his definition of an Indian prince:
"He is one of the old-fashioned class of 
Princes whom I do everything in my power 
to encourage - conservative, reluctant to 
move away from their own States, liberal in 
the distribution of their funds, intensely 
loyal to the Queen and the British connection, 
adverse to being too much bothered or fussed, 
but capable, if skilfully and sympathetically 
handled, of being guided where we will."^
Basically, therefore, Curzon*s coneption of a prince was
one who would remain in his state - "his real work, his
44princely duty, lies among his own people," - and one 
who would, above all, bend before a superior British will.
Many of Curzon*s policies, however, produced 
the exact opposite. No doubt the Viceroy intended that 
the younger element among the princes would be able to 
combine careers as army officers with the necessary admin­
istrative duties in their states. Yet all too often 
they did neither, preferring to idle their time in their 
capitals while accumulating purely honorary military 
distinctions. Moreover a number of princes who had been
43. Curzon to Hamilton, 25 July 1900, Curzon Collection, 
No. 159.
44. L.J. Zetland, The Life of LordCurzon, Vol.2, Viceroy 
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educated at the colleges emerged from adolescence with 
an increasing awareness of the arbitrary manner in which 
they were treated. As far as Ganga Singh was concerned 
it soon became apparent that he would never prove amenable 
to "being guided where we will." Early in his career 
his autocracy matched the efficiency of Scindia's but as 
he grew older he became more concerned that the guarantees 
of his treaty rights and privileges should be fully 
maintained and respected.
In addition to Ganga Singh, the leading members 
of this new breed of prince were Jey Singh of Alwar, 
Bhupinder Singh of Patiala and the Jam Sahib Ranjit Singh 
of Nawanagar. Until 1921, Scindia could be counted amongst 
their number. They were an odd assortment and presented 
many contrasts. Bikaner, dignified and sophisticated - 
Patiala, petulant and temperamental - Alwar, a brilliant 
intellectual, but devious and sly - Nawanagar, a sportsman 
who made a name for himself as a Test cricketer. Finally, 
Scindia. As a Maratha of humble origin, he cowered before 
Alwar and Bikaner, two blue-blooded princes from Rajputana. 
When out riding he kept a respectful two lengths behind 
Alwar, even though as Butler remarked, the size and wealth 
of his state meant that he could "buy him out many times 
over."^ What these princes shared in common was a greater 
consciousness of their rights and privileges, an ability 
to converse with high British officials and a physical 
proximity to New Delhi, the capital of British India since 
1912.
45. Butler to his mother, 18 February 1909, Butler
Collection, No.7«
Ganga Singh of Bikaner was principal spokesman 
and greatest celebrity of this group. He had suffered 
badly at the hands of the Political Department during his 
early years. When, in 1887, he had acceded to his gadi 
[throne]], he had been given to understand that restrictions 
on his ruling powers would remain in force for two years 
only. However it was not until May 1907 that these 
restrictions were finally removed. Moreover, Bikaner's 
first experience of a political officer left a profound 
impression upon him. From 1888 to 1897 he was confronted 
with the formidable Sir Charles Stuart Bayley who had a 
habit of demanding reports on selected petitions from 
state subjects. When Bikaner protested Bayley informed 
him:
"You must remember that though I have the 
pleasure of being your personal friend, I 
am also your Political Agent and as such 
have duties to perform ,of which land my 
superior officers are the only judges, and 
which cannot be neglected even though they 
unfortunately clash with your notions of 
what a Political Officer should do."^
Bikaner subsequently spent the best part of his political 
career attempting to ensure that such a situation would 
not be repeated elsewhere. This, however, was not his 
only concern. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge, 
who succeeded Minto in November 1910, Bikaner expressed 
his concern that the proposal for a Council of Princes 
should have been rejected while an instalment of British
46. Rajputana Residency Files, Box 182, No.81, 1898- 
1907, Installation of His Highness Maharaja Ganga 
Singh of Bikaner with Ruling Powers and removal of 
restrictions.
47. K.M. Panikkar, His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner,
London 1937, PP* 95-67
Indian reform had been introduced by the IndianCouncils
Act of 1909. He believed that these reforms had
unleashed an "unskilled democracy" and felt that there
was "more than a possibility of its eventually becoming
intolerant and unsympathetic with those who have a real
stake in the land and in the good government of the
country as has happened elsewhere throughout the world,"
To have excluded the states from the government of the
Empire was, according to Bikaner, fraught with danger
for Britain's allies:
"We do not wish to become mere puppets and 
share the fate of some of the European 
aristocracies•"
Moreover, without the states
"the whole Government of India might sink 
to a drab dead level of democracy without 
any of the interest or distinction that is 
suited to the instincts and imagination of 
the people."
Bikaner did not advocate the immediate establish­
ment of a Council of Princes. Indeed in view of the 
possible British Indian reaction he considered that this 
would be "both impolitic and undesirable." Instead he 
recommended that before the Imperial Legislative Council 
reached a decision on any matter "even remotely affecting
the states", the princes should assemble in order that
afttheir views be known first.
Hardinge thought Bikaner’s fears exaggerated
ZlQ
and that his note contained "a good deal of rubbish." '
48. GOI. FPD. Confidential B, Internal Branch, Section A,
1914, No.6, Bikaner's note, 14 January 1914.
49. ibid., Hardinge to Wood, 19 January 1914.
The new Political Secretary, John Wood, echoed these
sentiments and couldnot envisage the time when the
princes would he able to take part in the 1 regular
SOmachinery of Government."*' The Viceroy, however,
could see no harm in the princes discussing some
"anodyne" question affecting themselves and their
interests only and cited the example of the management
of states during minorities.*^* The minorities issue
subsequently became the most significant part of Hardinge’s
Viceroyalty as far as the states were concerned.
In December 1915, Scindia informed the Viceroy
that although political officers had used minority periods
to remove long standing abuses and improve the finances
of the states, their methods had "shaken the adherence of
the people to their traditional customs and ways." He
considered that minorities had therefore worked to alter
the ties of personal loyalty and obedience between the
subjects and their prince when the latter entered upon
52his inheritance. Hardinge felt these complaints were
not entirely groundless and considered that a clear and
detailed study of British policy was required in order,
not only to allay the suspicion which existed in the minds
of some of the princes, but also to lay down principles
55for the future guidance of the government. ^ To under­
take this task, he appointed a committee consisting of
50. ibid., Wood to Hardinge, 21 January 1914.
51. ibid., Hardinge to Wood, 19 January 1914.
52. PSSF, 1902-31, Pile 2811/1917* Ho.930/1917, GOI. 
PPD, Letter No.15, Enclosure No.11, to S/S,
9 February 1917*
53. ibid.
the Maharajas of Bikaner and Gwalior, the Begum of 
Bhopal, Wood and two other;political officers. The 
committee sat at Delhi in February 1916 and recorded 
their recommendations in a memorandum which was sub­
sequently communicated to the more important princes 
in Central India and Rajputana. The most significant 
recommendation was that which declared that any measure 
introduced during a minority "will be liable to revocation
by the minor Ruler at any time after he obtains his full 
54-powers."^ The contents of the memorandum were obviously 
welcomed by those princes to whom it was communicated but, 
as we shall see, this was not the case with certain 
members of the Secretary of State's India Council.
In April 1916 Lord Chelmsford replaced Hardinge 
as Viceroy. The change was accompanied by a further re­
appraisal of the Government of India's policy towards the 
states. The issue this time concerned an assemblage of 
princes. In May 1916, in sharp contrast to his earlier 
opinion, Wood recommended that a Council of Princes should 
be established. He was impressed by the possibilities of 
gatherings such as the committee which had discussed the 
minorities issue. They were not only welcomed by the 
princes, but were also of the greatest value to the Viceroy 
and the Political Department in that they served as a 
"safety valve through which minor grievances find a 
harmless vent, and tend to prevent subterranean communic­
ations behind the backs of Political Officers which are a 
source of danger to our administration." Above all,
54. ibid., Enclosure No.IV.
52.
however, the response and contribution made by the princes 
to the allied war effort during the struggle with Germany 
had firmly entrenched them in the Imperial camp. Wood 
was anxious that nothing should happen to dislodge them:
"... it is recognized on all hands that the 
collective goodwill and support of the Ruling 
Chiefs is an Imperial asset of incalculable 
value. If the growing demand for collective 
discussion is disregarded, we run the risk of 
alienating the sympathies of those whose 
support is most worth having.”
The constitution, functions and procedure of Wood's
Council were not to be embodied in a formal document;
the Council would be of a purely advisory character with
no statutorypcwers. Its main purpose would be to strengthen
the hands of the Viceroy by enlisting the collective
support of the princes in any measure which the paramount
power wished to take in connection with the affairs of the 
55states
When placed before Chelmsford's Executive 
Council, Wood's proposal received only qualified approval.
The reservations expressed ten years earlier by Ibbetson 
had by now disappeared but part of Morley's still remained: 
it was felt that a Council dealing only with the states 
would suffer from lack of material for discussion. To 
compensate for this it was suggested that a Council of 
Princes should be more closely co-ordinated with other 
constitutional and political developments then under
55* GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, July 1916, No.29> 
Wood's note, 27 May 1916.
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consideration for British India.^ Yet it was for this
very reason that a Council could not he immediately 
contemplated. In 1915? Chelmsford had described British 
rule in India as "aimless" and characterized by a "hand- 
to-mouth policy of giving reforms piecemeal in response 
to agitation." At the first meeting of his executive
in May 1916, the Viceroy therefore posed the following
two questions:
(1) What is the ultimate goal of British 
rule in India?
(2) What are the first steps on the road 
to that goal?^
Until answers could be found to these two questions it 
would not be possible to institute a Council of Princes.
In recognition of the princes' war services,
however, a less ambitious scheme of association did receive 
official endorsement. At Delhi on 30 October 1916, 
Chelmsford presided over the first session of a Conference 
of Ruling Princes and Chiefs. Present were nine repre­
sentatives from the Bombay states, six from the Punjab, 
eleven from Central India, ten from Rajputana and the 
Maharajas of Kashmir, Cochin, Cooch-Behar and Benares.
The rulers of the important states of Hyderabad, Mysore 
and Udaipur abstained, although on this occasion the 
Gaekwar of Baroda decided to attend. The most important 
discussion related to the minorities issue and the
36. ibid., notes by C.R. Lowndes, 3 June 1916, G.S. Barnes, 
3~June 1916 and C.H.A. Hill, 29 June 1916.
37. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 3 May 1916, Chelmsford 
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conference unanimously endorsed the recent memorandum
58on the subject.
This aspect of the conference, however,
disturbed certain members of the India Council in London.
It emerged that when the Government of India had circulated
the minorities memorandum in 1916, it had not sought approval
59from the Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain. J More­
over, according to one member of council, the Government 
of India had committed a grave error in drawing up such 
a document. This was none other than Sir Charles Stuart 
Bayley, Bikaner's former political agent. Bayley 
argued that in the past the government had avoided tying 
its own hands by refusing to define the principles of its 
policy towards the states. The doctrine of paramountcy 
was subject to change and growth and thus the principles 
involved in any one policy had always been kept as elastic 
as possible. He was quick to point out that both Bikaner 
and Gwalior had "axes of their own to grind", and took 
particular exception to the idea that a prince could 
rescind a minority measure on assuming his full powers. 
Revenue settlements, where none previously existed, were 
invariably the first reforms undertaken during minorities
58. Proceedings of the Conference of Ruling Princes and
Chiefs held at Delhi on the 3j)th October 1916,
November 191?, 20th January 1919 and 5rd November 1919 *
pp: 2 5 - 1 8 , 5 0 7 5 5 - 6 3 7 (beraft'ef, Conference "of------
Ruling Princes).
59. PSSF. 1902-51, Pile 2811/1917* No.930/1917. Secret
Letter No.9 to GGC, 15 September 1916.
60. It was common practice for political officers with 
distinguished careers to be appointed to the India 
Council. Bayley had risen to govern Bengal and Assam 
in 1912 and Bihar and Orissa between 1912 and 1913 
before his appointment to the India Council. It was 
significant that officials like Bayley maintained the 
beliefs they had held as political officers, often to 
the irritation of their successors in India. See below,
Chapter 5, the case of Robert E. Holland.
and to Bayley it was ridiculous that the Government of
1
India would now allow these measures to he rescinded.
The Under-Secretary of State, Sir Thomas 
Holderness, while appreciative of Bayley's views, was 
also more sympathetic towards the Government of India.
He considered that the loyalty of the princes during the 
war might not have been so effectively secured had a stiff 
attitude been adopted as regards the prerogatives of the 
paramount power during minorities. Moreover, he 
believed there was another side to the argument that 
relations with the states were subject to change and 
growth. The altered outlook and education of the princes 
and their greater knowledge of the power of concerted 
action made it desirable for the paramount power to 
absolve something of the claim that its agents should be 
free to act untrammelled by rules:
"Intelligent men who can cite particular 
instances in which the occasion of a 
minority has been utilized by an energetic 
political to reform the State, and who ask 
that definite rules should be laid down, 
expect more than a bar.e assurance that the 
Paramount Power will always seek the well­
being of its feudatories."^2
Yet it was precisely the arguments of his Under­
secretary that disturbed Chamberlain. Princes like 
Bikaner and Scindia now seemed to be emphasizing their 
claims to complete internal independence at the expense
61. PSSF. 1902-31, File 2811/1917, No. 2328/1916,
Bayley's note, 23 August 1916.
62. ibid., Holderness's minute, 31 March 1917*
of the prerogatives of the paramount power. This 
tendency caused Chamberlain to make the following 
important statement on the relations subsisting between 
Britain and the states:
"In the scrupulous maintenance of our treaty 
obligations nothing less than the honour of 
the Sovereign is involved, and no Government 
could ever seek to belittle them. The 
relations of the Government with the Chiefs 
are, however, necessarily subject to variation, 
and the literal fulfilment of an obligation 
may become impossible, either through change 
in essential circumstances, or by the mere 
passage of time. Again, many of the treaties 
were concluded before the Crown stood forth 
in Lord Canning's phrase - the unquestioned 
Ruler and Paramount Power in all India; and 
since that event considerations of the general 
good of the Indian body politic have necessarily 
become a new factor in their interpretation.
While they remain unrepealed in the letter and 
binding in the spirit, a constant development 
of constitutional doctrine is in process ...
But of that process the superintendence, 
direction and control must remain in the hands 
of the Paramount Power.
The Government of India was subsequently obliged to 
revise the minorities memorandum and omit that section 
which enabled a prince to rescind a minority measure.
It was also advised to furnish the India office with 
copies of the agenda for any future conferences. 
Controversial or objectionable subjects would henceforth 
be censored.
The minorities issue, however, had more far- 
reaching implications. Much to Bayley's disappointment, 
Chamberlain's statement did not mean that the Government
63. ibid., Secret Letter No.13 to GGC, 27 April 1917*
64. ibid., No. P4209/1917, GOI. FPD. Resolution No.1894- 
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of India would have to abandon its non-interference 
policy. What it did mean was that the Secretary of 
State considered it impossible to define paramountcy in 
accordance with the principles of this policy. Yet for 
princes like Bikaner, Alwar, Patiala and the Jam Sahib, 
this was the most objectionable feature of their relation­
ship with the Raj. They persistently argued that para­
mountcy required definition and that this should accord 
with the principles of non-interference. Moreover, they 
justified their argument by referring, not to Butler's 
policy - history had taught them to be wary of the 
durability of British policies - but to what they considered 
were everlasting guarantees in their treaties and sanads.
The ensuing struggle between these princes and the 
Government of India becomes intelligible only when these 
two conflicting viewpoints are recognized.
In 1917 many princes viewed the prospect of a 
further instalment of British Indian reform with similar 
apprehensions to those expressed by Bikaner three years 
earlier. Bikaner himself, however, responded to the 
situation in a very different way during the first few 
months of 1917* In order not only to gain sympathy for 
princely aspirations but also to prove that the states 
were not obstacles to the political progress of their 
neighbours, he now openly advocated an adequate measure 
of British Indian reform. In April 1917, when in London 
as a participant of the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, 
he presented Chamberlain with a note outlining the basic
reforms which should he granted to British India. In 
addition to the ’’desirability of greater autonomy being 
granted to the Government as well as to the Provincial 
Governments ...”, he stressed the ’’extreme importance” of 
an authoritative declaration that ’’self-government within 
the British Empire is the object and goal of British rule 
in India.
Bikaner's activities in this respect disturbed
Chelmsford. In February 1917 the Viceroy had written to
Chamberlain asking him to warn Bikaner against ’’holding
66out encouragement to the political extremists." In 
May 1917 the Secretary of State had a long interview with 
Bikaner and pointed out that just as the states resented 
any interference by the Government of India in their 
internal affairs, so the states must reciprocate by 
refraining from any interference in the affairs of British 
India. He also warned Bikaner that if the type of reforms 
he advocated became effective, the Government of India would 
become more interfering as it became more popular and claim 
a right of control over the states far in excess of that 
at present exercised.^
The interview left a profound impression upon 
Bikaner. As early as January 1914* he had envisaged that
65. Bikaner's memorandum, enclosed with Chamberlain to 
Chelmsford, 18 April 1917* Chelmsford Collection, No. 3*
66. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 15 February 19171 Chelmsford 
Collection, No.5. 1916 and 1917 were years of 
agitation by the Home Rule League in which Mrs. Annie 
Besant and Bal Gangadhar Tilak played prominent roles.
67* Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 8 May 19171 Chelmsford 
Collection, no.5.
in the future a "Federal Chamber representative of the 
states - and if necessary through the Governors and 
the Lieutenant-Governors, who could sit with the Ruling 
Chiefs, the Provinces of British India as well - would 
gradually grow up with at first advisory functions only."^® 
Henceforth he would only contemplate such an arrangement 
if the princes received constitutional guarantees that 
they would remain free from Government of India inter­
ference .
In July 1917? fresh impetus was given to the
reform movement by a change of personnel at the India
Office. Criticism of the Government of India's handling
of the Mesopotamiam campaign during the war caused
Chamberlain to resign. On 20 August 1917 bis successor,
Edwin Montagu, issued a statement to the effect that "the
progressive realization of responsible government in
India as an integral part of the British Empire", was
69the declared aim of British policy in India. '
The reference to "India" was pertinent, 
although at the time a mistake. It was inconceivable 
that responsible government was to be the declared aim 
for the Indian States. This was meant to apply only 
to British India, although by implication, the wording 
of the declaration did indicate that for the first time 
the problem of the states was to be identified with the
68. GOI. FPD. Confidential - B, Internal Branch,
Section A, 1914-> No.6, Bikaner's note, 14- January 
1914-.
69* Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918*
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Report).
70political progress of the rest of the country. The 
significance of this aspect of the declaration was not 
lost upon the participants of the Conference of Ruling 
Princes and Chiefs, a second session of which was held 
at Delhi in November 1917* Bikaner declared that "No 
scheme for the progress of India can be regarded as 
satisfactory or complete which does not take into 
consideration questions relating to those important 
territories outside British India.” Heeding Chamberlain's 
warning, he disavowed any intention of encroaching upon 
the affairs of British India and asked only that the 
states be consulted in matters of "Imperial or common 
concern.” To enable the states to keep pace with British 
India he suggested the early establishment of a "constit­
utional Chamber which may safeguard the interests and rights 
of ourselves and our S t a t e s . I n  reply, Chelmsford said 
that it might be possible to arrange for an informal 
discussion with the princes towards the end of Montagu's 
forthcoming visit to India and suggested in the meantime
that they frame the outlines of a scheme on the subject of
72their political future.(
70. The error was corrected in the Government of India Act 
of 1919. As Parliament was not entitled to impose any 
constitutional enactments upon the states, the term 
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72. ibid., p. 291.
Had it not been for Montagu, Chelmsford would 
have been at a loss on how to proceed with the princes.
In February 1917» Bikaner had requested of the Viceroy 
that the princes be given land grants in India or in 
conquered German territory abroad, as rewards for their 
war services as had been done in appreciation for princely 
support during the mutiny. In forwarding the request to 
Chamberlain the Viceroy admitted:
"The position today may be as important as 
that at the close of the mutiny, but it 
differs in toto, inasmuch as while at that 
time we had land to give away, today we 
have none. The truth is we axe in a great 
quandary so far as the chiefs are concerned."^
Montagu, however, had previous experience of the princes 
and their aspirations. He had toured India as Under­
secretary of State during the cold weather of 1912-13*
The frequent visits he made to the states left him with 
two impressions. First, he considered the westernized 
type of prince to be amongst the most distinguished
personalities in India and counted Jey Singh of Alwar
74as his favourite. Secondly he utterly despised the
pompous and overbearing manner of many political officers
and held them primarily responsible for the princes1 
75complaints. ^ He found nothing to alter these 
impressions during his second tour of India from November
73. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 1 March 1917? Chelmsford . 
Collection, No.3.
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1917 to April 1918. Moreover, although he subsequently 
recognised that democratic and nationalistic ’’hopes and 
aspirations may overleap frontier lines like sparks 
across a street”, ^  the Secretary of State appeared 
indifferent to the fact that most states were years 
behind British India in the quality of their admini­
strative systems. His sole concern was to avoid any 
possibility of estranging the princes: ”Our business ...
is to refrain from interference and to protect the States 
from it.”^
The outline of a scheme on the political future 
of the states that Chelmsford had requested was produced 
by a committee of princes consisting of Bikaner, Alwar, 
Patiala and the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar. These four began 
by asserting that the ’Treaty rights, position as Sovereign 
Princes and Allies, and the dignity and honour and 
privileges and prerogatives of the Puling Princes shall 
be maintained intact and strictly safeguarded.” The 
establishment of a ’’Chamber of Ruling Princes” was 
recommended in order to protect their rights. In addition, 
an ’’Advisory Board” of four princes would be created to 
advise the Political Department on all matters concerning 
the states. ’’Judicial Tribunals” would be appointed to 
determine inter-statal disputes or disputes between a 
state and the Government of India and the case for 
depriving a prince of his ruling powers was to be 
investigated by a ’Commission of Enquiry”. Finally, there 
was to be a ’’Committee of Reference for matters of Joint
76. Montford Report, para. 157*
77. ibid.
Interest" composed of representatives nominated by the 
Chamber of Princes and an equal number selected by the 
Government of India from the appropriate legislature.
The committee envisaged that when the provincial govern­
ments had reached the same level of internal autonomy as 
the states, the only satisfactory solution to the problem 
of common interests would "probably" be a "confederation" 
of provinces and states?^
The sum total of these proposals indicates that 
the major concern of the four princes was to gain protection 
from the arbitrary use of paramountcy. Closely allied to 
this was the recognition that if they could consolidate 
their rights against the existing bureaucratic machinery 
of the Government of India, then they would be in a stronger 
position to resist any future challenge to these rights 
should the government become more popular. Furthermore, 
although they wanted an effective voice in matters of 
common concern, the princes remained mindful of Bikaner's 
interview with Chamberlain. Thus they would only enter 
a merger with British India if their internal autonomy was 
respected.
At Delhi in February 1918, Montagu and Chelmsford 
convened a meeting with the princes and received the 
report of the committee. Besides the four responsible 
for the report, the meeting was attended by the Maharajas 
of Gwalior, Jaipur, Jodhpur and Kolhapur, the Maharao of 
Cutch and the Begum of Bhopal.^ In discussion the
78. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, May 1918, No.l, Minutes of 
meeting at Delhi, 4— 5 February 1918.
79. Not a single prince from south India was present.
princes complained that there had "been a tendency to 
disregard treaty rights and although they were unable 
to cite any specific instances offhand, Bikaner made it 
clear that they were apprehensive about their future and 
wanted to make sure that "the fulfilment of the Treaties 
should not depend on the personal goodwill of high
o n
officers." In order to see how far such claims were 
justified the Government of India invited the princes to 
indicate the occasions when they considered the government 
had failed to fulfil its treaty pledges. In their 
subsequent report, Montagu and Chelmsford recognized the 
anxiety of the princes and sought to assure them "that no 
constitutional changes which may take place will impair 
the rights, dignities and privileges secured to them by 
treaties, sanads and engagements or by established practice. 
As a positive gesture they suggested that, with the consent 
of those concerned, the situation could be reviewed "not 
necessarily with a view to any change of policy but in 
order to simplify, standardize and codify existing political
o p
practice for the future." The remainder of the report 
was largely a reproduction of the scheme presented by the 
four-man committee and concluded with a vision of the 
future embracing the "external semblance of some form of 
federation". The provinces would become autonomous units 
held together by a central governmwnt which would deal
80. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, May 1918, No.l, Minutes 
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with matters common to them all, as they would he to the 
states. The gradual concentration of the Government of 
India upon such matters would make it easier for the 
states, while retaining their internal autonomy to enter 
a closer association with the central government if they 
wished to do so.^
The two most significant recommendations of 
the report were those relating to the codification of 
political practice and the establishment of a Chamber 
of Princes. Moreover, the significance of these was 
not merely attributable to the issues at stake. Over 
both proposals the princes emerged, not as a united and 
coherent body but as a series of groups and factions 
urging a variety of demands designed to promote a number 
of particularist ambitions. Implicit in this disunity 
was a growing resentment among a large number of states 
at the manner in which the small activist group of 
princes, representative of the medium sized states, had 
assumed a monopoly interest in all the reform proceedings 
relating to the states.
At the princes' conference of January 1919> 
Chelmsford suggested that the proposed Chamber of Princes 
should consist of three classes of states: those with a
salute of eleven guns or over, those which had a nine gun 
salute and possessed practically full internal powers, and 
finally such other states with a nine gun salute that the 
government considered fit for the grant of full, or
ibid, para. 300.
practically full, internal powers. The Viceroy also 
suggested that a "reasonable and proportional represent­
ation of the lesser states" should be secured to enable 
them tohave a voice in matters affecting their interests. 
While the conference agreed to the first three categories, 
many princes of medium sized states objected to the second 
suggestion, particularly as the Viceroy had also hinted 
that some states which were the feudatories of others 
could be eligible for membership. The matter was 
referred to the Political Department which, in August 
1920, recommended that representatives of states not 
included in Chelmsford's first two categories, and 
exclusive of non-jurisdictionary Thakurs, Estates and
mere feudatories, should form an integral part of the
85Chamber and be styled "Representative Members." ^ This 
recommendation was accepted: twelve minor princes were
to be elected to represent 127 states in this manner.
Of the twelve, four came from the Bombay Presidency, 
three from Bihar and Orissa, two from the Punjab, two 
from the Central Provinces and one from Central India.
The Chamber of Princes, which was inaugurated 
by Royal Proclamation on 8 Februaryl921, was thus to 
consist of 108 princes who were to be members in their 
own right, plus twelve representative members. However, 
inclusive in the former category were the princes of the 
larger states for whom the very idea of a Chamber was 
anathema. Their aversion to a princely organization had
84. Conference of Ruling Princes, pp. 588-9*
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(Narendra Mahal), February l9£l (hereafter, Chamber 
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remained unchanged since Minto's day and they subsequently 
refused to participate. According to the Nizam of 
Hyderabad:
"I should not like any questions affecting 
my State being determined on the advice of 
other Ruling Princes, or of their represent­
atives, Hindus or Muhammadens ..., it would 
contravene the essential principle that each 
Prince is a Sovereign who is entitled to 
conduct his business direct with the British 
Government, without the intervention of 
other Indian States, or of any Legislative 
Assemblies of British India."gg
A similar position was adopted by the states of Baroda, 
Indore, Mysore, Jaipur and Udaipur.
In the absence of the larger states the Chamber 
was destined to be dominated by a league of princes from 
the medium sized states of Rajputana, Western India and 
the Punjab. They would contemplate no erosion of their 
position. During the first session of the Chamber a 
claim was made on behalf of the smaller states that the 
qualification rules be modified in order to accommodate 
more of their number. Bikaner replied:
"As regards the Representative Members, there 
has also been the apprehension expressed, not 
only of the levelling down process, but of 
the danger of our being flooded and out-voted 
by the lesser Rulers.
The Maharaja of Alwar warned that even those princes who 
had decided to attend the Chamber might abstain if they 
discovered "that their views do not carry the amount of
OQ
importance due to their position." Inevitably the
86. Conference of Ruling Princes, p. 507*
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Standing Committee of the Chamber to all intents and
purposes the Advisory Board recommended by the four
princes in 1918, was tightly controlled by the medium
sized states. Initially it comprised five members;
in addition to the Chancellor of the Chamber there was
to be one representative from each of the four divisions
of Bombay, Central India, Rajputana and the Punjab.
During the first session of the Chamber, however, two
changes were made: in future members were to be elected
on merit, not on any territorial basis and their number
was to be increased from five to seven. In November 1921
the Committee consisted of the following princes -
Bikaner [Chancello^> Gwalior, Cutch, Patiala, Nawanagar,
Alwar and Falanpur. Of these, Scindia was the odd man
out. With the exceptions of Patiala, who was a Sidhu
Jat, and Palanpur, who was a Pathan, all the others were
89descended from one of the numerous Rajput clans. '
Scindia, however, was a lowly Maratha, and although he
had sponsored their cause over the past six years, the
90others treated him as an outcaste. He resigned m
1924 and never returned. In all subsequent personnel
changes made on the Standing Committee, the pore do mi nance
of the medium sized states from Rajputana, Western India
91and the Punjab was perpetuated.J
89. A table listing the racial origins of the princes 
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Members of the Standing Committee.
The larger states also objected to the proposal 
to codify political practice. The Gaekwar of Baroda 
expressed their apprehensions when he said that codif­
ication would have a "levelling and corroding influence 
upon the superior Treaty rights of individual States ... 
Uniformity of standards and codified methods of inter­
pretation will tend to obscure these important distinctions 
of status no less than uniformity of nomenclature does 
now.
Montagu, who held but scant regard for the 
aloofness of the larger states, ignored these objections.
At his insistence the Government of India appointed a 
codification committee consisting of Bikaner, Alwar, 
Nawanagar, Patiala and Cutch, Sir George Lowndes, the 
Law Member of Council and Robert Holland, theLeputy 
Political Secretary. The committee met first in 
September 1919 to discuss twenty-three points of political 
practice which the princes, in their replies to the govern­
ment's enquiry about treaty infringments, alleged had 
encroached upon their rights and dignity. On this issue, 
however, the princes were unable to have things all their 
own way and a fundamental difference of opinion emerged 
between themselves and the British officials as to the 
procedure they should follow. The origin of this 
difference lay in the contents of a speech made by Alwar 
to the princes' conference in January 1919* He had 
argued that although the states could not claim a position
92. Conference of Ruling Princes, p. 487*
of equality with the British Government, the fact of 
their internal sovereignty meant that their position 
was not one of subordination either. It was therefore 
necewsary that any discussion on codification should be 
accompanied by a mutual definition regarding the relative 
position of the two partners in the relationship "because 
without that we could not decide or discuss the abstract
93principles which shall guide and rule our treaty relations." 
What in fact Alwar was asking for was an authoritative 
definition of paramountcy which would involve the 
Government of India indicating the limits of its rights 
and prerogatives. This was precisely the possibility 
that Chamberlain had vetoed in his correspondence with the 
Government of India on the minorities issue, and not even 
Montagu could contemplate such a procedure.
Accordingly, when Alwar repeated his proposal 
in the codification committee, Lowndes countered by 
suggesting that as political practice was so well 
established and extensive, it would be more useful to 
examine the existing usage and principles underlying it 
in order to ascertain if any of them conflicted with the 
terms of the princes' treaties. Lowndes was prepared to 
concede that the reforms being introduced in British India 
made future political developments uncertain and that 
ultimately it might be equally in the interests of both 
parties to define their mutual positions. As yet, however, 
this contingency had not arisen. The problem was eventually 
solved by a compromise solution, suggested by the Maharao of
93. ibid., p. 366.
Cutch. The committee would immediately concern itself 
with the examination of the twenty-three points of 
political practice, it being understood that this would 
not prejudice resort to Alwar*s "analytical" approach
QZL
should this seem necessary.
The Government of India was quite satisfied 
with the outcome. Four of the twenty-three points were 
successfully dealt with by the committee. ^ The govern­
ment felt that the committee's proceedings had not only 
removed many misunderstandings but had also witnessed a
"marked growth of mutual confidence" between itself and
96the states.J This self-congratulation omitted one vital
consideration: because no attempt had been made to define 
mutual rights and obligations, the princes concerned 
considered it necessary to append their own note to the 
general report of the codification committee. In their 
opinion it was:
94-. GOI. FPD. Secret-Reforms, February 1920, Nos. 1-6, 
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Conference of Ruling Princes and Chiefs to examine 
the question of codification of existing political 
practice, November 1919* The four points were
(1) Tours and visits abroad by Princes, (2) The 
procedure for the examination in Indian States of 
commissions in criminal cases issued by British 
Indian courts, (3) The construction and maintenance 
of telephone lines in Indian States, (A) The 
acquisition of immovable residential property in 
British India by the princes.
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"hardly necessary to emphasize the inviolate 
character of our treaties, sanads and 
engagements. Suffice it to say that the 
treaties between the British Government and 
the Indian States provide the sole test of 
the latter*s rights and the only correct 
standard for judging the obligations of the 
former. It must, however, be added that no 
laches, lapse of time or the growth of any 
practice in which the Princes had no voice 
can be admitted to modify the original 
relations of the States with the British 
Government as deducible from the treaties, 
much less to render these treaties obsolete."^
Clearly these princes did not share the Government of 
India*s satisfaction at the outcome of these negotiations.
V.P. Menon wrote of the position in 1921:
"The paramount power continued to be paramount 
and paramountcy remained as vague and undefined 
as ever."^g
Yet this did not mean, that by 1921, the states were in 
an analogous position to the one they had been in under 
Curzon. On the contrary, the states were now firmly 
established as Britain's principal allies. As Montagu 
had told Chelmsford in March 1918:
"I need not remind you, that after all, we 
owe a greater - or at any rate as great - 
a debt to the Princes than to British India, 
and it is equally incumbent upon us to try 
and satisfy them."^
The inauguration of the Chamber of Princes despite its 
drawbacks, was the clearest indication that the days of 
isolation were over. Moreover, by 1921 a policy of non­
interference was slowly beginning to pervade the Government
97. ibid., Report of the Codification Committee, November
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of India, and it is to this that we shall next turn 
our attention. It is important to recognize, however, 
that over the fundamental issue of paramountcy, the 
process of removing the isolation had left one section 
of these princely allies with a grievance; a grievance 
which their Imperial patron was most unwilling to 
redress. If this situation persisted, it was not 
inconceivable that in the future their effectiveness 
as allies would be subject to serious doubt.
CHAPTER 3-
THE POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE: 1920-1934.
The establishment of the Chamber of Princes was 
not only a major innovation in the evolution of British 
policy towards the states, it also represented a triumph 
for the eloquence and persistence of a select band of 
rulers of medium sized states. Throughout the reform 
discussions the manner in which they had enchanted Montagu 
was indeed remarkable, but it was also rather surprising 
that a liberal Secretary of State should have been able 
to establish such a harmonious rapport with some of India's 
leading autocrats. One of the principal reasons for this 
lay in the hostility they shared towards the bureaucracy 
of the Government of India. At the instigation of Princes 
like Jey Singh of Alwar, Montagu repeatedly protested to 
Chelmsford at the "petty acts of annoyance and interference 
by Political Agents."^" Such complaints were not new to 
the Viceroy: Chamberlain had reported a conversation with
Bikaner in which the latter had complained that some 
political officers were less courteous to the princes than
p
they should be. Chelmsford confessed that he felt some 
concern about the quality of the political service but 
considered that "the longer I am here the more reason I 
find for taking the stories of the Chiefs with no i&ore than 
a grain of salt."^ Montagu, however, was not to be put
1. Montagu to Chelmsford, 4 February and 4 March 1919* 
Montagu Collection, No.3.
2. Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 8 May 1917* Chelmsford 
Collection, No.3*
3. Chelmsford to Montagu, 1 April 1919* Montagu Collection, 
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off and he voiced similar complaints at an interview
4
he held with the Political Secretary, Wood. This
annoyed Chelmsford who replied imploringly: t!Now I do 
earnestly ask you not to accept the tales which you get 
from the Chiefs on the sub^ ject.**^  He reminded Montagu 
of an instance involving Patiala. The latter had 
constantly fulminated against what he considered to be 
unwarranted interference on the part of his Political 
Agent, L.M. Crump. Prom this Chelmsford deduced that 
Patiala would be particularly glad to see the back of 
this official, but when Crump was obliged to take his 
wife on leave to England, Patiala requested that he may 
be allowed to resume his duties as his political agent as 
they had always been the best of friends. Chelmsford 
was irritated and perplexed as he indicated to Montagu:
f,I am left in doubt as to whether to take 
this as one more instance of the incon­
sistency of the human mind, or as a 
reflection on the rest of my Politicals, 
on the assumption that no change of 
Resident could possibly be for the better.”^
Chelmsford*s confusion represented a dilemma for 
the Government of India and its Political Department which 
supervised the states. Despite his uncertainty, the 
Viceroy had at least identified the problem when, with 
reference to Bikaner*s complaint, he had informed Chamberlain 
that rather than the prestige of the princes being lowered
4. Chelmsford to Montagu, 18 June 1919> Montagu 
Collection, Ho.8.
5. ibid.
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in recent years, the exact contrary was in fact nearer 
8the truth. Princes like Alwar, Bikaner and Patiala 
were now beginning to reap the full benefit from the 
freedom which Butler*s policy of non-interference had 
intended for the rulers as a whole. A reversal of roles 
had in fact taken place; whereas in the time of Curzon 
political officers had resorted to every conceivable 
means of petty interference to emphasize their commanding 
position over the ruler3 and their states, by the end of 
the war the rulers, for their part, were prompted almost 
in a spirit of revenge and spite to protest against every 
petty indiscretion they encountered in order to emphasise 
their independence from political officers and to press 
for more. The difficulties of the Government of India 
were further increased by the precedent, established during 
the reform discussions, by which the princes now considered 
it their right to have direct access to the highest 
officials in London, particularly the Secretary of State. 
Montagu positively encouraged this because he believed it 
was the only means of avoiding the influence of political 
officers and ascertaining the real wishes of the princes. 
The opportunities for such contact were greatly increased 
in the post-war period. Bikaner was a frequent visitor to 
Europe in his capacity as an Indian representative at 
Imperial Conferences and the League of Nations. The 
lifting of restrictions on foreign travel meant that there
8. Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 22 June 1917* Chelmsford 
Collection, No.5*
was a continual stream of Indian Princes seeking inter­
views at the India Office. As a purely formal matter 
of etiquette this would have been harmless but the manner 
in which the princes began to clamour for redress of their 
grievances in India was frustrating to the Government of 
India. A trend emerged whereby the princes assiduously 
cultivated their contacts in Britain to whom they would 
extol the virtues of Princely India and relate how they
q
suffered under the iron hand of the Political Department. 
Many were completely taken in by the customary charms and 
graces of the princes; few bothered to enquire into what 
sort of men they really were, how they governed their states 
or what conditions in them were like. Pew realized that 
Patiala1 s extravagant excursions to Europe were leading his 
state to bankruptcy.^ Disbelief was often expressed 
when the authorities in India endeavoured to prove that 
some of the princes behaved quite differently when they 
were in their states as opposed to when they travelled 
abroad. By 1920, with greater freedom in India and 
influence in London, the triumvirate of Alwar, Bikaner 
and Patiala represented a formidable combination which 
even a Curzon would have had difficulty in dealing with.
One of the major recommendations of the Mont ford 
Report had been the institution of direct political 
relations between the individual states and the Government 
of India. In its simplest form direct political relations
9. 001. PPD. No. 488 - Political (Secret), 1927* Note 
by Major A.S. Meek, Political Agent, Mahi Kantha, 
29 January 1927*
10. GOI. FPD. No. 105 - Political, 1929* Financial 
difficulties of the Patiala state.
meant that there should he only one intermediary between
the states and the central government. In 1918 only
the premier states of Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda and Kashmir
corresponded directly with the Government of India through
four first-class Residents.11 In all the other states a
duplication of political control existed. There were
12three agencies under Agents to the Governor-General; 
the Central India agency covering 150 states, the Rajputana 
agency with some 20 states and the Baluchistan agency 
managing two states. Beneath the A.G.G's. came the 
political agents who were assigned to individual groups 
of states within the agencies. The remaining states dealt 
with provincial governments; Madras dealt with 5> Bombay 
with over 350, Bengal with 2, the United Provinces with 3» 
the Punjab with 34** Burma with 52, Bihar and Orissa with 
26, the Central Provinces with 15 and Assam with 16. These 
states were under a political agent or his assistant, who 
in turn was in direct contact with the Political Department 
of each province and each provincial government corresponded 
with the Government of India. The authors of the Joint 
Report concluded that the presence of two intermediaries 
involved a somewhat long and cumbersome process in the 
relationship with the states and recommended that, where 
possible, one of them should be removed.1^ The principle 
of direct relations was welcomed by various princes for a 
significantly different reason; through it they saw a
11. Montford Report, para. 310.
12. Hereafter, A.G.G.
13. Montford Report, para. 310.
means to endorse their independence at the expense of 
the political officers who had been the symbols of their 
previous subordination.
For those states whose relations were with
provincial governments it was not only a question of a
single intermediary, they had also to be transferred to
the Political Department of the Government of India.
Although the Montford Report had given warning that the
political hopes and aspirations of British India "may
14overlap frontier lines like sparks across a street”, 
there was no intention to equate political advance in 
British territory with the same in Indian States. Reforms 
in the latter could not be brought about as a result of 
the constitutional changes in British India and it was 
therefore essential to remove those states from the control 
of provincial governments which would soon embark upon 
the experiment of semi-responsibility known as dyarchy.
When the question of direct relations had been discussed 
at the informal conference in February 1918, the Jam Sahib 
of Nawanagar expressed the view that the Bombay Government 
was less liberal and broad-minded than the Government of 
India and stressed that as relations with the states were 
a central subject it was essential that in the future the 
Government of India should decide all questions affecting 
them.1^ The Chief of Sangli considered that it would 
give the states a better "perspective of Imperial sentiment
14. ibid., para. 157*
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if they were under the Government of India and thought 
that the provincial system encouraged Minsular feeling.
The proposal, however, met with strong opposition 
from the provincial governments concerned. The Lieutenant- 
Governor of the Punjab, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, considered 
that it would be detrimental to the Punjab states if they 
were to sever their political, economic and social connect­
ions with the neighbouring British districts. The fact 
that the revenue and administrative arrangements in the 
most important states were based upon the Punjab model, 
the growth of communications, the long-standing partnership 
in such Joint ventures as the Jirhind Canal, which was one 
of the "pillars of prosperity of the Phulkian states", the 
closer co-operation in excise and police matters which 
had steadily been built up, all warranted the maintenance 
of the status quo.1*7 0*Dwyer considered that with his
previous experience as Resident at Hyderabad and A.G.G. 
in Central India, he himself could assume the mantle of 
A.G.G. for the Punjab states and assured the Government
of India that he would not act in this capacity with either
18his official or popular advisers. The Government of 
India remained unimpressed by these arguments and asked 
the Punjab for a tentative scheme of transfer. The 
Punjab's scheme, earmarking all the salute states and 
those which maintained Imperial Service Troops for transfer, 
were grudgingly forwarded by the Chief Secretary of that
16. ibid.
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government, J.P. Thompson, who was still of a mind to 
question the utility of the proposal:
"The Lieutenant-Governor has done his best to 
advise the Government of India how the 
contemplated change could be carried out.
But the question naturally arises - when there 
is in existence a system which has grown up 
with the Province, is in consonance with its 
history, traditions and geographical features, 
is working smoothly to the satisfaction of the 
Punjab Government and of the Punjab State 
generally - why should Government set up a 
novel organisation that will lack the weight 
which the above considerations give to the 
present system, or in other words why should 
it appoint a separate Agent to the Governor- 
General for the Punjab States, with all the 
administrative difficulties and risks of 
friction that such an appointment will involve, 
when the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is 
already capable of discharging the functions 
of such an Agent smoothly and adequately.
As negotiations proceeded O'Dwyer still hoped that he
POwould become the new A.G.G., but his representations, 
like those of his Chief Secretary, were to no avail. In
November 1920 preparations were made to transfer the 
states of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Bahawalpur, Kapurthala, 
Faridkot, Sirmur, Malerkotla, Mandi, Suket, Chamba, 
Bilaspur and Loharu to the control of an independent A.G.G. 
Only the very minor states, eighteen located in the Simla 
Hills and the two Plains states of Dujana and Pataudi 
were left to the supervision of the Punjab Government.
Objections to the transfer proposals were also 
raised by the Madras Government under Lord Pentland and
19* ibid., No.5» Thompson to Wood, 12 October 1918.
20. ibid., No.10, French to Wood, 2 January 1920.
21. ibid., No.12, Wood to Thompson, 3 November 1920.
and even the Political Department had to admit that, 
prima facie, there was little reason for taking these
op
states into direct relations, Montagu, however, urged
pz
that there should be no unnecessary delay ^ and in May 
1921 the new Governor of Madras, Lord Willingdon, agreed 
that the states of Cochin, Travancore, Pudokkottai,
P4
Banganapelle and Sandur could be transferred#
The stiffest opposition came from Bombay. Here 
a special enquiry had recommended that it would be feasible 
to transfer fourteen of the sixteen first class states and 
eight second class states to the Government of India. The 
Bombay Government objected on the grounds that the transfer 
would be deterimental to the interests of the inhabitants 
since the provincial government was in a better position 
to supervize the administration of the states in the 
interests of their subjects than the central government.
They argued further that the transfer would break the 
close economic and social association which had been built 
up between the majority of the Bombay states and the rest 
of the Presidency.^ The Governor, Lord Lloyd, reasoned 
that the transfer was inexpedient at a time when the 
Chamber of Princes was still in its "earliest infancy’1 
and when the reforms scheme which was only just being 
inaugurated in British India meant that "new forces were 
at work, the effect of which upon the general administration
22. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, July 1921, Nos.24-31*
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of India could not be foreseen or measured* * He 
attributed the orderly administration of the Bombay states 
to the nature of his government’s supervision and was 
convinced on administrative and political grounds that 
it was both unnecessary and undesirable to introduce so 
many and so great changes at the same time* He therefore 
suggested a postponement of the transfer until the Govern­
ment of India had gained further experience of the effect 
of such changes elsewhere.
Lloyd was obviously concerned that the prestige 
of the Bombay Government would be lowered if the states 
were taken away from their sphere,^ but the Government 
of India recommended to Montagu that, in deference to 
Lloyd’s views, the transfer should be postponed for the
pQ
present. This was only partially true, for the issue 
had divided Chelmsford's Government in a most revealing 
manner* W.H. Vincent, the Home Member, was in complete 
agreement with Bombay's arguments. He considered that 
even a partial transfer would lead to an over-centralization 
of authority which would impose an impossible burden on 
the Viceroy with the resultant loss in efficiency being 
detrimental to the states concerned. He doubted whether 
the Government of India would be able to deal with the 
repercussions and developments which the introduction of 
the reforms would produce in the states with the same
26. ibid.
27* Chelmsford to Montagu, 31 March 1920, Montagu 
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No.22, Secret-Internal Despatch No. 8 to S/S,
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sympathy and knowledge of local conditions as the Bombay 
Government.^ The Finance Member, W.M. Hailey frankly 
admitted that:
MIf I were the subject of a Native State, 
or were a Thakur or Jagirdar, I would rather 
on the whole that the States were in relation 
to the neighbouring Local Government than to 
theGovernment of India.... My case would be 
considered in a more independent and judicial 
atmosphere, interested rather in the securing 
of justice than in the maintenance of the 
puncilio of political relations.
However, at the same time, Hailey revealed that this was 
not the principal consideration:
"We cannot safely face a process which would 
contemplate putting the Chiefs on one side.
The rapid growth of democracy will be 
inconvenient enough in many ways in our own 
territory; and it would seem to me wrong, 
in view of our previous relations with the 
Chiefs, to bring them against their wishes 
under the direct control of reformed Local 
Governments •
In other words, Hailey had confirmed that, although the 
arguments of Bombay and the Punjab were valid, the 
necessity of preserving the princes as supporters of the 
Raj outweighed the consideration that the administration 
of the states should be conducted in accordance with the 
interests of their inhabitants. It was for this reason 
that Hailey had agreed to leave O'Dwyer and his government 
in control of the very minor Punjab states:
"The maintenance of large numbers of very 
small States is no gain to the country 
politically or economically: it is no
29. ibid., Minute of dissent by W.H. Vincent, 22 December
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particular source of strength or of 
stability to the Imperial Connection.
The larger States stand on an entirely 
different footing.
Hailey expected that in time the princes would have to 
undergo democratization of their own territories and 
experience a change from autocracy to at least constit­
utional monarchy, but for the present they should be 
allowed breathing space to work out their own destiny 
without having to face immediate contact with the 
popularly controlled executives which were being created 
in the provinces. He concluded that the princes would 
never agree that the Governor of a Province could act as 
an A.G.G. because they would never be convinced that he 
would be entirely independent of the goodwill of his 
ministers.^
Hailey had, in fact, shrewdly anticipated the 
key factor which was to influence the attitudes of the 
princes to British Indian politics for the next twenty 
years. What he did not anticipate was that the progress 
of reforms in the provinces would lead the princes in the 
opposite direction. The princes responded to eachstage 
in the constitutional process by insisting that, if the 
provinces of British India were to be granted greater 
autonomy, then they should receive greater freedom in 
the control of their internal affairs. They justified 
their demands by reference to their treaty rights; but
32. ibid.
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these rights made no mention of Hailey's process of 
democratization. Thus, while British India proceeded 
on the path of democracy, the majority of princes sought 
refuge in the principles of autocracy embodied in their 
treaties. Any inducement there may have been for those 
princes who were supervized by provincial governments to 
keep in step with progress in British India, was lost when 
the process of transferring them to the Government of India 
began. For the Bombay states this was after Lloyd's 
departure in 1923. The states in the Kathiawar, Gutch 
and Palanpur Agencies were transferred to the Government 
of India in October 1924, and became the Western India 
States Agency under an A.G.G. stationed at Rajkot.^
The question of establishing direct relations 
with the states of Central India and Rajputana which had 
not previously been supervized by provincial governments 
was, for this very reason, less immediate, but still of 
equal intricacy. Montagu had argued the case for direct 
relations with these states in 1913 when he had been Under­
secretary of State for India.^ His solution then had 
been to abolish the A.G.G.'s and split the two agencies 
into several subordinate charges under the direct control 
of the Government of India. The respective A.G.G.'s for 
Rajputana and Central India, Sir Elliot Colvin and Sir 
Oswald Bosanquet, saw the proposal as a direct threat to 
their own positions and objected strongly to it. However, 
they also reasoned more sensibly that the withdrawal of
34. GOI. FPD. No. 186 - Political (Secret) 1924-3, 
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political officers would result in instances of gross 
misrule escaping notice and the matter was therefore 
allowed to drop by the Government of India
When Montagu returned to India in 1917 he still 
favoured the abolition of the A.G.G.'s, but the princes, 
particularly those in Rajputana, were undecided. When 
Montagu met them in February 1918 he found that although 
Alwar agreed with him, others like Bikaner, Jaipur and 
Jodhpur wanted to retain the A.G.G. and abolish the 
political agents.^ To accommodate these differences 
the authors of the Joint Report made three alternative 
suggestions for the implementation of direct relations 
in Rajputana and Central India: the abolition of the
political agent and the transfer of his functions to the 
A.G.G.; the abolition of the A.G.G. and the retention of 
the political agent; instead of abolishing either, to 
allow the political agent to communicate direct with the 
Government of India, a copy of the communication being 
sent to the A.G.G.^® Alwar remained committed to the 
second alternative for a very significant reason; upon 
the abolition of the A.G.G. he wanted the appointment of 
non-resident political agents for groups of states. Under 
this scheme the political agents would congregate together 
in Ajmer where, according to Alwar, they would find more 
"society" than in a state. He also claimed that this
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system would minimize any risks of misunderstanding and
obviate the risk of political agents favouring the states
in which they resided.^ Alwar*s charming consideration
for the welfare of political agents could not disguise
the real purpose of his scheme; his aim was to
consolidate the gains he had already made at the expense
of paramountcy by actually removing the instruments of
that paramountcy from the confines of the states. The
princes would then be left with a completely free hand
in the management of their internal affairs. In
announcing this scheme to the Conference of Chiefs in
January 1919» Alwar was also able to reveal that he had
managed to convert Bikaner shortly before the latter left
40for Europe to attend the Paris Peace Conference.
Bikaner*s conversion however, came too late to prevent
preparations being made, upon the basis of the opinion
he had recorded in February 1918, to place his state in
direct relations with the A.G.G. The transfer took place 
41in March 1919, while Bikaner was still in Europe and
upon his return the Rajput expressed his annoyance at
the manner in which the proposal had been carried without
4?his specific concurrence. Consequently he joined forces
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40. ibid.
41. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, July 1921, Nos.13-23,
No. 14, Enclosure No.l, R.E. Holland to Rajputana 
Chiefs, 27 March 1920. The state of Sirohi, which 
ranked fourteenth in the precedence of Rajputana 
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with Alwar to campaign amongst the other Rajputana 
princes in favour of the non-resident scheme.
The activities of Alwar and Bikaner and the 
recommendations of the Montford Report were a source of 
serious concern to the former deputy political secretary 
and now A.G.G. in Rajputana, Robert E. Holland. He was 
hardly enamoured with any of the three alternatives 
suggested in the report; the second would see him lose 
his position, the third would reduce him to the position 
of a mere functionary while both the first and second 
were totally opposed to his political instincts. To 
undermine the work of Alwar and Bikaner he decided to 
ask all the Rajputana princes for their views and used 
the opportunity to impress upon them his opinion that, 
in the interests of preserving the unity of Rajputana, 
the abolition of the A.G.G. was impracticable. According 
to Holland, the correct solution was the elimination of 
the local political agents but even this could only be 
given effect to gradually as the A.G.G. could not 
immediately assume the duties of all the political agents 
in Rajputana; hence the experiment was being tried in 
Bikaner and Sirohi and if it proved successful i/ might 
be extended if local circumstances proved favourable.^
The replies received by Holland were interesting 
in showing that at this stage only three states, Alwar, 
Bikaner and Banswana wanted the abolition of the A.G.G., 
while the majority of the remainder not only expressed
43. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, July 1921, Nos.13-23,
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a clear preference for the retention of the A.G.G., but
also admitted that there were good reasons for keeping the
44-local political agent as well. With this evidence 
Holland could become more precise in his reasons for 
wishing to preserve the existing status quo. His 
arguments were not only a commentary on the wishes of 
the princes but also a reflection upon the implications 
of the policy of non-interference 5 a policy to which 
Holland could never reconcile himself. There was a 
tendency to attach too much weight to the views of those 
princes who ”owing to their better knowledge of the English 
language and experience of public life command a hearing 
in the Conference of Princes and too little to those who, 
though they did not play so prominent a part in public, 
wield as great if not a greater influence in Rajputana.”
The rulers of Udaipur, Dholpur, Jodhpur and Kotah, who 
were opposed to the abolition of the A.G.G., were as 
much entitled to consideration as those of Alwar and 
Bikaner and the impression was being created that ”as 
in the politics of British India, attention will only be 
paid to the wishes of Princes who agitate.” Alwar and 
Bikaner were obviously influenced by ”overpateraal 
methods” adopted in the past. That they should strive 
to prevent a repetition of this was natural, but their 
manner of so doing had very grave implications:
”There are plain indications that some Darbars 
incline to the theory that political officers 
ought to be metamorphosed into diplomatic 
agents, the change typifying the purely 
reciprocal nature of the bond which unites 
the States with the Crown, and illustrating
44. ibid., No.14, Holland to Wood, 13 May 1920.
the Sovereign character of the Princes' 
powers. If the uniformity now asked for 
were granted, the change would, by weakening 
the political officer, tend to aggrandize the 
State vis a vis the Government of India.”
Furthermore, Holland believed there were dangers 
inherent in the policy of non-interference. There was 
a general trend of apprehension among the jagirdars of 
Rajputana that this policy might leave them to the 
“unfettered caprice” of their rulers. There was no 
established public opinion or any effective checks on 
the actions of a ruling prince. Holland also drew 
attention to the fact that the Rajput states differed 
both in origin and political constitution from the great 
majority of states in other parts of India, in that the 
nobles of the states claimed to be “co-partners with the 
rulers in their right of dominion over the soil and to 
the fruits of it.” The frequent state of tension that 
existed between the rulers and the nobility, particularly 
of the older States, meant that the Government of India 
had a particular obligation to see that, as a result of 
the security conferred upon the rulers by British protection 
the status of the great nobles did not deteriorate. Holland 
also had the exaggerated notion that measures of the type 
advocated by Alwar and Bikaner would enable the princes 
to arm their states with modern weapons, in which case 
any effective opposition to their authority in future 
would be practically impossible. If this synchronized 
with the withdrawal of political officers or a further 
diminution of the authority of the Paramount Power, public 
apprehension would inevitably increase. Therefore great
caution was required in introducing any changes which 
might have the effect of converting political officers 
into "postal agents".^
Holland's arguments received additional support 
from Hailey, who commented that Bikaner had "for some 
time considered that he occupies a position in which it 
is not consonant with his dignity to have relations with 
anyone below the rank of Governor-General". He agreed 
that the "tendency of the modern Indian Chief is to assume 
a position of autocracy which altogether neglects the 
historical basis on which, in Rajputana at all events, 
his personal position rests", and felt that the movement 
for the abolition of the A.G.G. was in part due to a 
belief held by the princes that they would have a clearer 
field in dealing in an arbitrary manner with their Thakurs
/ig
and Talhqdars. The Government of India therefore decided
to recommend to the Secretary of State that, in view of
the wishes of the majority of Rajputana princes, the status
47quo would have to be maintained for the present. 1 It was 
no surprise that Montagu was not prepared to accept this.
He felt it was a direct violation of the recommendations 
of the Joint Report and suspected that there was a 
conspiracy on the part of political officers to sabotage 
them. He frankly disbelieved Holland's analysis and 
commented naively to Chelmsford: "Are you aware that some
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33737 2 September 1920.
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of the Princes, such as Alwar and Bikaner, deny the very
] l Q
existence of this majority as real?" He insisted that
the Viceroy should use the first available opportunity to
personally ascertain the "real wishes" of the princes,
Chelmsford saw no reason to doubt Holland’s word, but he
was never able to undertake the proposed enquiry because
Alwar and Bikaner were now to get unexpected assistance
for their case from the least likely quarter - the
Government of India itself.
By 1922 the consequences of the dislocation
which the Great War had imposed upon India’s finances
were becoming increasingly acute. The Government of
India budget for 1922-23 showed a revenue deficit of
Rs. 9>16,28,000. This was the fifth of a succession of
deficits amounting in aggregate to about Rs. 100 crores
and it was anticipated that the deficit for 1922 could
work out at a figure considerably higher than the budget
estimate. Immediate steps, therefore, had to be taken
4Qto balance the budget. 7 The Poreign and Political
Department were asked to make cuts in their establishments
and also to institute enquiries into whether it was
necessary to maintain all the subordinate agencies in
50Central India and Rajputana.
Consequently in June 1922, Holland and his 
counterpart in Central India, Colonel Denys Brooke Blakeway, 
were asked to consider the possibility of dividing Rajputana
48. ibid., p.7., S/S to Viceroy, telg., 23 December 1920.
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and Central India into five units along the following 
lines:
(1) A first class appointment for Western Rajputana 
with up to three assistants,
(2) A second class appointment for Eastern 
Rajputana with one assistant,
(3) A second class appointment for Bundelkhand 
and Baghelkhand with one assistant,
(4) A second class appointment for Gwalior and 
Bhopal with one assistant,
(5) A second [or possibly firs€} class appointment 
for the rest of Central India with two assistants.'
It was estimated that such an arrangement would effect
an annual saving of Rs. 1,34-*000 in salaries of gazetted
officers alone, while it would be possible to reduce the
51cadre of the Political Department by eight officers.^
The Justification given by the Political 
Department for these proposals was not only economic.
They would also enable the principle of direct relations 
to be implemented and conform with official policy towards 
the states. In their interpretation of that policy, the 
Political Department was clearly at variance with some of 
the more experienced officers serving in the states. 
Holland and Blakeway were informed that:
"Modem conditions of publicity and political 
organization render it unlikely, however, that 
the withdrawal of local officers will result 
in instances of gross misrule escaping notice,
51. GOI. FPD. No. 226 - Political (Secret), 1924-25*
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while their presence is the less necessary 
by reason of the inclination of the Government 
of India to interfere less and less with the 
internal affairs of the States.
It was too late in the day to expect Holland to readily 
accept this thesis; his world was that of the supervisor, 
not that of the distant and casual onlooker. He was 
particularly at pains to point out that he stood by the 
arguments he had already made for preserving Rajputana 
and its political establishment intact, and that he was 
only prepared to consider the proposals in the interests 
of economy, not because of any Mnew political factors”. ^  
He was also alarmed at what he considered would be the 
consequences for Rajputana of amalgamating the existing 
seven agencies, supervized by an A.G.G. into only two, and 
the reduction of the political establishment from eleven 
officers to six.^ Although these changes would afford 
an annual saving of Es. 75*528, Holland Judged that they 
would result in ”the occurrence of grave disorders, the 
settlement of which will be a far more costly business 
than the maintenance of establishments on their present 
footing.” Not only was there a possibility of grave 
misrule escaping notice “but also the greatest danger that
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for the Southern Rajputana states; a political 
agent for Haraoti and Tonk, and a political agent 
for Kotahand Jhalawar.
agitators from British India, working insidiously among 
the people, will exploit their grievances, real or 
imaginary and estrange them from their Rulers, with the 
result of widespread disturbances which can only be 
quelled by our intervention.1 Moreover, whether or not 
government interfered in internal affairs less and less, 
it still had an obligation to intervene to restore law 
and order if the stability of the administration was 
threatened: ftA policy of non-interference may lessen
temporarily the work of political officers but, on the 
other hand, the withdrawal of the personal influence of 
the political officer and the trend of political affairs 
in British India, are likely to enhance the administrative 
difficulties of the Darbars and consequently to multiply 
the occasions on which they will need the advice and 
assistance of the political officer
Holland was obviously conscious of the 
restrictions which the changes would impose upon his own 
authority, but in the case of Udaipur he had substantial 
evidence to support his arguments. In 1903 the A.G.G. 
in Rajputana, Sir Arthur Martinade, had observed of the 
Maharana of Udaipur: "As a Ruling Chief in the twentieth
century of our era his administration and his qualific­
ations leave much to be desired." The Maharana was 
"rigidly conservative, intensely suspicious and extremely 
sensitive to the least encroachment on his hereditary rights 
and dignity." He had no advantages in the shape of early
55. ibid.
training or education and with these characteristics, 
Martinade concluded, "the difficulty of inducing him to 
move in the direction of modern progress and reform will 
he a d m i t t e d . C u r z o n ' s  Government had suggested that 
an improvement would he the introduction of an Executive 
Council, hut in view of the fact that the Maharana was 
not unpopular and that petitions from his subjects were 
rare, no strong pressure had been exerted in this 
direction. Eighteen years later Holland was able to 
echo his predecessor :
"The administration of His Highness the 
Maharana is one of the worst in Rajputana, 
because his Highness will grant no 
delegation of his powers to any individual 
and insists on concentrating all authority 
in his own hands.
The situation now, however, was fundamentally different 
because disaffection existed and there were indications 
of sympathy with the non-co-operation movement in British 
India. Four main causes of unrest were cited; the 
despotic and autocratic methods of the Maharana, corruption 
among subordinate officials, the tardiness of the admini­
strative machinery and the complete inadequacy of the 
Judicial system.^* The relationship between ruler and 
nobility was far from satisfactory. The Maharana had 
endeavoured to curtail their Judicial powers, a much 
needed reform in itself, but he had not acted with the 
intention of establishing a reformed and uniform Judiciary,
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rather as a means to extend his autocratic control.
This the British could not tolerate because they considered 
that without the co-operation of the nobility every scheme 
of internal reform, education, justice, police, irrigation 
and sanitation would be only partial and unsuccessful.
Above all, as long as serious difficulties existed between 
a ruler and his nobles "the state, as a unit in alliance 
with the British Government, is practically valueless."^
A serious agrarian problem had arisen within 
the state. In the districts of Bijolian, Parsoli, Begun 
and Basi, revenue had been withheld and attempts to collect 
it or to enforce official orders were met with threats of 
violence. In all four the villagers had refused to admit 
the direct authority of their jagirdars and independent 
tribunals had been established to decide civil, revenue 
and criminal cases. Large weekly meetings were held and 
all who attended were armed with lathis. Prom October to 
December 1921 volunteers had been posted in each village 
to disseminate notices of meetings and to refuse officials 
entry to the villages. These displays, although seemingly 
much more militant, resembled the campaign of non-co- 
operation which was being conducted across the border in 
British India and in December 1921 it was estimated that 
250 villagers visited Ahmedabad to attend the session of 
the Indian National Congress. This so alarmed the 
jagirdars that one, the Rao of Bijolian, even wrote to 
the Resident in Udaipur, W.H.J. Wilkinson, asking whether 
they should send representatives to the Congress to
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counteract the influence of the agitators, Wilkinson
was quick to advise against this as it would amount to
a recognition that the Congress could interfere in the
60internal affairs of the States,
The situation was restored when the Maharana
was obliged to delegate his powers to his son, the 
61Maharaj Kumar, but the case of Udaipur remains one of 
the mostvivid illustrations of the consequences of the 
non-interference policy. The problem had been identified 
since 1903 but no attempt had been made to rectify it 
despite the fact that it was common knowledge that the 
situation could only become worse as the Maharana grew 
older. Instead, government policy had accorded to that 
laid down in the Political Department Manual of judging 
each case on its merits and refraining from intervention 
until misrule had reached a pitch which violated "the 
elementary laws of civilization.H In practice this now 
proved to be the stage when the subjects of the state were 
on the verge of open rebellion and by the time the govern­
ment chose to interfere in Udaipur the state was virtually 
beyond redemption. Wilkinson was in no doubt as to where 
the blame lays
"It is commonly said in Mewar that the 
administration took a steep downward curve 
from the time when Political fficers 
received instructions to leave the Darbars 
to their own devices, and in effect to 
refrain even from enquiries as to what was 
going on within the State. The news spread 
among the officials who were stimulated to
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of powers by His Highness the Maharana to his son the 
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fresla opposition. The nobles and 
cultivators alike lost their only hope of 
protection, and became easier victims ...
The people, knowing the Resident's 
impotence, have been less and less inclined 
to acquaint him with their troubles, and he 
each year becomes less well informed of the 
condition of the State and its inhabitants.
For Holland, this was ample justification to oppose the 
new amalgamation proposals; the policy of non-interference 
was bad enough but to abolish five appointments would be 
sheer folly. He therefore suggested as "a less calamitous 
alternative1 the creation of separate political groups.
He considered that the Eastern Rajputana agency could be 
more easily "lopped off" since the four states of Alwar, 
Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli were in easy rail connection. 
To these he would add Kotah, Jhalawar and Jaipur and convert 
these seven states into a second-class Residency with 
headquarters at Jaipur. He estimated that this would 
secure an annual saving of Rs. 18,264. Holland wanted 
to draw the line here, but if the Government of India felt 
a greater saving was required, he suggested the creation of 
a group of the Southern states under a second-class 
Resident based at Udaipur. This would provide an additional 
saving of Rs. 15,864. Holland was obviously very reluctant 
to make these suggestions even though they fell well short, 
in terms of money saved, of those of the Political Depart­
ment. The only advantage he could see in them was that 
they maintained the "paramount necessity" of preserving
resident political officers in the premier states of
65Udaipur, Jaipur and Jodhpur.
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In Central India, Blakeway shared Holland’s
concern about the amalgamation proposals* In deference
to the seniority of Gwalior, that state had been accorded
the status of a separate Residency in July 1920, but that
was as far as the authorities in Central India wished to 
64-go* The new proposals now meant that the existing six 
agencies, supervized by an A*G*G*, would be amalgamated 
into three, and the political establishment reduced from 
ten officers to s e v e n . ^  Blakeway was disturbed because 
he felt that any real advance on the part of the princes 
of Central India towards a more liberal and democratic 
conception of the theory of government could only be 
achieved through the persuasion and arguments of the 
political officers in touch with them. Like Holland, he 
was adamant that the position of the A*G.G. could not be 
abolished and expressed his own concern at the effect 
which the changes would have on the future cadre of the 
political service:
"The number of junior posts where a young 
officer can obtain first hand experience 
of Indian States is already lamentably small 
and the abolition of so many Political Agencies 
would make it impossible for all but a very 
small number of officers to obtain such 
experience even at a later stage of their 
service."gg
Blakeway also clearly illustrated where he differed from
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official thinking; the latter considered that a policy 
of non-interference would induce the states to be more 
amenable in performing their role as Imperial allies 
while Blakeway reasoned that some measure of control 
was necessary to ensure that they were capable of 
fulfilling that role;
"Ordered development in the administrative 
system of the States is, however, a great 
political desideratum. Their fortunes are 
bound up with ours. Their strength is our 
strength; their weakness ours. Misgovernment 
allied with corruption and incompetence is 
calculated not so much to furnish an object 
lesson of the benefits of British rule as a 
handle for our enemies* accusation that this 
state of affairs is due to our approval and 
connivance. The seditious movement of the 
last few years has fortunately not made much 
headway amongst the conservative peoples of 
Central India, but agitation has not left 
them entirely unaffected ... In view of the 
general political situation throughout India 
it is hardly prudent to dispense with the 
best agency we possess for furthering the 
cause of reform in Central India and avoiding 
the troubles which may be anticipated sooner 
or later between democracy and unrestrained 
absolutism.
Moreover Blakeway believed that there were serious practical 
objections to the proposed amalgamations in Central India. 
The location of agency headquarters would be vital if 
Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand were amalgamated. There 
were two alternatives; Nowgong in the former or Sutna in 
the latter. Nowgong would probably be chosen because 
Bundelkhand was the change with the heaviest work, but 
this would deprive the state of Rewa in Baghelkhand of a 
political officer. Rewa was 132 miles by road from Nowgong 
and three unbridged rivers had to be crossed. The rail
67. ibid.
journey took sixteen hours to which had to be added a 
further road journey of 31 miles over two unbridged 
rivers at one end and twenty miles at the other. The 
condition of Rewa itself was far from satisfactory; in 
1919 Bosanquet had expressed the view that "the State and 
its people are so backward in every respect that it will 
take years of uninterrupted effort to raise its admini­
stration to the level of ordinary efficiency even 
according to the standards of other States. It remains 
to be seen, too, whether the young Maharaja when he gets 
his powers will choose the path of progress." Blakeway 
therefore considered that in the interests of Rewa alone, 
this particular amalgamation was premature. Mutual 
jealousy and pride also made it improbable that Gwalior 
and Bhopal would ever agree to form a joint residency. 
Accordingly, as Holland had done, Blakeway framed his own 
alternatives; the Malwa and Southern states should be 
amalgamated and Bhopal should amalgamate with the two 
Dewas states. This would effect an annual saving of 
Rs. 1,772, as compared with Rs. 3*022 in the Political 
Department*s proposal, but it would enable one political
6 Q
officer and his establishment to be retained. J
At the beginning of 1923* before a decision 
had been reached upon either Holland's or Blakeway*s 
alternatives, Alwar and Bikaner chose this critical 
juncture to renew their attack upon the position of 
the A.G.G. The Viceroy, Lord Reading, who had succeeded 
Chelmsford in April 1921, was confronted with a deputation
68. ibid.
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of Rajputana princes consisting of Alwar, Bikaner,
Bharatpur, Dholpur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur at Delhi on
7 February 1923 during the Chamber of Princes session
of that month. The deputation was totally manipulated
by Alwar and Bikaner; from the records on file of the
meeting with Reading, they were the only two princes who
actually said anything. Alwar reiterated his idea of
local political officers for groups of states, the
salient feature of which was that they should reside in
neighbouring British districts. Together with Bikaner,
he urged that Ajmer could replace Jodhpur for the Western
Rajputana states, Agra could replace Bharatpur for the
Eastern states, the political agent for Haraoti and Tonk
could be located at Deoli, that of Jaipur and Kishengarh
70at Ajmer and that of Udaipur at Neemuch. These
proposals now received the unanimous support of all the 
princes at the meeting. In the opinion of the Political 
Department this was not surprising "since it is natural 
that the masterful Bikaner and the subtle Alwar should 
have carried their less clever brethren along with them, 
especially when the reward held up before them was greater 
freedom from interference by Government and a raised 
status."'*1 An anxious Holland, however, urged Reading 
to make a definite pronouncement that the status quo 
would be preserved as even "those Princes who are most 
firmly in favour of the maintenance of things as
70. GOI. FPD. No.30 - Political, 1923* Proceedings of 
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they are may waiver if they think that the tide is 
really going to turn against them;"^
A final decision was eventually reached upon 
the basis of an important note written by the new 
Political Secretary, John P. Thompson, formerly Chief 
Secretary to the Punjab Government, who had succeeded 
Wood in March 1922. According to Thompson three 
fundamental questions were at issue: whether any
definite promise had been given as regards the principle 
of a single intermediary, the general utility of the 
A.G.G. and whether the same official increased the 
possibility of undue interference. On the first question, 
he correctly concluded that no such pledge had been given. 
Not only had the recommendations of the Joint Report 
envisaged the retention of both the A.G.G. and the 
political agents, but it had also added the important 
phrase that direct political relations could only be 
introduced "wherever possible".7^ As regards the second, 
Thompson alluded to a point which he considered had been 
given less prominence in the discussions than it deserved. 
The Political branch of the Foreign and Political Depart­
ment was unique in one respect. In all the other 
government departments, the Viceroy not only had a Member 
of Council and Secretary to advise him, but all important 
cases came up before his Council. On the Foreign side of 
the Political Department, although there was no Member of
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Council, the importance of international policy and 
frontier questions made it inevitable that most important 
cases would come up before the Viceroy in Council. On 
the Political side, however, only exceptional cases came 
up before the Council and the Political Secretary was the 
Viceroy’s only adviser. Thompson considered that the 
A.G.G. functioned as a valuable link in the government's 
information and advisory service and concluded therefore 
that, in this respect, the balance of argument now lay in 
favour of Holland. On the final point, Thompson had to 
agree that both Colvin and Holland, who between them had 
held the post of A.G.G. in Rajputana with short intervals 
since 1905, had a reputation of being prone to interfere 
and that in some cases they had gone too far, but at the 
same time:
"no Agent to the Governor-General who did his 
duty could possibly come up to the progressive 
Princes' ideal of non-interference. For the 
rest, interference is largely a matter of 
temperament. Some men cannot resist the 
natural instinct to protest when they see 
things going wrong; others can and do.
Possibly among successful officials there
are more of the former type than of the latter."
He concluded that the presence of the A.G.G. probably did
lead to a slightly greater degree of interference, but
felt that the knowledge of his existence on the whole
74-benefited both the princes and their subjects.r
Thompson's almost casual appraisal of this 
distinction between political officers was in fact the 
very essence of the policy of non-interference. It is
74-. GOI. FPD. No.30 - Political, 1923* Thompson's note, 
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recognized that the immediate retort to the theory that 
the proposals for amalgamations and service cuts would 
he detrimental to the interests of the states is that 
this would make no difference if, in any case, the 
political officers were pursuing a policy of non-inter­
ference. However, as Thompson recognized, interference 
was largely a question of temperament, which was entirely 
dependent upon the individual political officer. Whether 
or not an individual would interfere depended upon his 
political instincts which had been moulded by the length 
of time he had spent as a political officer, the number 
and different types of states that he had served in and 
the problems that had confronted him. There could be 
no set rules upon such a personal matter but the fact 
remains, as Thompson again recognised, that those who made 
it their business to know everything about their states 
often made more successful political officers than those 
who did not, and while there would always be some of the 
former, the nature of the non-interference policy was 
producing more of the latter.
On the issue of retaining the A.G.G.'s, Thompson's 
report had therefore vindicated the arguments of Holland 
and Blakeway. However, the amalgamations still remained.
In Rajputana, much to the delight of Holland, preparations 
to create a second-class Residency for the Eastern states 
had to be suspended in November 1926 owing to disagreement 
among the states concerned over the location of a suitable 
headquarters. The Government of India suggested the
existing establishment at Bharatpur, but the latter 
protested on the grounds that it would have to finance 
the new facilities that would be required. Of the 
remaining states only Jhalawar seemed satisfied with 
Bharatpur, Alwar, Kotah and Karauli all favoured Agra.^ 
The suspension of the proposal infuriated Jey Singh of 
Alwar who, after six years of negotiating and scheming, 
still found himself confronted by two intermediaries.
In an effort to remedy this he made a complete volte 
face and asked to be placed in direct relations with the 
A.G.G. To rub salt further into the wound, his claim 
was rejected on the grounds that his status in Rajputana 
did not warrant this and that it would encourage similar 
requests from other princes.^ Central India was not so 
fortunate. Upon memorials from the two Dewas states 
their proposed merger with Bhopal was shelved but the 
amalgamation of the Malwa and Southern agencies was 
implemented in May 1925* The combined agency now 
consisted of 10 salute states and 34 minor and guaranteed 
estates with a population of 983*953 and an area of 8,150 
square miles, all of which would come under the super­
vision of a single political officer.^7
The first phase of amalgamations and establish­
ment cuts were not as drastic as originally contemplated
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but the interplay of personalities and policies had 
been revealing. Economic difficulties and princely 
pressure had combined to pose a grave threat to the 
existence of the instruments of British paramountcy 
in the states. That these instruments had survived 
relatively intact by 1926 was largely due to the fact 
that in seeking complete independence Alwar and Bikaner 
had pushed their demands too high. In retrospect, 
however, it is also clear that warnings about the 
implications of amalgamations and establishment cuts 
had been approached in the wrong way. These warnings 
had come from Holland and Blakeway, yet one must consider 
whose interests they claimed to be representing. They 
had argued for the preservation of the status quo bythe 
retention of both the A.G.G. and the local political agent, 
and had considered that, if at all, the latter should be 
abolished. The Political Department had accepted this 
view but again the efficacy of their decision must be 
questioned. If the detection of misrule and the ability 
to give advice were the primary functions of a political 
establishment surely these functions could be best 
performed by the political agent who was the man on the 
spot. Holland and Blakeway had in fact argued very much 
from the point of view of their own interests because 
they had objected to a process which they envisaged would 
result in individual princes rising to a higher status 
than they possessed. Although the ideal solution would 
have been to maintain both officials, if one had to be 
removed it should have been the A.G.G. who could have been
transferred along the lines of Reading*s compromise
solution. The Viceroy considered that a great deal had
been done to stimulate the princes* desire for direct
relations but he had also been impressed with Thompson*s
comments upon the utility of the A.G.G. Consequently
he suggested that an officer with specialist knowledge
of Rajputana should be added to the secretariat of the
Political Department.^® His proposal was never
seriously entertained because Holland was able to seal
his already formidable battery of arguments with the
information, supplied by the Regent of Jodhpur, Sir
Sukhedo Pershad, that what Alwar and Bikaner really wanted,
was to get a member of the Diplomatic Service substituted
for the Political Secretary, the underlying aim being to
gain recognition of the princes as allies "pure and simple*'
79with no hint of subordination.* J As a result Reading was 
obliged to submit to the view that the one official who 
possessed really intimate knowledge of local grievances 
within the states should become the target for future 
retrenchment proposals. Even Thompson had admitted that 
given a choice he would prefer the political agent "as a 
protector of the interests of the subjects of the states," 
but he had refrained from advocating this because he 
considered that the A.G.G. was in a position to speak with 
more authority to the rulers than the less experienced
on
local officers. This argument, however, took no account
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of the effect which the amalgamations would have upon 
the remaining political agents and it was their position 
which would subsequently give cause for the gravest 
concern. The amount of work ejected of an officer 
who was appointed political agent for an amalgamated 
change like that of the Malwa and Southern states would 
now be double that to which he had been accustomed. Here 
in embryo was one of the major problems which would 
confront British policy ten years later when, in an 
effort to stem the tide of nationalist pressure directed 
from British India, the need for internal reforms in the 
states would be all important: there were too many states
in too backward a condition and not enough political 
agents to supervise them.
There was one state to whom the policy of non­
interference could never be said to apply and it is 
initially surprising to learn that this was Hyderabad, 
the largest and most important of them all. In Hyderabad, 
intervention was the rule rather than the exception; the 
precedent had been established over the past 150 years 
with British intervention repeating itself at regular 
intervals of fifteen or twenty years. On each occasion, 
the reasons for such intervention, either conflict between 
the Ruler and his Chief Minister 0/ between the Ruler and 
Resident and Viceroy, had been remarkably similar. The 
British attributed this perpetual state of friction to 
the person of the Nizam. They had never succeeded in 
establishing cordial relations with Hyderabad because of 
what they considered to be the idiosyncracies of successive
generations of Nizams. Curzon described the Nizam of
bis generation as being "utterly ignorant of, and
completely indifferent to, the administration of his
State or the welfare of his people" who cared only "for
the gratification of his personal whims and desires,
and is surrounded by a horde of venal scribes and
81bloodsuckers of the worst description." Three years
before partition, the Political Adviser, F.V. Wylie,
wrote that the last Nizam -"must surely be the most
freakish and disreputable person to be at this date
placed in a position of authority over some 16 millions
ftpof his fellow human beings." These were not purely
personal prejudices for it was true that, with the
exception of the first Nizam and founder of the Osmania
dynasty, Asaf Jah, there was not one really successful
Nizam who emerged with any credit as an administrator.
These opinions, however, do not explain the reverse side
of the coin; the mistrust with which successive Nizams
83viewed the British. For this, as Wylie admitted, y 
the paramount power had itself been responsible through 
the disgraceful conduct of early British officers in 
Hyderabad. This was the sordid affair involving the 
banking firm of "William Palmer and Company" which was 
established in Hyderabad in 1819 ostensibly to make loans 
to the Nizam to help him avoid financial disaster, but the 
exorbitant rates of interest charged and the methods
81. Curzon to Hamilton, 28 December 1899* Curzon 
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employed in their collection served only to worsen the
finances of the state and reduce the peasantry to
conditions of abject poverty. The crucial point for
future Anglo-Hyderabad relations was the discovery that
the Resident, Charles Russell, in collusion with the
dubious but cunning Chief Minister, ChanduLal, not only
acquiesced in, but drew handsome profit from these under-
84hand transactions. Whatever good intentions the 
British may subsequently have had, they could never 
remove the stigma of this episode from the minds of 
successive Nizams. In 1899 the Secretary of State,
Lord Hamilton, informed Curzon that it was unfortunate 
that "several of the Europeans who have been in Hyderabad 
have so conducted themselves and so done the Nizam that 
he has a natural detestation of the race."®^ Future 
interference was henceforth viewed with a mixture of 
suspicion and resentment and any Chief Minister who showed 
signs of becoming too independent of his master was either 
summarily dismissed or subjected to such a campaign of 
intrigue and abuse that he would be forced to resign.
Of more serious concern to the British was that although 
the manner in which the Nizams displayed their hostility 
increased the problems for the administration in Hyderabad, 
they were denied the one sure means of retrieving the 
situation. In 1900 the perennial financial difficulties 
of the state led Curzon to believe that "some fine day we
84. For details of this period, see E. Thompson, The 
Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe, London* 1937* 
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shall have to step in and cleanse this Augean stable of 
the "premier Mahomedan State in India". Hamilton had 
to agree that Hyderabad was a "sink of iniquity" but 
cautioned the Viceroy:
"The deposition of the Nizam would be so 
serious a matter that I would tolerate a 
good deal of oppression and maladministration 
before I had recourse to an act which would 
unquestionably frighten all the ruling 
princes.
The last Nizam of the Osmania dynasty, Mir Osman 
Ali Khan, succeeded in 1901 and although twenty-five at 
his accession he knew nothing even about his own 
dominions outside the walls of King Kothi, his palace 
in Hyderabad. He was intensely suspicious and jealous 
and possessed an insatiable appetite for accumulating 
and hoarding riches in the form of money and jewellery.
In November 1914, in accordance with Hyderabad tradition, 
he engineered the resignation of his popular Chief Minister 
Salar Jang, and took it upon himself to be his own minister 
Imperial necessity had dictated Hardinge's acquiescence in 
this ill-advised decision, for upon Turkey's entry into 
the First World War, the Nizam issued a manifesto declaring 
that the Indian Muslims should remain loyal to the allied 
cause. This won for the Nizam the title of "His Exalted 
Highness" and confirmation of the traditional appellation 
of "Faithfull Ally of the British Government". His 
gesture of friendship, at best only superficial, was
86. Curzon to Hamilton, 1 April 1900, Curzon Collection, 
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certainly short-lived and by the end of the war the 
Nizam had renewed Hyderabad's anti-British bias. In 
1918, largely at the instigation of a Bombay journalist, 
Abdullah Khan Khasmandi, who had previously been expelled 
from Hyderabad and was now attempting to regain the 
favour of his former patron, the Nizam was persuaded that 
being known as "His Exalted Highness" was both meaningless 
and insufficient and that instead he should enjoy the title 
of "king". Suitably flattered, the Nizam became all that 
more desirous of replacing British and Hindu officials in 
his administration by Muslims and he ordered the dismissal 
of two British officers who held the key posts of Revenue 
and Police in Hyderabad. Montagu reminded Chelmsford 
that he had always "feared something of this kind because 
of the reverence which you and your Government felt it 
necessary to show the Nizam, not on his personal merits, 
not because of his short lineage, but having regard to the 
position which he holds among Muhammadans ...", and doubted 
whether the Resident, Stuart Eraser, was the right man to 
deal with a person "so liable to become swollen headed
go
and dangerous from stupid vanity". Theposition of the 
Resident at Hyderabad, although the leading appointment 
in the political service, was hardly an enviable one and 
Montagu's concern at the attitude which Fraser had adopted 
during his term of office from 1914 to 1919 was not the 
first time such misgivings had been expressed. In May 
1900, at the time of the financial crisis in Hyderabad,
88. Montagu to Chelmsford, 7 November 1918, Montagu 
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Hamilton in agreeing with Ourzon that the then Resident, T.J.C. 
Plowden, was quite unsuited to the work, had added his 
own reflection that "very few of our officers who are 
quartered there contrive to leave it with as good a 
reputation as they had when they went t h e r e F o r  
his part, Chelmsford chose the occasion of the Nizam*s 
impertinence to deliver a vigorous indictment of the 
administration in Hyderabad, the result of which was 
that in June 1920 the Nizam was obliged to accept an 
Executive Council of between five and seven members with 
a Chief Minister or President who was to be given the 
fullest powers of control.
From the beginning the experiment was doomed to 
failure for two basic reasons; the continued impotency 
of the Residency and the machinations of the Nizam. The 
first was itself largely due to the intransigence of the 
Nizam who adopted a policy of isolating himself as far 
as possible from the Residency and opposition toanything 
in the nature of even friendly advice. In March 1922,
Stuart Knox who was deputizing for Sir Lennox Russell as 
Resident in Hyderabad, complained that he had not even 
been allowed a confidential conversation of five minutes 
with the Nizam.^ He received no help from the Political 
Department who informed him that the Nizam was not obliged 
to speak to him and that "if a Prince chooses to bury 
himself in his palace the Political Agent cannot dig him
89. Hamilton to Curzon, 10 May 1900, Curzon Collection, No.159*
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out merely for the purpose of cultivating his acquaintance, 
and however tactful and untiring he may he in his efforts, 
they will not always he crowned with s u c c e s s . " ^  This 
ridiculous state of affairs persisted until 1925 when the 
more forthright Sir William Barton was appointed Resident 
and in December of that year he produced evidence that 
conditions in Hyderabad had seriously and rapidly deterior­
ated. Corruption and oppression ware now rampant and 
manifested in the Nizam*s abuse of the practice of giving 
nazars. ^ Appointments were now sold to the highest 
bidder; the Director-General of Police was compelled to 
pay Rs. 4-0,000 for his continuance in office as a nazar 
of that amount had been offered by someone with designs 
on his position. The receipt of nazars had poisoned 
every aspect of public life: "The Revenue Department is
honeycombed with corruption: Qustoms officials are a
byword for rapacity: the Police are more concerned to
line their pockets than to suppress crime." The heaviest 
demands were made upon the nobility who were constantly 
plagued by fear of their families being ruined by the 
seizure of their estates upon their death. The nobles 
in their turn, were forced to make heavier demands on the 
peasantry, the majority of which was Hindu, in order to 
meet the exactions. The Nizam had also succeeded in
92. ibid., Thompson to Knox, 31 May 1922.
93* Nazars were a form of tribute traditionally
presented to a ruler to signify the loyalty of 
the donor. Petitioners asking for favours at 
court, the Nizam*s birthday celebrations, or 
when the Nizam visited the districts were the 
occasions for presenting nazars.
undermining the influence of the Council. The first 
President, Sir Ali Imam, although he had played a major 
role in enabling the Nizam to thwart the Residency, soon 
aroused the jealousy of his master and, as a result of 
a deliberate campaign against him in the press, he was 
forced to resign in September 1922. From mid 1923 to 
1925 9 the post had been held by a Paigji noble with no 
administrative capacity, Nawab Wali-ud-Daula, while two 
other Paigh nobles on the Council owed their positions 
to the Nizam’s attempt to induce them to refrain from 
pressing their claims to their estates.^ Basically
the Council functioned as "mere constitutional zasss- J 
flange designed to screen the arbitrary acts of the
Ruler: if its advice registered the Nizam*s approval
it was accepted, if not it was ignored." Finally, 
matters had been made worse by the attitude adopted by 
Barton.'^ :* immediate predecessor, Sir Lennox Russell, who, 
being impressed with Sir Ali Imam’s legalistic view of 
the Nizam's treaty rights, had deduced from it exaggerated 
theories as to the extent to which non-interference should 
be carried out. The result was not only that Russell had 
closed his eyes to many of the existing abuses, but also 
that the Nizam had now become intolerant of any inter­
ference from the Residency.^
94-. One of the Nizam's favourite devices for squeezing
money was to keep succession cases involving the Paighs 
pending while his minions moved in to administer, in 
effect plunder, the estates. In the meantime the Nizam 
would wait to see who would pay him the biggest bribe. 
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Barton concluded that; MWe have to deal with
cv\oS©\
the most complete absolutism in bistory, and ab^o-PcrCYon 
untempered by fear of danger from witbin or without. 
Immediate steps bad to be taken to prevent further 
deterioration and restore the position of the Residency. 
Upon the basis of Barton*s suggestions, the Government of 
India, witb the concurrence of the Secretary of State, 
formulated the following measures: The Nizam was
required to appoint an efficient President and Council, 
neither of whom were to be appointed or dismissed without 
the approval of the Government of India; there was to be 
a fixed division of responsibility between the Nizam and 
his Council; the Revenue and Police departments were to 
be placed under the control of lent British officers; the 
system of giving nazars was to be regularized and limited 
to official occasions only.^
The imposition of these restrictions upon the 
authority of the Nizam in 1926 had the most profound impact 
upon the future course of Anglo-Hyderabad relations. The 
British could justify their intervention not only by 
referring to the principles of non-interference, which 
had laid down that gross misrule could not be tolerated, 
but also by the precedent of their past policy towards 
Hyderabad. Yet previous experience taught tham that the 
root of the problem lay in the person of the Nizam and 
everything now depended upon the attitude he would adopt.
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It was hoped that he would realize that the measures 
were not only designed to promote a spirit of reform 
within his administration hut also to strengthen his 
position politically. There were already signs that 
the majority Hindu population were beginning to react 
against the degeneracy of those who governed them. In 
a state with a working population of nearly twelve and 
a half million, just over ten and a half million were 
Hindus and just over one million were Muslims. Out of 
a total of 3*521 employed in public administration, 1,711 
were Hindus and 1,376 were Muslims, which meant that while 
there was one Muslim official for approximately every 900 
of the Muslim population there was only one Hindu official 
for approximately every 6,000 of that community.^® Even 
then these figures belie the fact that while Muslims held 
sixty per cent of the top administrative posts, the Hindus 
only held twenty per cent.^ The attention of the Hindus 
was directed first towards the continual stream of Muslim 
immigrants from North India who were appointed to fill the 
leading administrative positions. Many of these were 
graduates of the Aligarh Muslim college which had been 
founded in the late nineteenth century and was intended 
to produce a class of Muslim leaders who, "endowed with 
a consciousness of their claims to be the aristocracy of 
the country as much in British as in Mughal times" could
98. Census of India, 1921, Vol.XXI, Pt.II, Table 10.
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be encouraged to work for the welfare of the Muslim 
community in India.100 When they came to reform back­
ward Hyderabad in the 1920*s they brought with them many 
ties to the religions and political movements of North 
India which were being increasingly divided among 
communal lines. An attempt, therefore, to exert 
pressure for a reduction of the number of foreigners in 
the bureaucracy was made by a movement of Hyderabad 
natives known as Mulkis who had been displaced from 
administrative positions. The movement, although pre­
dominantly Hindu, did not possess a wide enough basis of 
support to make it a success. It was led by families 
who had themselves migrated from the north during the 
early years of the Osmania regime and who remained isolated 
in the old quarters of Hyderabad City treasuring the 
Persian traditions of the old court. They could not 
attract the support of rural Hindus because they 
continued to use Urdu and advocate it as the medium of 
education and thus their ideology was correctly identified 
as being merely another "thinly veiled argument for 
government jobs." The remainder and majority of the 
Hindu population chose to express their dissatisfaction 
by forging links with the growing movements of linguistic 
nationalism in Andhra and Maharashtra.101 Many wealthy 
Telegu Desmukhs and landlords, who had been particularly
100. P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge 
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vulnerable to the exaction of nazars, sponsored the
Andhra State Conference which had been established in
Hyderabad in the early twenties and which put them in
touch with the cultural-political association of Telegus
outside the state, the Andhra Mahasabha. Similarly, in
the Maharashtrian districts the merchants turned to
communal organizations, in particular the Arya Samaj,
which became the vehicle for Hindu communalism within 
102the state. However, as Barton had indicated, the
Nizam was oblivious to these as yet nascent threats to 
his regime. Prom 1926 he was determined at all costs 
to avoid the natural consequences of the scheme of quasi­
constitutional government to which he had committed himself 
under pressure from the Government of India. He remained 
aloof from the Residency and continued his intrigue to 
paralyze the Council by attempting to enforce the appoint­
ment of his own nominees in the hope that this would 
neutralize the work of theBritish officers.10^ One of 
these, Theodore Tasker, who had been appointed Director- 
General and Secretary of the Revenue Department, considered 
that it was essential for the stability of his dynasty 
that the Nizam should himself head the reforms and gain 
the credit for any improvement that it might be possible 
to effect. The British officers should be seen to be 
"eating his salt and wholeheartedly at his service."
102. For an analysis of Hindu political movements in
this period, see Carolyn M. Elliott, op.cit., pp.32-5*
103. GOI. FPD. No. 610 - Political (Secret), 1927, Barton 
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That they were not seemed to he "a political blunder of 
the first magnitude on his part: it confirms the belief *
that, although no ruler was worse advised or worse served 
during that period, he himself was in active sympathy with 
the old order of things."10*1’
By 1928, Barton had despaired of achieving any 
permanent remedy short of removing the Nizam10** but by 
then the consequences of such a step would be even graver 
than those envisaged by Hamilton at the turn of the century. 
In justifying intervention the Resident had confidently 
predicted that outside a few extremist circles there
would be no general outcry among the Muslims of British
106India. The Nizam, however, assiduously began to
cultivate contacts among this community in the hope that 
propaganda on his behalf, if carried far enough, would 
induce the Government of India to leave him alone.
Through the offices of Abdullah Khan Khasmandi the Nizam 
sent Rs. 25,000 to finance the 'Nizam Conference', a 
subsidiary of the Conference of the Khuddam ul-Haramin 
which was held at Lahore in October 1926 to discuss means 
of reviving the Caliphate. It was reported that, as a 
result, a deputation consisting of such leading Muslim 
notables as Sir Muhammad Shafi, Sir Abdur Rahim, Sir 
Fazalbhoy Currimbhoy, Dr. Hasanlrnam., Dr. Kitchlew and
104. Tasker's note "From the point of view of the British 
Officers lent to the Government of Hyderabad", 1928, 
Tasker Collection, No. 5-
105. PSSF. 1902-31, File 906/1925, No.P2764/1928, Barton 
to Political Department, 17 April 1928.
106. GOI.FPD. No.13(5) - Political (Secret), 1924-26,
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the Maharaja of Mohamadabad should wait on the Viceroy.10^ 
The deputation never actually materialized and Muslim 
interest in the Nizam's affairs was only short-lived but 
it would evidently create serious misgivings in their 
minds if the premier Muslim Prince in India were to be 
deposed. When to this is added the importance which 
Hyderabad would subsequently assume in the forthcoming 
constitutional negotiations, it can readily be seen how 
far the hands of the Government of India were tied in 
their dealings with the Nizam.
The much vaunted intervention, which theoret­
ically placed the most far-reaching restrictions upon the 
authority of a Ruling Prince, was therefore a conspicuous 
failure. The Nizam's one consuming ambition was to divest 
himself of British control and thus restore his independ­
ence and it is in this light that his prevarications up 
to the invasion by the new Indian Dominion in 1948 must 
be seen. For their part, the British had to be content 
with periodic remonstrances with the Nizam in the hope 
that, in time, fat© might remove him for them. Unfort­
unately their prayers remained unanswered and in 1944, 
three years before the end of British rule, they were 
still lamenting the existence of the Nizam and longing
for the day when "His Exalted Highness may oblige us by
108joining his predecessors."
If the problems of British officers acting in
107. GOI. FPD. No.13 (17) - Political (Secret) 1926,
Nos.1-78, Barton to Political Department, 23 October 
1926.
108. GOI. Political Branch, No.80 - Political (Secret), 
1944, Wylie's note, 9 August 1944.
a spirit of intervention in Hyderabad were considerable, 
those of their counterparts in the remaining states who 
were pursuing a policy of non-interference were even 
greater. Lord Irwin, who succeeded Reading as Viceroy 
in April 1926, was made aware of the situation early in 
1927* In January of that year, the political agent for 
a minor change in the states of Western India, Major 
A.S. Meek, forwarded a note to the Political Department 
with the remarkable title: "British India is advancing
along the lines of Evolution: The Indian States are on
the road to Revolution." Meek claimed that while 
British India was moving towards self-government through 
education and a general raising of the standard of living, 
with very few exceptions, there was no such progress in 
the Indian States. The policy of non-interference was 
not only causing the division between the two systems to 
become more pronounced, it was also responsible for the 
increasingly frivolous attitudes which were being adopted 
towards the states:
"There is bitter criticism of the subject of 
State administration by many who have knowledge 
of it; but a remarkable feature of the time is 
that British officials who have the same 
knowledge condone with light hearted good 
humour whatthe common judgement would hold 
intolerable and a matter of grave disgrace."
Meek attributed the weakness of the Indian State system
to the nature of the relationship between the states and
the paramount power. Prior to the British a ruler had
been obliged to consult the needs and desires of his
subjects in order to protect his own rule and life* There
was a common interest in the safety of the state; rulers
often being selected or elected according to their qualif­
ications, and those who failed in their duty as protectors 
of the interests of their states were liable to deposition. 
The British, however, in extending their paramountcy, had 
divested the rulers of the responsibility for the safety 
of their states and had themselves assumed this function. 
The result was that the modern ruler now stood apart from 
his people. Freed from any anxiety as to the security 
of their states many rulers absorbed themselves in luxury 
and in building up that strange phenomenon they called 
their 'izzat1. Meek concluded by recommending an 
immediate reversal of the non-interference policy in two 
ways. First, there should be more discussion between 
the Government of India and political officers: many of
the latter were completely in the dark about official 
policy towards the states, while the former would benefit 
from the specialist knowledge of the latter in devising 
that policy. Secondly, political officers should cease 
to be held at arms length by the princes and be placed in 
actual contact with the details of state administration in 
order to avoid the necessity for drastic intervention when 
malpractices had been discovered too late.^^
Irwin considered Meek's note to be very
110"interesting and suggestive" and resolved to call an 
informal conference of political officers to examine the 
methods by which the Viceroy, within the framework of
109. GOI. FPD. No.48 - Political (Secret) 1927, note by 
Major A.S. Meek, Political Agent, Mahi Kantha,
29 January 1927*
110. ibid., Irwin’s note, 9 February 1927*
general policy, could induce improvement when needed 
and also place the officers in fuller possession of the 
mind of the central government. Discussion upon non­
interference at the conference, which was held at Simla 
in July 1927, varied according to the personality and 
experience of individual officers. Lt.Col.R.H. Chenevix- 
Trench, with nearly twelve months experience as Revenue 
and Police Member of Council in Hyderabad,strongly 
condemned the policy, which he considered had led to 
oppression and general misgovernment, as being "as short­
sighted as it was unworthy of the Imperial Government."'*'11 
From Central India the A.G.G., E.H. Kealy, considered 
that even if the policy was abandoned, the task of the 
Political Department would be doubly difficult as the 
princes would more than ever resent interference with 
what they believed to be their sovereign rights of 
independence. Moreover, the princes were now more 
united as a result of the Chamber of Princes which offered 
them greater opportunity for communication. Consequently;
"Any suspected tendency to return to interference will
112close the remaining gaps in their ranks." L.W. Reynolds, 
the A.G.G. from Rajputana, approached the subject from a 
theoretical angle: "the standard of the administration
represents the stage of social development which the State 
has reached and we can hardly expect the administration of 
a State emerging from the 'tribal* stage of evolution to
111. GOI. FPD. No. 577 - Political (Secret), 1927, opinion 
recorded by Lt.Col.R.H. Chenevix-Trench.
112. ibid., opinion recorded by E.H. Kealy.
approximate to that of British India." He considered 
that the problems confronting the states of Rajputana 
were too deep-rooted for either a policy of interference 
or a well-intentioned ruler to make much progress. For 
this reason he was opposed to interference to improve an 
administration which was based upon indigenous talent.
It was no use forcing the princes to adopt regular budgets 
and civil lists unless these measures were supervized by 
honest officials with some security of tenure. As such 
officials were rare in Rajputana, Reynolds concluded that 
the only solution was for the Government of India to loan 
to the princes the services of trained British Indian 
administrators until such time as the advance of education
113
in the states had created the necessary indigenous supply. ^
The opinions recorded by the representatives of 
Central India and Rajputana at the conference revealed yet 
a further dilemma for British policy. Kealy had indicated 
that a return to interference would meet with formidable 
opposition from the Chamber of Princes while Reynolds had 
declared that the only solution lay in going beyond the 
norm of interference by urging the states to employ British 
Indian officials. Lord Irwin was confronted with the task 
of resolving the dilemma.
From the beginning the Viceroy determined to 
steer a middle course. He was himself of the opinion that 
the instructions to political officers outlined in Butler's
115. ibid., opinion recorded by L.W. Reynolds.
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Political Department Manual went too far, and was 
rather surprised.at the conference to learn that the 
more junior officers thought that the government wished 
them to interfere as little as p o s s i b l e . H e  agreed 
with Kealy*s analysis but not with that of Reynolds: 
the princes would never submit to the bureaucratic 
control of British Indian officials. Intervention there 
would have to be, but it should be pursued respectfully 
and tactfully and with the acquiescence of the general 
body of princes. In order to win them over, Irwin chose 
to work in close co-operation with the Chamber of Princes 
and more particularly with the Standing Committee of that 
organisation. As in his approach to the problems of 
British India, he adopted the principles of conciliation 
and consultation towards those of the states. Historians 
have since applauded his statesmanship in dealing with the 
conflicting elements of the nationalist movement in British 
India, but a similar judgement cannot be passed on his 
handling of the princes. His tactics made none of the 
necessary modifications in the non-interference policy and 
served only to elevate still further the members of the 
Standing Committee to a position of influence out of all 
proportion to the importance of their States.
An aristocrat himself, Irwin felt a natural 
empathy with the princes and found welcome relief from the
114. Irwin to Birkenhead, 31 August 1927, Halifax 
Collection, No. 3* (The Viceroy was created
Baron Irwin in 1925 and succeeded his father 
as Viscount Halifax in 1954).
115* Irwin to Birkenhead, 7 July 1927* Halifax
Collection, No.5*
complexities of Indian politics during the many hours of 
leisure he spent among them in their states. However it 
was the affluence of palace society which made him realize 
that all was not well in princely India. The lavish 
expenditure of the princes must have affected his conscience 
for he considered that the first ’great reform" would he 
to induce them to have a regulated civil list for what 
they spent on themselves. He did not anticipate a great 
response:
"I do not conceal from myself that we are not 
likely to get them all to adopt this principle 
very quickly, or that even if they did they 
would still no doubt, as some do today, be able 
to wangle their accounts. But if one could get 
the principle into their minds, it would begin 
to create a public opinion in its favour and 
would gradually bear increasing fruit."^6
He spoke to Patiala about it in November 1926 and
suggested that two leading princes might move a resolution
to this effect in the Chamber of Princes. Irwin's
reasoning was typical of his approach: "They would get
the full credit of this public-spirited action and I should,
on behalf of the Government of India, congratulate them on
117their progressive inclinations." { When informal 
discussions were held with the Standing Committee in May 
1927, Irwin again hinted at the need for internal reforms 
in the states and, at his request, Bikaner agreed to move 
a resolution on the subject in the forthcoming Chamber 
session. Again the Viceroy was content in the knowledge 
that although there would be a "gulf between profession 
and practice", it would be a great step forward to have
116. Irwin to Birkenhead,7£uly 1926, Halifax Collection, No.
117. ibid.
131.
secured a recognition of "sound principles".118 
Accordingly, at the Chamber session in February 1928, 
Bikaner called for a definite code of law, guaranteeing 
liberty of person and safety of property, to be admin­
istered by a judiciary independent of the executive, and 
the settlement, upon a reasonable basis, of the purely 
personal expenditure of the ruler as distinguished from 
the public charges of his administration11^ The Rajput 
was clear that there should be no misunderstanding about 
the intention of such reforms:
"We naturally cherish, and desire to preserve 
intact, and to render secure for all time, 
our internal autonomy; and we resent . 
undue intervention or interference from any 
source outside our States in our internal and 
domestic affairs, or any encroachment on our 
Sovereign powers,
In seconding the resolution, Patiala chose to be more 
explicit. Reforms in the states were not to be confused 
with those pending in British India:
"In the States our institutions are framed 
upon certain traditional lines, the position 
of the Ruler is fixed in accordance with the 
dictates of religion and morality, I for 
one believe that the position of Kingship in 
India is every bit as constitutional as that 
of the monarchies in the West, for which 
reason, I want to tell your Higtmess^that 
in lending our support tohis High«rnes3 of 
Bikaner's resolution, we are, I am sure, in 
no way committing ourselves upon the vexed 
question as to whether democracy is or is not 
a good thing, either for India in general or 
our States in particular.,f^ 2l
118. Irwin to Birkenhead, 11 May 1927, Halifax Collection, 
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The speeches of Bikaner and Patiala made it clear that 
in contemplating reforms, the princes would not he obliged 
to consider the introduction of representative institutions. 
On the contrary, it was their positive duty to maintain 
the traditions of autocracy within their states. For 
his part, Irwin made no attempt to encourage the growth 
of democracy within the states. He recognized that only 
Mysore, Cochin and Travancore in the south, and possibly 
Baroda, possessed representative bodies exercising any 
degree of popular influence on the administration and 
considered that the events of the last ten years in 
British India had not convinced the princes that democracy 
was a worthwhile experiment. In 1930, in the midst of 
constitutional negotiations in London, he confided to 
the Secretary of State, Wedgwood Benn, that "it might 
even do harm if they suspected us of trying to stampede 
them towards responsible representative institutions", 
and concluded that it would be better to leave such 
reforms to the growth of public opinion both within and 
without the states once the constitutional position of
ipp
British India had been settled. Irwin's contribution
to reform was a note he prepared for circulation to those 
princes who requested it on the general principles of 
'Administration and Government'. In it the Viceroy 
stressed the need for an administration conducted in 
accordance with the law, an efficient and uncorrupt police 
force and an efficient judicial system whose personnel
122. Irwin to Benn, 18 January 1930, Halifax 
Collection, No.6.
should be secure from arbitrary executive interference 
and who should be secure in the tenure of their office 
provided they continued to do their duty. He also drew 
attention to the fact that taxation should be proportionate 
to the ability of the tax-payer to pay and that the 
personal expenditure of the ruler should be fixed either 
at a definite sum or a definite percentage of the total 
income of the state. Reference was made to the need 
for every government to have some machinery, not necessarily 
"representative (or elective]}", whereby it could inform 
itself of the wishes of its subjects and whereby the 
latter could make their voice heard. Finally, Irwin 
emphasized:
"Perhaps the principal necessity for a 
personal ruler is that he should be able 
to choose wise counsellors, and having 
chosen them that he should trust them, 
and encourage them to tell him the truth, 
whether or not this is always palatable.n^23
The initiative for this note did not, as some believe,
1?4belong to the Viceroy: it was written at Patiala's
125request x and the circulation it achieved created more 
problems than it purported to solve. Many princes 
completely misunderstood the purpose of the document.
Some, like the Maharaja of Jind, thought it was intended 
as a criticism of their own administrations and replied 
with notes of their own in which they attempted to prove
123* Irwin's "Notes on Administration and Government",
14 June 1927* enclosed with Irwin to Benn,
18 January 1930, Halifax Collection, No.6.
124. Phadnis, op.cit., p. 82 and F.W.F. Smith, Second
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125. Irwin to Sir L. Wilson, Governor of Bombay,
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that they governed in accordance with the principles
ipc
laid down by the Viceroy. This had never been Irwin's
intention and he had to reassure many princes that the 
note merely expressed his personal views and was not 
to be regarded as an official document.12^ In so doing, 
Irwin had let slip a rare opportunity of closing the gap 
in administrative standards between British India and the 
states. He appreciated that:
"In the last resort and in the fullness of 
time I am certain no doubt that an even 
more effective security for the States 
than assurances of goodwill on the part 
of either Viceroy’s or Secretaries of 
State will in the long run be found to 
consist in the quality and in the calibre 
of their administrations.
However, the lack of sanction behind his note, which meant 
that it soon became a dead letter as far as the princes 
were concerned, and his repeated assurances as to the 
sanctity of treaty rights and Britain's obligation to 
uphold them,12^ served only to confirm the belief held 
by many princes that these rights would be sufficient to 
protect them from what theyconsidered to be revolutionary 
influences across their borders. It would have been 
more to the point had Irwin made this support and defence 
of the princes contingent upon them reforming their admin­
istrations in accordance with the principles he himself 
laid down.
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Irwin’s tactics were more than complemented by 
those of a new Political Secretary, Charles Watson, who 
succeeded Thompson shortly after the conference of 
political officers. Watson, who had attended the 
conference in his capacity as A.G.G. for the states of 
Western India, was a firm believer in the policy of non­
interference. It was significant that he was one of 
the few officers at the conference who considered that
administrative conditions in many of the states compared
150favourably with those in British India.  ^ It was also 
no coincidence that the most disastrous consequence of 
the non-interference policy occurred when Watson was 
head of the Political Department.
The issue was once again that of direct 
relations and amalgamations. At the July Conference,
Kealy had expressed his opinion that it was essential to 
restore those agencies which had been abandoned or amal­
gamated in recent years. He considered that the amal­
gamation of the Malwa and Southern states in Central India 
had proved to be a very great mistake because the combined 
agency was too large for the political agent ever to get 
to know the states or use his personal influence with 
their rulers. As a result several of the States had not 
been visited for many years. He concluded: "If non­
interference continues, however, these defects are 
151immaterial." ' Kealy in fact emerged from the conference
130. GOI• FPD. No. 577 - Political (Secret), 1927* 
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under the impression that Irwin meant to abandon non­
interference and therefore recommended the separation 
of the Malwa and Southern s t a t e s . H e  was informed 
by the Political Department that there was no question 
of departing from that policy and that it was Irwin’s 
desire to diminish the instances of intervention by 
encouraging political officers to secure the confidence 
of the p r i n c e s . T o  this Kealy quite justifiably 
replied that the size of the new agency made it impossible 
for the political agent to achieve such a rapport. It 
was two-hundred miles from end to end with the head­
quarters station at Manpur being tucked away in one 
corner. The states, over forty in number, were almost 
inacessible by road which made touring even more
difficult. Many of them were hopelessly backward and
134-in desperate need of more constant help and advice. ^
These misgivings, however, fell on deaf ears in the 
Political Department.
Of more immediate concern to Watson when he 
became Political Secretary was a renewed campaign for 
the conversion of the states in Eastern Rajputana into 
a second-class Residency. Not surprisingly, the 
initiative rested with Alwar. In February 1929* Watson 
approved the proposal*^ but he met with formidable
132. GOI. FPD. No.177 - Confidential/Establishment, 1930,
Kealy to Watwon, 25 July 1927*
133- ibid., Thompson to Kealy, 29 August 1927*
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135. 001. FPD. No.177 - Political (Secret), 19291 Watson's
note, 18 February 1929*
opposition from the then Secretary of State, Peel, who 
objected for reasons which stood in marked contrast to 
those which Montagu had used in making the original 
proposal for direct relations: "In seeking direct
relations main object of Princes is to reduce control 
of Paramount Power." The Secretary of State considered 
that as this was one of the underlying issues of policy 
arising out of the report of the Indian States Committee, 
it was desirable to avoid any premature action which might 
appear even slightly to prejudge this question. Further­
more there was a danger that the princes might connect
the proposal with the wider question of the retention of 
136the A.G.G.  ^ These arguments were reminiscent of those
which had been used by Holland and indeed he was responsible
for them having been appointed to the Secretary of State's
Council upon the expiry of his term of office in Rajputana.
Watson was furious; he considered that the "desire of the
Princes to get rid of Paramountcy is an ever present bogey
to the India Office,"1^  and again, after Peel had refused
to reconsider, that the decisionvas "a typical example of
the rigid conservatism of the India Office and their want
138of touch with the feelings of the Princes." ^ Alwar 
shared Watson's anger but he was able to take advantage 
of his presence in London for the first Round Table 
Conference to petition Benn, the new Secretary of State.
136. ibid., S/S to Viceroy, telg., 19 April 1929*
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The latter eventually relented and proposed that while 
preparations were being made for the conversion of all 
the states in Eastern Rajputana, Alwar should be placed 
in direct relations with the A.G.G.^^ This took effect 
from July 1931* the month Holland left the India Council.
The arrangement for Alwar lasted under two
years. In January 1933 British troops were moved into
the state to suppress a rebellion by a tribe of Muslim
peasantry known as Meos. An enquiry into the revolt
revealed a sickening catalogue of financial oppression*
corruption, torture and misery unparalleled in any other 
140state. The sinister personality of the Maharaja had
pervaded every aspect of life in Alwar. Arthur Lothian, 
who was Prime Minister in Alwar from February to March 
1933 wrote of Jey Singh:
"When to his arrogance there is allied a 
vindictive, capricious, and cruel 
temperament, his officials and attendants 
never dare put up any proposals that are un­
palatable to him or they would get savagely 
punished by dismissal or fine, or at the 
least get held up to ridicule or approbium 
in files or in the State Gazette. As a 
result there is a cringing, frightened 
atmosphere in Alwar amongst the Maharaja's 
staff such as I have never seen in any 
other State.
Lothian acknowledged that the Maharaja was somewhat of 
a Jekyll and Hyde; "... when he chooses to show the 
charming side of his character, a more intelligent man
139. GOI• FPD. No.53 - Political (Secret), 1931» S/S 
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than even the late Mr. Edwin Montagu might well he taken 
14Pin." As a result of the enquiry, Jey Singh was forced
to leave his state which was hurriedly re-incorporated
on a temporary basis into the Eastern Rajputana states
143
agency in the summer of 1933.
Responsibility for the sordid state of affairs
that had arisen in Alwar lay not only with Jey Singh but
also with the policy of non-interference. The Political
Department had been aware of the existence of grave
oppression and maladministration in the state for the
past ten or twelve years and Watson reported of the
Maharaja that there had “for some time been a general
impression that his rule represents autocracy in its 
144-worst form.” He appreciated that the case would
lead to criticism of the department but felt that this 
could be faced with "equanimity". He reasoned that 
officials could only intervene if there were complaints 
from the oppressed, and in Alwar fear of the Maharaja 
had prevented this. He had himself been political agent 
in Alwar from 1918 to 1921 and had never heard of any 
complaints either by letter or when he toured with the 
Maharaja.1^  He completely ignored the fact that because 
of the non-interference policy neither he nor his successors 
in Alwar made it their business to question how the state 
was governed. If they had, the calamity of 1933 might
142. ibid.
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have been avoided. Furthermore, in support of Alwar*s 
claim for the upgrading of the Eastern Rajputana states 
in 1929* Watson had written:
"As the Stqtes administrations improve - 
as they gradually must - the Rulers are 
inclined to prefer that the exercise of 
Paramountcy should take place from a 
reasonable distance outside. The immediate 
presence of a Political Officer does tend 
to minor complaints being made by aggrieved 
persons, and the knowledge that such complaints 
are being received tends to make the Darbar 
suspicious of the local Political Officer 
even though he may take no action upon them.
Where complaints are serious and widespread, 
justifying intervention, they will always 
reach the Agent to the Governor-General even 
although his headquarters are outside the 
State. In the case of States therefore with 
reasonably modern and efficient systems of 
administration it may be preferable that the 
Political Officer in relation with them should 
have his headquarters outside. The same does 
not of course apply where the administration 
is notoriously backward or inefficient or 
where there are special conditions, auch as 
a minority, requiring closer and more detailed 
attention on the part of the Central Government.
What could be more notoriously backward or inefficient 
and in greater need of closer and more detailed supervision 
than the state of Alwar? The logic of the Political 
Department in their adherence to a policy of non-inter­
ference had reached the height of incompetence.
To make matters worse that policy received 
further confirmation from the financial crisis of 1929 to 
1931 which necessitated even more widespread retrenchment. 
This time the Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand agencies in 
Central India could not escape and were amalgamated in
146. GOI. FPD. No. 177 - Political (Secret), 1929* 
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147June 1933• In July of the following year, Rajputana
was re-organized upon the following basis2 the Eastern
Rajputana states, the Western Rajputana states, the
Residency at Udaipur and the Residency at Jaipur to
148which Alwar was now transferred. This meant that
in the period from 1920 to 1934 the number of subordinate 
agencies in Central India had been halved, from six to 
three and those in Rajputana reduced from seven to four. 
Concurrently, the number of local agents expected to 
cope with the increase in work resulting from these 
amalgamations had been reduced from six to three in 
Central India, and from eight to five in Rajputana.
A future Viceroy would have cause bitterly to 
regret the policies that had been adopted in these fourteen 
years.
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CHAPTER 4.
THE INDIAN STATES COMMITTEE: 1921-1929.
Upon the establishment of the Chamber of Princes, 
the main concern of the princes on the Standing Committee 
was to achieve a suitable definition of paramountcy. By 
1921 this had assumed a new dimension. The progress of 
the non-co-operation movement in British India had created 
grave misgivings in the minds of the princes. Only a few 
were directly affected by agitation within their territories 
but all were particularly vulnerable to the increasingly 
hostile attitudes which were being adopted towards the 
states and their rulers in the vernacular press. The 
princes sought protection by lobbying for press legislation 
and an assurance that in future they would conduct their 
relations solely with the Viceroy rather than with the 
Governor-General in Council who was head of a government 
that could become increasingly susceptible to popular 
opinion. At the same time, however, the princes remained 
anxious to prevent encroachments by the Political Depart­
ment on their sovereignty and continued to press for a 
codification of political practice which would recognize 
that the exercise of paramountcy depended solely upon the 
terms of their treaties and not upon the vagaries of usage. 
These twin objectives were really incompatible for while 
the former depended upon the strength of paramountcy, the 
latter sought to weaken it. This chapter is concerned 
with the attempts by the Standing Committee to achieve a
subtle balance whereby the paramount power would be 
strong enough to protect the princes from any threats 
posed by British India but not to infringe their 
cherished rights.
Although the non-co-operation movement of 
1920-1922 was India’s first experience of "mass" 
involvement in politics, for some princes, like the 
Maharaja of Kolhapur, it revived bitter memories of 
the old anti-Brahmin campaigns of Minto’s day. As early 
as January 1920, Kolhapur was advising Chelmsford to take 
stern measures to repress "the wild abuse of speech at 
Congress meetings."’*' The Nizam of Hyderabad was equally 
perturbed by the Khilafat agitation which existed as part 
of the non-co-operation movement. This agitation had 
been inspired by Muslim hostility towards the allied 
intention, revealed in the Treaty of Sevres of May 1920, 
to dismember the old Turkish Empire. The Nizam responded 
by prohibiting all Khilafat meetings within Hyderabad and 
attacking Khilafat theory as both disloyal and unjustified 
by historical circumstances. As a result he was vilified 
as a traitor of Islam in certain Lahore based Urdu papers 
like the Zandur, Siyasat and Zamana. In July 1920, the 
Nizam warned Chelmsford that "the virulence of the Urdu 
Press had broken all bounds" and that it would become 
increasingly difficult for him to give the right lead to
p
the Indian Muslims if these "scurilous attacks continued."
1. Kolhapur to Chelmsford, 19 January 1920, Chelmsford 
Collection, No.24.
2. Barbara Nell Ramusack, "Indian Princes as Imperial 
Politicians, 1914-1939'’* unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Michigan, p.138.
The question of press legislation to protect 
the princes was first raised by Kolhapur during the 
informal meetings held concurrently with the inauguration 
of the Chamber of Princes in February 1921. Accordingly, 
Bikaner was deputed to raise the issue with the Political 
Secretary. By November 1921, when the second session of 
the Chamber was held, princely concern had been increased 
by the knowledge that the restrictive Press Act of 1910 
would probably be repealed. This Act, designed to afford 
protection to both the government and the princes against 
such press criticism as the government considered would 
lead to "disaffection or hatred", had been widely condemned 
by nationalist politicians because the proprietors and 
editors of accused papers were denied the opportunity to 
defend themselves in court. Montagu was anxious to see 
a revision of some of the more objectionable features of 
the Act in order to ensure that the government would have 
the support of moderate politicians in working the new 
constitution. Chelmsford responded by appointing a nine 
man Press Act Committee in March 1921 to consider if any 
modifications were necessary. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, 
the Law Member of the Government of India, and W.H. Vincent, 
the Home Member, were the only official members of the 
committee which reported in July 1921. The princes were 
disturbed to find that it had unreservedly advocated total 
repeal of the Press Act.^ If this recommendation was 
accepted, the only protection available to the princes would
3. ibid., p. 158*
be for them to prosecute offending newspapers. This, 
however, was precisely what they wished to avoid as they 
considered court actions to be beneath their dignity and 
status#
Chelmsford had been on the point of retirement
when he appointed the committee# His successor, Lord
Reading, was quickly informed by Alwar that no prince
would allow his name to be mentioned in connection with
4
court proceedings. In August 1921 Montagu gave his 
approval to the introduction of legislation to repeal 
the Press Act but asked the Government of India "to 
consider whether you could not afford the protection of' 
your courts to Princes and Chiefs in some form which 
would not be rendered nugatory by their objection to appear 
in court."^ The answer to this query was provided by 
Sir Ali Imam during an interview he held with Wood in 
September 1921. According to Imam, it wasrot only a 
question of princely aversion to court appearances; the 
damage would have been done once a newspaper had published. 
For a prince to have to answer criticisms of his admini­
stration in court would only be adding insult to injury. 
Imam confided to Wood that as far as Hyderabad was 
concerned, the Nizam would never agree to abdicate his 
despotic powers and would inevitably be driven to take 
strong measures to protect his reputation and to prevent 
the penetration of democratic ideas into his state from
4. Reading to Montagu, 21 July 1921, Reading Collection, 
No.l.
5. Ramusack, op.cit., p. 158.
c.
British India. At the Chamber session of November
1921 Alwar moved a resolution calling for protective
press legislation. Scindia objected because he thought
that the princes would be emphasizing the weakness of
their position by asking for special protection.
Scindia*s influence, however, was rapidly declining
in the Standing Committee, and his was the only voice 
7
of dissent.f
The Government of India was therefore obliged 
to reconsider the necessity of special press legislation 
for the princes. In March 1922, Montagu was forced to 
resign over his handling of the Government of India’s 
protest against the Treaty of SSvres. His Conservative 
successor, Lord Peel, refused to approve the repeal of 
the Press Act until he had received definite assurances
Q
that the princes would be protected. Sapru remained 
adamant that legislation to this effect was unnecessary 
but Vincent was obliged to change his mind because he 
felt that if the princes were not protected, "we shall 
ourselves suffer from the reaction and the Princes might, 
as indeed some of them have done in the past, encourage 
sedition and intrigue against the Government of India in
Q
their states."7 On 23 September, just six months after 
the repeal of the Press Act, Vincent asked leave to 
introduce a bill in the Legislative Assembly to prevent
6. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, January 1922, No.3* Wood*s 
"Memorandum of conversations with Sir Ali Imam",
16 September 1921.
7* Ramusack, op.cit., p.159*
8. ibid., p. 162.
9. ibid., p. 163
the dissemination of news calculated to excite dis­
affection against the princes and their governments.
The Assembly rejected the motion but on the following 
day Reading used his powers of certification to enable 
the bill to become law. On 3 October Peel wrote to 
Reading expressing satisfaction that certification under
the Act of 1919 had first occurred in a matter which was
10one between Indians and Indians.
The princes of the Standing Committee had 
sufficient political acumen to realize that special press 
legislation could not, of itself, secure adequate provision 
for the protection of the states and their rulers. Even 
before Reading*s certification they realized that any Press 
Act could, like its predecessor, become the subject of a 
debate demanding its repeal. Moreover, it was not incon­
ceivable that a future Government of India might consider 
it more politic to submit to nationalist opinion in British 
India rather thanoidorse the claims of its less numerous 
princely clients. It was this possibility that led the 
princes to seek an assurance that in future they would 
conduct their relations with the Viceroy rather than the 
Governor-General in Council. The offices of Viceroy and 
Governor-General in Council were held by the same person. 
The term Viceroy was used to describe the representative 
of the Crown in India and it was through theViceroy that 
the Indian States owed allegiance to the British monarch.
As the states were not constitutionally part of British 
India it was extremely rare for the Viceroy to act in his 
capacity as Governor-General and thereby consult his 
Council on matters concerning the states. However, fearing
10. ibid., p. 165.
that the logical development of the Government of India 
Act 1919 would be the responsibility of the central 
executive to the central legislature, many princes now 
sought an assurance that the Viceroy would never consult 
his Council on matters concerning the states. In this 
way the princes hoped to gain immunity against inter­
ference by the British Indian executive and legislature.
This issue had in fact been the subject of a 
controversy between two members of Chelmsford*s Council 
in 1920. Sir George Lowndes, the Law Member, had been 
in favour of making the Viceroy immediately responsible 
for all the affairs of the states which did not directly 
affect the administration of British India. He argued 
that the change should have been made in 1870 when the 
Indian Empire had been constituted because all the matters 
involved referred to suzerainty which, in his opinion, 
was definitely a relationship concerning only the states 
and the British Crown. He considered that the princes 
did not contemplate the change as an attempt at "aggrand­
isement" but rather out of a "genuine fear of the effect 
of a popular government of India upon the rights and 
privileges which we have guaranteed them." Lowndes 
concluded:
"The ruling Chiefs all want this, and, if 
we are to be able to consolidate the Indian 
Empire, which is to me of the greatest 
possible importance at the present time, I 
feel that we must carry them with us*,fn
11. GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal, January 1921, Nos.1-22,
Lowndes' note, 20 August 1920.
A different view had been expressed by the Home 
Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey. He considered that it would 
be wrong to lend any encouragement to what he believed was 
a mistaken theory that the states were dependent only on 
the Crown and entirely independent of the Government of 
India. He saw the problem in terms of central respons­
ibility and argued that the position could only be re­
considered if a radical change was contemplated in the 
constitution of theGovernment of India whereby the 
Viceroy's executive gave way to a popularly elected 
ministry. In these circumstances Hailey admitted that
it would be impossible to make theprinces subordinate to
IPan authority elected by British India.
Hailey's opinion was the one that prevailed.
In July 1921, when Alwar asked if it would be possible 
to amend the wording of the 1919 Act to the effect that 
the states were in relation only with the Viceroy, he 
was informed by Reading that as it was extremely rare 
for the Viceroy to consult his council on matters 
concerning the states, no such action was necessary.
Alwar, although expressing misgivings as to the attitude 
of a futureViceroy, was reluctantly obliged to let matters 
rest there.^
The princes were similarly disappointed with 
the promised negotiations on the codification of political 
practice. Although Lowndes had previously conceded that 
future political developments could necessitate a definition
12. ibid., Hailey's note, 15 August 1920.
13* Reading to Montagu, 21 July 1921, Reading Collection, 
No.l.
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14of mutual rights and obligations, the Political Depart­
ment remained convinced that there was nothing to be 
gained by Alwar's analytical approach. When the 
Standing Committee met Thompson in January 1924, Patiala 
argued that:
"... if the position of the States was 
strengthened in the manner proposed (I.e. 
the analytical approach] great benefit to 
the Empire might be expected. When the 
Government of India is surrendering its 
power into the hands of the people why 
should the Government not increase the 
powers of the Princes who have always 
been loyal and who do not desire to be 
handed over to the British Indian democracy.11 ^
To this Thompson replied that numerous difficulties would
arise if an attempt was made to extract principles from
treaties and sanads, many of which had been concluded
over a century ago. Moreover the Political Secretary
thought that it was not inconceivable that a thorough
examination of these treaties and sanads might result in
a case being justifiably made for an even stricter inter-
16pretation of political practice. By August 1924, 
Thompson had slightly modified his position in that he 
was prepared to work with Alwar in formulating a set of 
principles based upon treaties provided that due recog­
nition was given to usage and that such an examination
17would not be binding on the government or the princes.
14. See above, p. 70.
15* Ramusack, op.cit., p. 167*
16. ibid., p. 168.
17. GOI• PPD. No.73 - Reforms, 1928, Nos.1-4, Appendix 1,
Political Department, "Memorandum regarding the
relationship between the Paramount Power and the States."
By then, however, the princes* reflections on events 
which had accompanied the first threeyears of the reforms 
in British India, had persuaded them that something far 
more substantial than a codification of political practice 
was required*
In May 1922 Bikaner had written to Reading 
asking for atfround-table conference with a selected 
number of princes*1 to enable the Viceroy to ’’understand 
at first hand the difficulties, hopes and aspirations of
■jo
the princes and the remedies they suggest.” Bikaner 
could possibly have been influenced by the knowledge 
that in December of the previous year Reading had been 
prepared to convene a round-table conference with 
moderate nationalist politicians and Gandhi as a means 
to end the non-co-operation movement. To the relief 
of Reading’s advisers and the exasperation of some of 
Gandhi's lieutenants the conference never met because 
Gandhi imposed certain conditions upon his attendance , 
which were completely unacceptable to the government.
By the time Bikaner made his request the government's 
position had been considerably strengthened. The 
violence of Chauri Chaura brought non-co-operation to 
an end in February 1922 and in the following month
'-W cats'
Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to six manfcfeg* 
imprisonment. Thereafter the Indian national movement 
fell into sad disarray. While the Congress split into 
various factions over the adoption of a new political
18. GOI• FPD. No. 179 - Political (Secret) 1924-25,
Bikaner to Reading, 18 May 1922.
strategy the Khilafat agitation began to appear pointless 
in view of the enthusiasm which greeted the movement by 
Kernel Attaturk in Turkey to abolish the Caliph. By 
the summer of 1922 the confidence of the Government of 
India led to a summary rejection of Bikaner's suggestion:
"The idea underlying a round-table conference 
is that all meet on a footing of equality 
and this alone is sufficient to show that 
it is impossible where the Princes and the 
Viceroy are concerned.
Bikaner was informed that as the princes now had a 
regular organ of expression in the Chamber of Princes, 
they should make use of it for the purpose of bringing 
matters to the attention of the Viceroy.
Two years later Bikaner tried again. In July 
1924 he presented Reading with two lengtbyand detailed 
notes. In the first the Maharaja dropped the idea of 
a round-table conference and wrote instead of the "urgent 
need" for informal discussions between the Viceroy and 
the princes. He explained that since the constitutional 
negotiations of 1918 the states had been able to reflect 
upon how matters stood and to focus upon the great 
difficulties that lay ahead of them. As a result:
"The time would therefore appear to be fully 
ripe when, in the best interests of both 
parties, the British Government and the 
States ought to take stock of the whole 
situation and without loss of time 
concentrate, during the period of transition 
in British India on measures leading to a 
settled line of action and with the goal 
clearly defined and the future position of 
the Indian States clearly in view when a
19* ibid., Thompson's note, 5 August 1922♦
condition of affairs will prevail in 
British India• Otherwise the position 
of the Princes and States will he an 
unenviable one and in many respects 
probably even worse off than that of 
the Loyalists in Ireland.”
20
Bikaner emphasised that his suggestion would not under­
mine the Chamber of Princes and that the proposed 
discussions would not take place regularly "but, as 
in this case, when special circumstances demand them, 
or at the outset of each new Viceroyalty." What then, 
were the special circumstances of this particular case?
It was clear that Bikaner, in common with many other 
Chamber members, had been unnerved by the campaign of 
non-co-operation, the controversy that had surrounded 
the special press legislation and the reluctance of the 
Political Department to recognize the importance of treaty 
rights. These princes feared that unless their position 
was defined before the next stage of constitutional 
advance, they could find themselves at the mercy of the 
democratic movement in British India. Thus, "in order 
to eliminate all elements and risk of surprise, uncertainty 
and haste," Bikaner considered that it was imperative to 
give the princes sufficient time to consider their future 
well in advance of the Statutory Commission which was due 
to report on the progress of the British Indian constitution 
in 1929.21
In his second note Bikaner chose to be rather 
more explicit:
20. ibid., Bikaner to Reading, 27 July 1924-.
21. ibid.
"The day may be near or distant when India 
attains full Self-Government but, without 
the least hostility to constitutional 
advance in British India •••, the instinct 
of self-preservation urgently demands every 
timely effort and precaution to preserve 
the entity and to safeguard the rights and 
autonomy of our States and, wherever 
possible, even to strengthen our position."^ 2
Bikaner again emphasized the need for informal discussions
but this time his proposals went further because he felt
that the result of any "stock-taking" would be to reveal
the multiplicity of inter-dependent subjects requiring
thorough investigation. He considered that this work
would be beyond the capacity either of the Viceroy or the
Standing Committee and therefore requested the appointment
of an "important Committee" to go into the whole matter
and report to the Viceroy. The Committee would have to
be chaired by someone who was "endowed with statesmanlike
qualities and imagination and a broad outlook and genuine
sympathies with the legitimate aims and aspirations of
the Princes and States ..." Bikaner had even prepared
a time-table: informal discussions would be held
immediately prior to the Chamber session in November 1924;
the Committee would be appointed either in December 1924
or January 1925; approximately three months would be
allowed for the investigation with the Committee thus
23submitting a report in March or April 1925* Bikaner 
was in fact anticipating that if an Indian States Committee 
reported in the spring of 1925, the British Government
22. ibid., Bikaner to Reading, 29 July 1924.
23. ibid.
would “be in a position to settle the future position 
of the Indian States four years before it was due to 
examine the future of British India.
Reading and the Political Department reacted 
to Bikaner*s suggestions in two very different ways. 
Thompson welcomed the proposal for informal discussions 
because he believed thats
**Private conversations do not give them Cbhe 
princes] quite the opportunity that they 
want, and do not inspire the same degree 
of confidence in the minds of the Princes 
as a body, as informal discussions with a
few selected rulers.** ,
24
As for the subsequent enquiry he considered that although
a Committee would eventually have to be appointed, there
25was no immediate urgency about it. y In viewing the 
informal discussions and the appointment of a Committee 
as two quite separate issues, Thompson appears entirely 
to have missed the point. The very idea of informal 
discussions was that they would give the princes an 
opportunity to present their case in readiness for the 
investigation to be undertaken by a Committee. Informal 
discussions by themselves would, for the princes, be 
useless. Reading, however, appears to have been more 
aware of Bikaner's intentions. Realising the impli­
cations of the type of Committee that Bikaner had 
anticipated would follow the informal discussions, the 
Viceroy refused to even contemplate the latter. He
24. ibid., Thompson's note, 3 August 1924.
25. ibid.
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argued that they would create a 1 camarilla1 in the 
Chamber of Princes. Reading must have been aware that 
his argument made little sense in view of the fact that 
the Chamber was already controlled by a camarilla. He 
was, however, prepared to use any excuse in order to 
prevent discussions on the constitutional future of the 
states preceding similar discussions on British India by 
four years. As far as Reading was concerned the situation 
was similar to the one in 1916 when Wood had suggested a 
Council of Princes: no decision could be taken on the
future of the states until British Indian policy had been 
settled.
The attitudes of Reading and Thompson were also 
responsible for their differing responses to a suggestion 
made by Scindia when the Chamber of Princes met in 
November 1924. Scindia put forward the idea of an 
"Advisory Committee of the Princes” which the Viceroy 
could consult periodically.^ He suggested that it 
could be consulted on matters such as the economic develop­
ment and fiscal interests of the states, the organization 
of minority administrations and the reconciliation of 
communal differences. Reading looked more favourably 
on this idea for it was intended only to discuss "matters 
of the moment” rather than the larger issue of the
po
constitutional position of the States. Thompson, 
however, saw Scindia*s suggestion as an attempt to circumvent
26. ibid., Reading's note, 7 August 1924.
27* Chamber of Princes, November 1924.
28. GOI. FPD. No. 179 - Political (Secret), 1924-25,
Patterson's note, 5 March 1926.
the Chamber and considered that it was therefore 
"nothing but unreasonable on the part of the Princes 
to ask for the constitution of another Committee which 
could not but prove unnecessarily embarrassing, much 
less of any real benefit either to the States or to 
the Government."^ In the event no action was taken 
upon the basis of an Advisory Committee for an issue 
which originated with Hyderabad's claim for the 
restoration of the Berars convinced the princes that 
they would gain nothing from negotiations with the 
Reading administration.
The Berars were a tract of country to the 
north of Hyderabad consisting of the four districts of 
Amraoti, Yeotmal, Akola and Baldana. For administrative 
purposes these districts had been part of the Central 
Provinces since 1853. Their three million inhabitants, 
however, were not British Indian subjects, but subjects 
of the Nizam whose sovereignty over the Berars had been 
acknowledged by Dalhousie in the same year. In 1902 
the then Nizam of Hyderabad had been forced by a severe 
financial crisis to conclude an agreement with Curzon's 
government whereby the British held the Berars on perpetual 
lease in return for a fixed annual payment of Rs. twenty- 
five lakhs. In 1918, in pursuit of his ambition to 
divest himself of British control Mir Osman Ali Khan 
employed Sir Ali Imam, at a fee reported to be in the 
region of Rs. 1,000 a day, to prepare a case Justifying
29* ibid., p. 33, Thompson's undated note.
the reincorporation of the Berars into his dominions.
Eventually, in October 1923, the Nizam presented Reading
with an enormous and extraordinary document. It
contained a survey of the past 150 years of Anglo-
Hyderabad relations and concluded by suggesting that if
the Berars were restored to Hyderabad, the Nizam would
grant their inhabitants a constitution for responsible
government with complete popular control save in matters
relating to his relations with the Crown and the Hyderabad
Army Department. Copies of this document, together with
a covering letter from Sir Ali Imam asking for support,
were also sent to Peel and several other members of
Prime Minister Baldwinfs cabinet. Peel expressed his
surprise that the Nizam should have appealed over the
head of the Government of India and it was this audacity,
together with a recognition of his ultimate objective;,',
30that led Reading to reject the claim in March 1925*
The Nizam, however, was not prepared to let 
matters rest there. In September 1925 be wrote to 
Reading requesting the appointment of a Court of 
Arbitration to examine the Berars controversy. He 
Justified his request upon the following basis:
"Save and except matters relating to foreign 
powers and policies, the Nizams of Hyderabad 
have been independent in the internal affairs 
of their State Just as much as the British 
Government in British India. With the 
reservation mentioned by me, the two parties 
have on all occasions acted with complete 
freedom and independence in all inter- 
Government questions that naturally arise
30. For a brief resum£ of the Berars case up to 1925, see 
GOI. FPD. No.13 - Political (Secret), 1924-26, Nos. 
1-49, Question of retrocession of Berar to His Exalted 
Highness, the Nizam of Hyderabad, pp. 7-9*
from time to time “between neighbours.
Now, the Berar question is not and cannot 
be covered by that reservation. No 
foreign power or policy is concerned or 
involved in its examination, and thus the 
subject comes to be a controversy between 
the two Governments that stand on the same 
plane without any limitations or sub­
ordination of one to the other.
pi
In deriving a theory of internal independence from the 
fact that he was the equal of the British Government in 
this respect, the Nizam was striking at the very essence 
of paramountcy. For the Resident, Barton, this served 
only to compound the already considerable difficulties 
he was facing in dealing with the Nizam. He produced 
a lengthy note of his own in which he described how the 
numerous occasions of British interference in Hyderabad 
proved beyond all doubt that the state had never been 
internally independent. He concluded with a remark 
made by a previous Resident in 1903:
1 If I may say so I think the tendency is 
to treat Hyderabad with undue importance; 
to place the State too much on an equality 
with the Government of India.
Barton recommended a clear and definite 
assertion of the governments right to interfere in 
Hyderabad in order to impress upon the Nizam f,that his 
position is more in accord with history than with his 
own i n t e r e s t s . R e a d i n g ,  however, saw the issue in 
a much wider perspective. In January 1926, the Viceroy 
took the decision to publish all correspondence relating
31* ibid., Nizam to Reading, 23 September 1925*
32. ibid., Barton's note, 14 February 1926. The remark
was made by Sir David Barr who was the Resident in 
Hyderabad between 1900 and 1905*
33. ibid.
to the Berars once a reply had been officially sent to 
the Nizam. Reading thought this necessary
**not only for the purpose of publicly refusing 
the Nizam*s claim, but also because there is 
an underlying current of thought among the 
Princes ... to claim that under their treaties 
and engagements, they or most of them, are 
Allies of His Majesty and consequently should 
be in a position of complete internal 
independence whatever may happen regarding 
foreign relations.**^
Moreover in view of the princes* recent concern to gain 
acceptance of this theory in any consideration of their 
constitutional future, Reading saw the occasion as an 
opportunity to inform them all exactly where they stood 
in relation to the paramount power. In March 1926 the 
following statement was made in a letter to the Nizam:
"The Sovereignty of the British Crown is supreme 
in India, and therefore no Ruler of an Indian 
State can justifiably claim to negotiate with 
the British Government on an equal footing.
Its supremacy is not based only on Treaties 
and Engagements but exists independently of them 
and, quite apart from its prerogative in matters 
relating to Foreign Powers and policies, it is 
the right and duty of the British Government, 
while scrupulously respecting all Treaties and 
Engagements with the Indian States, to preserve 
peace and good order throughout India... The 
right of the British Government to intervene in 
the internal affairs of Indian States is another 
instance of the consequences necessarily involved 
in the supremacy of the British Crown. The 
British Government had indeed shown again and 
again that they have no desire to exercise this 
right without grave reason. But the internal 
no less than the external security which the 
Ruling Princes enjoy is due ultimately to the 
protecting power of the British Government, and 
where Imperial interests are concerned or the 
general welfare of the people of a State is 
seriously and grievously affected by the action 
of its Government, it is with the Paramount 
Power that the ultimate responsibility of taking
34. Reading to Birkenhead, 14 January 1926, Reading
Collection, No.6.
remedial action must lie. The varying 
degrees of internal sovereignty which the 
Rulers enjoy are all subject to the due 
exercise by the Paramount Power of this
responsibility.'*^
Reading*s statement came as a shock to the princes.
While respect for treaties had been mentioned, the 
degree of intervention now claimed seemed almost to 
invalidate the rights which the princes believed to be 
embodied in them. A stronger declaration of the omni­
potence of the paramount power could not be imagined.
In April 1926, a month after the publication 
of the Berars correspondence, the Viceroyalty changed 
hands. For the princes, the circumstances in which 
Irwin succeeded Reading were similar to those in which 
Minto had succeeded Curzon. They hoped that the new 
Viceroy would, like Minto, prove to be more sympathetic 
to their interests than his predecessor. In this respect 
Irwin did not disappoint them. In sharp contrast to 
Reading he was immediately prepared to consider the 
future of the state®. At the end of June 1926, after a 
mere exchange of pleasantries with the Standing Committee, 
he confided to Lord Birkenhead, Peel's successor at the 
India Offices
"I think myself it is quite vital that we 
should seek to clear our minds on this 
problem in advance of the Statutory Commission.
It must be faced sooner or later and failure 
to do so will inevitably breed uneasiness in 
the minds of the general body of the princes.
35. GOI. FPD. No.13 - Political (Secret), 1924-26, 
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Irwin proposed to institute a preliminary enquiry 
through a sub-committee of his Executive Council following 
which he hoped to be in a position to hold informal talks 
of an exploratory nature with the Standing Committee. 
Birkenhead was dubious about any informal talks:
!lIt is always a danger in discussion with the 
Princes that even the most informal remarks 
may be brought up again subsequently as 
'pledges', and in a matter of this importance 
to the Princes we should have to be specially 
cautious on this point."^
He gave his reluctant consent on condition that nothing 
which could be construed as commitments were made.
Irwin commissioned Thompson to write a note 
which would form the basis of discussion in the sub­
committee of his council. Before considering Thompson's 
remarks, however, it is worthwhile to recall that some 
important conclusions had already been reached on one 
aspect of the future relationship between the states and 
British India. At the Chamber session of January 1926, 
the princes had expressed dissatisfaction with the existing 
economic and financial policy of the government which 
they considered to be totally biased in favour ofBritish 
India. According to the Maharaja of Bharatpur this was 
due to the failure to initiate the kind of joint deliber­
ations between the Council of State and the Chamber of
38Princes which had been recommended in the Montford Report.
As a result a situation had arisen in which although the 
princes were theoretically independent of the British
37* Birkenhead to Irwin, 22 July 1926, Halifax 
Collection, No.2.
38. Montford Report, para 326.
Indian legislature and free to tax their subjects as
they saw fit, in practice acts passed by the legislature
applied with equal force in the states as in British
India. Bharatpur cited the example of the salt tax.
Despite the fact that most states had salt treaties
with the Government of India, they were all equally
affected by the periodic increases and decreases in the
salt tax sanctioned by the legislature. If this practice
was to continue, then Bharatpur argued that the states
were entitled to a share of the salt revenues of the
Government of India. He also complained that the states
had not been consulted on such major questions as the
adoption of a tariff policy and the establishment of a
tariff board. Moreover, as the customs revenue derived
from this tariff policy should legally be used for the
benefit of India as a whole, the states, as in the case
of salt, were entitled to receive a share of it. y
Bharatpur's views were endorsed unanimously by
the Chamber with the result that Reading was obliged to
appoint a committee of his council, consisting of Sir
Basil Blackett, S.R. Das, C.A. Innes and B.N. Mitra,
together with Thompson, to consider the states’ claim
to a share in the customs and salt revenues of the
40Government of India. The committee was also asked to 
frame the substance of a reply which would be given to
39* Chamber of Princes, January 1926.
40. PSSF. 1902-31, File 2764/1927, pts. 1 and 2,
No. 1747/1927i GOI. FPD. Secret-Internal Despatch 
No. 8 to S/S, 9 September 1926, Claim of the Indian 
States to a share in the customs and salt revenues 
of the Government of India.
the princes in the event of their claims being found 
unacceptable. In their evidence before the committee 
the princes added a further argument to their customs 
claim: as the Government of India had no right to
impose taxes within their states, it also had no right 
to continue the existing practice of levying customs 
duties on goods which, although imported through British 
Indian ports, were intended for consumption in the states. 
Thompson thought that these claims were justified in view 
of the enormous increase in customs duties which had been 
occasioned by the adoption of a protective tariff in 1922.
He also believed that the backwardness of many state 
administrations was due to their lack of funds. The 
Government of India was therefore hardly helping the
41states by forcing them to pay such heavy customs duties.
The other members of the committee disagreed with Thompson.
They argued that the states derived considerable revenue
from other sources such as income tax, the proceeds of
which in the provinces went completely to the central
government. They also considered that it would be impossible
to admit the claim to a share of the customs revenue unless
the inland customs duties, levied by a large number of
42states, were abolished. Moreover as long as the princes 
occupied a position in which they stood strictly by the 
terms of their treaties and held themselves as far aloof 
as possible from British India, there could be no justifi­
cation for giving them a voice in decisions concerning the
41. ibid., Enclosure No.4, Report of the Committee appointed 
by Sis Excellency Lord Reading to enquire into the claims 
of the Ruling Princes to a share of the customs and
salt revenues of the Government of India, 4 June 1926, 
para. 11.
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fiscal policy of the Government of India. If the states 
wished to obtain such a voice they would have to agree to 
the formation of a Zollverein or Customs Federation with 
British India. This in itself would involve something 
more than the mere adoption of a common tariff. Repre­
sentatives from the states would have to be directly 
associated with representatives from British India for 
the purpose of determining customs policy. Hence:
"It should be regarded as a cardinal principle 
that any step taken to alter the status quo 
of the relations, particularly the financial 
relations, between the Government of India 
and the Indian States, should be a step in 
the direction of federal unity, and this 
proposal, unless combined with far-reaching 
changes of other kinds, offends against this 
cardinal principle."^
Thus the committee's conclusion was that economic
considerations alone could not determine the basis upon
which the states could be given a voice in financial policy.
They would have to enter some form of political, as well
as economic, federation with British India. Yet it was
by no means certain that the princes would agree to this.
Would they, for instance, agree to rescind their sovereignty
in the administration of matters deemed federal when they
had persistently argued that this sovereignty derived
44from inviolable treaty rights?
The Committee did not feel competent to predict 
the possible reaction of the princes and therefore concluded 
that the claim to a share of the customs and salt revenues 
were aspects of the much larger question of the future
43. ibid.
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political relationship between the states and the 
Government of India. According to the committee, this 
was
"... one of the most difficult problems which 
will have to be faced in working out a scheme 
for self-government in India. It will no 
doubt be reviewed in all its aspects by the 
Statutory Commission, and we do not think 
any useful purppse would be served by our 
attempting to anticipate the conclusions of 
the Commission."^
Reading had departed by the time the committee presented 
its report in June 1926. Irwin was therefore informed 
that the question of a reply to the princes should be 
decided by the Secretary of State in consultation with 
the Government of India.
Thompson was mindful of these conclusions when 
he prepared his note for Irwin. He began with an 
appraisal of princely apprehensions:
"The princes are afraid of the future .•.
They are the last congenital autocrats in 
the world. Democracy has swept away others 
before their eyes. The reflection that it 
may end in dictatorship brings them no balm.
Such a dictatorship would mean their downfall.
With the examples of Ireland and Egypt before 
them, they discount our assurances of 
protection, and they are terrified lest out 
of deference to clamour or fetish of the 
people's will we should let all the powers 
of the Government of India pass to a 
responsible Government composed of the type 
• dominant among politicians, a type they 
dislike and distrust."^
The Political Secretary suggested two ways in whichthese 
fears could be overcome. First, as soon as an element
45. Report of the customs and salt Committee appointed 
by Lord Reading, para. 13*
46. GOI. FPD. No. 302 - Political, 1926, Thompson's 
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of responsibility was contemplated in the central
government, the Viceroy would have to act apart from
his council on matters concerning the states. This
had been advocated by Hailey in 1921 but Thompson now
added that while it would give satisfaction to the
princes it would also distinguish the Viceroyalty in
India from a Governorship in the other dominions in that
a permanent portfolio would be left in the hands of the
4-7Crown Representative. r Secondly, Thompson suggested 
that the recent idea of a Customs Union should be extended 
to all matters of common concern by the establishment of 
a "union" legislature. He contemplated that repre­
sentatives from the states and British India would 
participate in a unitary legislature, the former being 
nominated by the princes. Rejecting the misgivings of 
the other members of the customs committee, Thompson was 
of the opinion that this scheme would in fact appeal to 
the princes. Although education and the growth of 
democracy were destined "to bring the despot down", the 
scheme would "break his fall and tend to keep him on his 
throne with powers equal in extent to those of the
'autonomous' provincial governments of the future, and
4-8with his ceremonial position safeguarded permanently."
Irwin endorsed Thompson's conclusions and 
expressed his own view that he had no wish to see the 
disappearance of the states as independent entities in 
British India by forcing compulsory constitutional progress 
upon them.^ The Viceroy, however, was also of the opinion
4-7. ibid.
4-8. ibid.
49. ibid., Irwin's undated note.
168.
that it would take many years before -Jiwam- achieved 
self-government and therefore asked his Political Secretary 
for a further opinion on the immediate necessity of 
devising means for discussion of matters of common 
c o n c e r n . T h o m p s o n ’s reply was extremely subtle for 
in arguing that there was such a need he was also now 
able to make out a case for the Viceroy acting independ­
ently of his council well in advance of British India 
achieving responsible government. He argued that \ 
provision should be made for the Viceroy to act inde­
pendently and for the establishment of a Union Legislature 
in 1929, the year the Statutory Commission would be 
appointed. This would not only remove the princes* 
apprehensions that the ’’progress of British India towards 
responsibility will be marked by a steady growth in the 
influence of popular representatives on the policy of the
Central Government”, but also make them even more amenable
51to participation in the Union legislature.^
Thompson’s views were debated in September 1926 
by a sub-committee consisting of Irwin, Blackett, Sir 
Alexander Muddiman, Das and Thompson.^ Blackett, the 
Finance Member and Muddiman, the Home Member, objected 
strongly to the Political Secretary’s hypothesis. They 
both considered that it would be wrong to protect the 
states in this manner from the pressure of popular opinion. 
Muddiman also thought that there was a tendency to think
50. ibid.
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52. ibid., Minutes of the proceedings of the sub-committee
appointed by the Viceroy to discuss future relations 
between British India and the Indian States, 17 September 
1926.
only in terms of the princes and asked whether their 
subjects would welcome the states conducting their 
relations only with the Viceroy. Moreover the Home 
Member considered that in ignoring the probable reaction 
of British Indian politicians, Thompson had failed to 
realise that the existing Legislative Assembly would 
never agree to the change. Eventually a compromise was 
reached upon the basis of the suggestion made by Thompson 
in his first note: the principle of the Viceroy acting
independently of his council was endorsed but it was 
agreed that, as a matter of tactics, the change could 
only be effected simultaneously with a change to 
responsible government in British India.^
The sub-committee was, however, unanimous in 
its approval of the idea of a Union Legislature. Due 
recognition was given to the fact that the British Indian 
representatives would be likely to take exception to their 
association with state representatives who were nominated 
by the princes and not elected by popular vote. The 
committee therefore considered that ’’something in the 
shape of federation" would be the only satisfactory 
solution. Such an association would involve a substantial 
sacrifice of sovereignty on the part of the princes with 
the Union Legislature exercising direct and indirect 
matters of taxation and powers of federal execution within 
the states. Despite Thompson's optimism, the other 
members of the committee still thought that this would 
be a highly contentious issue as far as the states were
53. ibid.
concerned* It was recognized, therefore, that it might
be necessary to begin with a less ambitions scheme of
association, but the details of the form this would take
54were not discussed.
Before these preliminary investigations had 
been completed, the Government of India felt ready to 
reply to the claims made by the princes, particularly in 
respect of customs policy. In September 1926 Birkenhead 
was informed that when the Chamber of Princes assembled 
in November, Irwin proposed to make a statement to the 
effect that although customs policy could only be 
considered as but one aspect of the future political 
evolution of India:
"... Parliament has provided machinery for the 
timely consideration of future developments 
and he [the Viceroy] hopes that it will be 
found possible to bring the larger questions 
here involved within the scope of that enquiry 
••• The solution to be aimed at must be one 
which will tend to unity and not to dissidence 
among the various elements which go to make up 
the Indian empire. In this sphere of customs 
duties there appear to exist already the 
beginnings of a federal unity which may be of 
the greatest value in working towards the 
solution which all must desire. "cc;
Here the Government of India had officially recommended 
that an investigation into the relationship between the 
states and British India should be undertaken by the 
Statutory Commission. It was upon this basis that Irwin 
wished to initiate informal discussions with the Standing
54. ibid.
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Committee. Birkenhead, however, doubted the wisdom of
the Government of India's suggestion. The Statutory
Commission would be required to report only on British
Indian matters. Moreover: "We cannot feel certain that
combined enquiry would be acceptable either to Princes or
to British Indian opinion, since no-one knows what
composition of Commission may be."^ He also deprecated
any mention of federation as this "raises large questions
and may perhaps frighten the princes". Birkenhead in
fact thought that it would prove more convenient to dispose
first of an enquiry concerning the states in order that
the conclusions resulting therefrom could be available for
the Statutory Commission as a basis for its separate
57investigations.^' This idea was almost exactly the same 
as the one Bikaner had suggested to Reading in 1924; the 
essential difference being that at this stage Birkenhead 
was not prepared to commit himself as to how such an 
enquiry would be conducted or indeed what it would discuss. 
The Government of India accepted the observations of the 
Secretary of State. When Irwin addressed the Chamber in 
November he invited the Standing Committee to hold informal 
discussions with him. He emphasized that it would be 
premature for the Government of India to commit itself in 
regard to the question of customs policy but did esqpress 
the hope that the ultimate solution to the problem would 
be one tending "to unity and not to dissidence among the
56* ibid., S/S to Viceroy, telg., 15 November 1926.
57* ibid., S/S to Viceroy, telg., 14 November 1926.
172.
various elements which go tomake up the Indian Empire."^®
The informal discussions took place at Simla in 
May 1927* Present were the Maharajas of Alwar, Bikaner, 
Kashmir and Patiala, the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar and the 
Nawab of Bhopal. They were assisted by Sir Mirza Ismail, 
the Dewan of Mysore, Sir Prabhashankar Pattani, the Dewan 
of Bhavnagar, Sir Manubhai Mehta, the Dewan of Bikaner who 
also acted as representative for Baroda, Kailas Haksar on 
behalf of Gwalior and L.F. Rushbrook Williams on behalf of 
Patiala.^
Discussion focussed upon an Aide-Memoire which 
had been prepared by the princes. In it they ascribed 
their feeling of insecurity to two reasons: the infringement
of their treaty rights by the paramount power and their 
uncertain position with regard to their future relations 
with a self-governing British India. "The result of our 
stock-taking'1 said the Aide-Memoire, "has been increased 
realization of the fact that our position, during the last 
ten years of intensive developments in British India, has 
been adversely affected to a degree not generally appreciated." 
Thus in view of the forthcoming Statutory Commission on 
constitutional reform in British India it was essential 
that the position of the states should be investigated by 
a committee whose personnel "should be such as would be 
welcome to, and inspire confidence amongst the Indian 
States."^0
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In preparing the Aide-Memoire, the princes 
were unaware of the Government of India's opinion that 
they were not to he transferred to a responsible Indian 
government. They knew only of Reading's reluctance to 
commit himself to this view. They therefore devised a 
formula which made the Secretary of State and not the 
Viceroy the final authority on matters concerning the 
states. Moreover they suggested that if the powers of 
the Secretary of State were curtailed or even removed 
altogether by a further devolution of power in British 
India, there should be statutory machinery competent to 
adjudicate on disputes between the states and British 
India. The princes also wanted the suggested committee 
to report upon methods of harmonizing political practice 
and to recommend means of effective co-operation with 
British India on matters of common concern whereby the 
disabilities under which the states were labouring as a 
result of the financial policy of the Government of India 
would be removed. Finally the princes suggested that a 
distinguished British statesman like Lord Ronaldshay 
should preside over the committee which would consist of 
the following personnel: an eminent jurist, a member of
the Secretary of State's Council, representatives of the 
Government of India, an economist and financier of "European 
repute", some ruling princes and some ministers from the 
states
There was a fundamental contradiction in these 
proposals. While the princes sought legal protection in
61. ibid.
matters of dispute with British India, they also wanted
an effective voice in matters of common concern. The
princes were prepared to consider some form of economic
merger with British India but wanted to maintain their
distance politically. Evidently they were as yet unaware
that an economic union was to a large extent dependent
upon the consummation of some form of political association*
In reporting the informal discussions to
Birkenhead, Irwin confided that the princes were unclear
as to whqt they really wanted not only because of the
complexity of the problem but also because "they are
undoubtedly hampered by lack of ability in their Counsels
and by their temperamental incapacity to agree among
themselves." Indeed he believed that the only unanimity
63reached at the meeting was a "cordial dislike of Alwar."
The immediate problem confronting the Viceroy was to devise 
some means of making the princes realise that it was 
impossible to divorce their economic from their political 
future. He considered that while it would be premature 
to consider the hypothetical case of the relationship 
between the states and a responsible Indian government,
"it might not be impossible to approach the main political 
problem more indirectly through an enquiry ostensibly 
directed to economic and financial issues." He therefore 
suggested that an Indian States Committee should be appointed 
to enquire not only into the relationship between the states 
and the paramount power but also into the economic relations
62. Irwin to Birkenhead, 5 May 1927, Halifax Collection,No.5*
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No. 3.
between British India and the states and to make any
recommendations considered desirable for their more
64satisfactory adjustment. Irwin's idea was not for 
the committee to suggest a new constitutional relationship 
between the states and British India but for it to present 
its report on economic and financial issues in such a way
as to impress upon the princes that ultimately such a
relationship would be necessary.
In his response to Irwin*s suggestions, 
Birkenhead appeared at first to be contradicting himself. 
Having previously considered that it might be wise to 
dispense first with a states' enquiry, he now began to 
express doubts.^ Apparently when Birkenhead had 
suggested a separate states' enquiry in 1926, he had 
anticipated that it would serve only as a preliminary 
investigation into the economic and financial relations
between the states and British India. He had not
anticipated that it would discuss paramountcy. Indeed 
it was clear that the Viceroy and Secretary of State had 
different views about the possible results of a states' 
enquiry; whereas the former believed that it would above 
all induce the states to be more realistic in their 
attitude towards relations with British India, the latter 
was more concerned at the effect it might have on the 
paramountcy issue.
In December 1927 Birkenhead confessed that he 
was agreeing to the appointment of a states' committee as
64. Irwin to Birkenhead, 26 May 19271 Halifax Collection, 
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a matter of expediency only in order to show the princes
66that the government was not unaware of their anxieties.
His greatest fear was that the paramountcy findings of 
the Committee might satisfy the princes. On the one 
hand this would seriously hamper the conduct of the 
governments relations with the states, while on the other, 
"giving them a written constitution on their relationship 
with the paramount power” would in all probability "impede 
the adjustment of the states to any future developments in 
British I n d i a . B i r k e n h e a d * s  approval of a states* 
committee was therefore dependent upon Irwin impressing 
these considerations upon its designated chairman, Sir
Harcourt Butler. Realizing that Butler was likely to
6Rbe "out of touch” with the states, Birkenhead instructed 
Irwin to inform the former Foreign Secretary that there 
could be no weakening of the paramountcy question as 
expressed in Reading*s letter to the Nizam. The Secretary 
of State concluded:
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68. Butler's views on the states had not changed since 
he was Foreign Secretary during Minto's Viceroyalty.
In June 1927 he wrote to Irwin: "I should be very
sorry myself to see any popular body in British India 
interfere in any way with the Native States. They 
existed long before there was any idea of democratic 
institutions in India and they are an excellent foil. 
Also the Indian Princes are likely to be the best 
friends that we shall ever have... Democratic 
institutions have not succeeded anywhere in the East 
as yet, and although I am by no means a pessimist as 
regards India, I think it is a very large assumption 
to expect that they will blossom at an early date." 
Butler to Irwin, 1 June 1927* Butler Collection, No.61.
"Even granted that it may he in the interests 
of Great Britain (as many people think), no 
less than of the States themselves that they 
should he entrenched against an Indianized 
Government of India responsible to an Indian 
legislature, the dreaded day is remote, and 
we cannot afford in the meantime to entrench 
them against ourselves."^
It is clear, therefore, that the subsequent paramountcy 
recommendations of the Indian States Committee had been 
effectively prejudged before the Committee began its 
deliberations.
The personnel on the States1 committee, which 
arrived in India at the beginning of 1928, were a 
disappointment to the princes. Besides Butler, it 
consisted of two other members only; Professor V.S. 
Holdsworth, an eminent jurist, and Sidney Peel, a 
financier. The princes, however, were not as one in 
presenting their evidence before the committee. The 
Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes established 
a Special Organization, briefed by Sir Leslie Scott, K.C. 
and four other constitutional lawyers, to prepare a case 
on its behalf. Approximately three-quarters of the 
Chamber states associated themselves with the activities 
of the Special Organization which functioned under the 
guidance of Haksar, Williams and K.M. Panikkar. The 
larger states, however, continued to maintain their distance 
from the Chamber. Hyderabad, r'lysore, Baroda and Travancore 
chose to present their cases before the committee inde­
pendently. Rampur, Junagadh and some of the Kathiawar
70states adopted a similar course.(
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The case prepared by Sir Leslie Scott on 
behalf of the Standing Committee monopolised the 
proceedings of the Indian States Committee. Birkenhead's 
fears of what was likely to happen should the princes 
gain satisfaction on paramountcy were immediately 
confirmed by the strategy of the Standing Committee's 
advisers. Scott and his colleagues sought a positive 
assurance that paramountcy derived literally from the 
treaties between the government and the states. This 
was essential in order to secure for the princes 
permanent protection against interference either from 
the Political Department or subsequently from a self- 
governing British India. From this virtually unassail­
able position the princes would then be able to dictate 
the terms upon which they were prepared to reach an 
understanding concerning their relations with British India.
Scott's work consisted of three parts, the first
being an interpretation of paramountcy. He claimed that
the states had originally been independent and that they
had remained as such save to the extent that they had
transferred any part of their sovereignty to the Crown.
All sovereign rights not so transferred were vested in
the ruler of the state. As it was only in respect of
foreign affairs and internal and external security that
any sovereignty hsd been surrendered, the states were
therefore fully independent in matters concerning their
71internal administrations.
71. ibid., Appendix III, Joint Opinion of Sir Leslie Scott, 
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The second part concerned proposals for the 
Political Department. Scott recommended the virtual 
abolition of the department and its replacement by an 
"Indian States Council" consisting of the Viceroy, three 
princes or ministers, two "impartial” Englishmen and the 
Political Secretary. Each member of the council would 
subscribe to a solemn obligation to protect the interests 
and rights of the states. Future Viceroy's would take a 
separate oath to this effect upon assuming office.
Political officers would operate under the direction of 
the princes and there would be a royal proclamation 
limiting interference in the affairs of the states.
Finally, the Viceroy's intervention in the event of gross 
misgovernment in a state would be subject to the condition 
that he first consulted and took advice from the Indian 
States Council.^
The third and final part concerned the relations 
between the states and British India. Scott suggested 
the creation of a "Union Council" for discussion of 
matters of common concern. It would consist of repre­
sentatives from the Indian States Council together with 
representatives from the Governor-General's executive.
The interests of the states would be safeguarded by 
stipulations that the Governor-General's executive could 
not outvote the Indian States Council and that any proposal 
to which the latter objected would be withdrawn.^
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Irwin was cynical in his response to these 
proposals. He believed that Scott was not only mis­
leading the princes but also suffering from delusions of 
grandeur:
"I am afraid that his trouble really is that 
he convinced himself that his intervention 
at this juncture is one of the direct 
attempts of Providence to bring order into 
a disordered world and his critical faculty 
has suffered some obliteration under his 
enthusiasm."^
The Indian States Committee proceeded to dismantle 
Scott's contentions.
Acting upon instructions, Butler and his 
colleagues declared: "The relationship of the Paramount
Power with the states is not merely a contractual relation­
ship, resting on treaties made more than a century ago.
It is a living, growing relationship shaped by circum­
stances and policy, resting ..., on a mixture of history, 
theory and modern fact." Moreover it was not true that 
the states were originally independent: "Nearly all of
them were subordinate or' tributary to the Moghul empire, 
the Mahratta supremacy 01 the Sikh kingdom, and 
dependent on them. Some were rescued, others were 
created by the B r i t i s h . T h e  committee therefore 
concluded: "Paramountcy must remain paramount; it
must fulfil its obligations, defining or adapting itself 
according to the shifting necessities of the time and the 
progressive development of the States."^
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The Committee rejected the idea of an Indian 
States Council although it did suggest that more frequent 
discussion between the Standing Committee of the Chamber 
and the Political Department might lessen the friction 
between the two.^ However, the Committee also suggested 
a new and novel theory of intervention. If an insurrection 
which occurred in a state was due, not to misgovernment 
on the part of the ruler, but to a widespread popular 
demand for a change in the form of government, then the 
paramount power would be bound to take such measures as 
would satisfy this demand without eliminating the prince.
The Political Department's acquiescence in this recommend­
ation was typical. ' Watson thought it "unthinkable for 
many years to come" that the government would be required 
to act in this manner provided the autocratic rule of the 
princes was "tolerably just and efficient." Moreover, 
agitators who might stir up discontent "could always be 
won over by a prudent ruler who gave them employment in 
the state service.
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undated note on the "Position of the Government of 
India in supporting a Ruler against a demand of his 
subjects for a change in the methods of State Govern­
ment." As he had been in the case of Alwar, Watson 
was again proved wrong. In the summer of 1931 the
grievances of the Muslim population of Kashmir exploded 
into rioting and forced the Government of India to 
intervene with troops. The Hindu prince, Hari Singh, 
was subsequently obliged to inaugurate a council system 
of government and to appoint a commission of enquiry 
headed by a British official to investigate the Muslim 
grievances. For an account of the disturbances in 
Kashmir, see Prem Nath Bazaz, The History of the Struggle
for Freedom in Kashmir: From the gayiiggfr times to the
present day, New Delhi, 1954, pp.
In considering relations between the states 
and British India, Butler's committee recommended the 
appointment of an expert body to enquire into the 
’reasonable claims" of the states to a share in that 
part of the government's revenue which was derived from 
matters of common concern to the states and British India. 
It also suggested that policy on such matters as excise 
and postal arrangements should henceforth be decided
after joint consultation between the states and British
81India. These proposals were designed to prod the 
states in the direction intended by Irwin. Anything in 
advance of them, particularly any scheme of a "federal 
character" was deemed by the Committee to be wholly
8p
premature. Endorsing the opinion reached by Irwin's 
executive in 1926, the Committee concluded:
"For the present it is a practical necessity 
to recognize the existence of two Indias ... 
there is need for great caution in dealing 
with any question of federation at the 
present time so passionately are the Princes 
as a whole attached to the maintenance in its 
entirety and unimpaired of their individual 
sovereignty within their states."q^
Irwin's expectation of the Indian States 
Committee never materialized. The reason was that when 
the Committee presented its report in March 1929 the 
attention of the princes was riveted upon its paramountcy 
recommendations. Needless to say this aspect of the 
report horrified the princes of the Standing Committee..
80. Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-29* 
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81. ibid.
82. ibid., para. 66.
83. ibid., paras. 67 ancl 78*
For them it represented a complete repudiation of nine
84.
years prolonged, and often expensive, labour. Yet they
were not the only ones to feel aggrieved. The princes
in general were alarmed at the suggestion that the
government could suggest changes in the form of their
governments should popular demands for such arise. This
appeared to be an open invitation to their political
opponents to encourage agitation for change. Moreover,
in this respect it was significant that in December 1927
the first meeting of an All-India States* People's Conference
had been convened at Bombay. The conference had been
partly inspired by the government's refusal to allow the
forthcoming states committee to receive deputations from
subjects of the states on the grounds that this would
exceed its terms of reference. The conference, which
subsequently attracted the support of such prominent
Indian politicians as C.Y. Chintamani and N.C. Kelkar,
moved a resolution urging "responsible government for the
people of the Indian States through representative
85institutions under the aegis of their Rulers." y
The only consolation for the princes in the 
Butler Report was its recommendation, also advocated by 
Irwin's executive in 1926, that the states could not be 
transferred to a responsible Government of India and that 
accordingly relations with the princes should be conducted 
through the Viceroy and not the Governor-General in Council.
84. Scott's fees were estimated at £100,000.
85. R.L. Handa, History of the Freedom struggle in the 
Princely States, Hew Delhi, 1968V P> 31.
86. Renort of the Indian States Committee, 1928-29» 
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For the princes, however, events in British India seemed 
to emphasize the uncertainty of this solitary gain.
In February and March of 1928 an All-Parties 
Conference had been convened in British India with the 
object of devising a constitution for an Indian Dominion.
In the following August Motilal Nehru and Tej Bahadur 
Sapru presented the conference with details of such a 
constitution which became known as the Nehru Report.
With reference to the Indian States the report proposed 
that the new Indian Commonwealth would have the same 
rights and obligations towards the states arising out 
of the treaties as were exercised and discharged by the 
Government of India.^
For the princes a more alarming prospect could 
not be imagined. Moreover by 1929 it appeared to them 
that an attempt might be made to give effect to this 
threat. Jawaharlal Nehru and the radical wing of the 
Indian National Congress were annoyed that the Nehru 
Report had advocated Dominion Status instead of complete 
independence for India. With their attitude threatening 
to split the Congress, Gandhi emerged from his self­
enforced political retirement to effect a compromise.
At Calcutta in December 1928 the Congress confirmed 
Dominion Status as its goal, but threatened to resort to 
civil disobedience in order to achieve complete independence
oo
if dominionhood was not conceded by 31 December 1929*
87. All Parties Conference, 1928. Report of the Committee 
appointed by the Conference to determine the principles 
of the Constitution for India, 1928, cited in
C.H. Philips (ed.), The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 
1858-194-7: Select Documents, London, 19&2, P*233*
88. S.R. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, 1885-1929* 
London, 1965* P* 140.
When seen in the context of the report of the 
Indian States Committee, the Congress decision at 
Calcutta had placed the princes, particularly those 
on the Standing Committee, in an extremely invidious 
position. These princes had completely failed in their 
efforts to achieve that subtle balance whereby the 
paramount power would be strong enough to protect the 
states from a hostile British India but not to impinge 
upon their cherished rights. On the contrary, the 
Indian States Committee's definition of paramountcy 
seemed to invalidate these rights; its novel theory of 
intervention seemed to invite hostile action from British 
India; while the Congress decision at Calcutta seemed to 
confirm the imminent possibility of such action taking 
place. It was these considerations which prompted the 
latest recruit to the Standing Committee, Hamidullah, 
l^ he Nawab of Bhopal, to inform Irwin that the time had 
come for the British to distinguish between friends and 
enemies. Appealing for a rejection of the conclusions 
of the Indian States Committee and for the princes to be 
freed from all the restraints of intervention so that 
they could appear as effective rulers in the eyes of 
their subjects, Bhopal declared:
"You will, I am sure, find amongst the Princes 
of India certain Rulers who could be fully 
trusted and taken into confidence and who, in 
their turn, if they are well supported, would 
be of far greater use to you than any of the 
most influential and clever politicians in 
British India. I will go as far as to say 
that you will find them more useful and more 
tactful than many of the responsible Englishmen 
who are today guiding the destinies of the 
Indian Empire. These Rulers will be ready to
stand by you through thick and thin; and 
they will be able to collect behind them a 
power which none of the politicians would 
dare to flout or ignore, and which would 
always be at the disposal of the British. 
After all the fact remains that the utility 
of the Indian Princes has stood the test of 
time and trial. Is it therefore in the best 
interests of the Empire to create a position 
for them whereby they should cease to be a 
real factor in guiding the destinies of the 
country and thus strengthen the position of 
the British Indian politicians whose loyalty 
and allegiance to the Empire is not only 
debatable but is unquestionably non-existent? 
If you would only give us a chance and trust 
us, we would, God willing, prove ourselves 
worthy of the confidence reposed in us.Hg^
89. Bhopal to Irwin, 4 September 1929* Halifax Collection, 
No. 28.
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CHAPTER 5*
THE POLITICS OF AN ALL-INDIA 
FEDERATION: 1930-1935
Irwin used the opportunity of his mid-term 
leave in the summer of 1929 to take soundings from 
political opinion in Britain on proposals which he 
believed might forestall the Congress threat of civil 
disobedience. His intention was first to gain an 
assurance from the recently elected Labour Government 
that ultimate Dominion Status was implicit in the Montagu 
declaration of 1917* and secondly, to secure a promise 
that Indian leaders would be consulted on any conclusions 
the Government might reach upon the basis of the Statutory 
Commission's report before they were included in a new 
Government of India Act.^ Of the two, Irwin considered 
the latter to be the more problematical. It would be 
difficult to devise a suitable occasion for making such 
a declaration without implying a change in policy and 
also impairing to some extent the position of the Statutory 
Commission. Ultimately the questions raised by the 
report of the Indian States Committee and the obvious
1. In this respect Irwin was also attempting to atone for 
his own error of judgement. That India had been brought 
to the verge of civil disobedience was largely due to 
the Viceroy's insistence that the Statutory Committee 
should consist solely of representatives from the 
British parliamentary parties. The appointment of 
the Commission had been brought forward from 1929 to 
1927 by the Conservative government in an attempt to 
prevent a Labour government supervising its 
proceedings.
necessity of considering the future of the Indian States 
provided the only feasible opening. In London Irwin met 
with formidable opposition from spokesmen for the 
Conservative and Liberal parties who believed that both 
parts of the Viceroy's strategy would persuade Indians 
to believe that far-reaching constitutional changes were 
imminent. However, on 31 October 1929 a statement was 
issued to the effect that Dominion Status was implicit 
in the declaration of 1917* and representatives from 
British India and the Indian States were invited to 
convene a conference in London with the British Government 
for the purpose of discussing both British Indian and all- 
Indian problems.
Irwin was subsequently disappointed to find 
that his initiative had failed to prevent civil dis­
obedience. In part this was due to the uproar which 
greeted the statement in Britain. The hostility 
displayed during the debates in both the House of Commons 
and House of Lords was sufficient to convince many Indians 
of British insincerity. Above all, however, when Gandhi 
and Motilal Nehru met the Viceroy on 23 December they 
informed him that they would only attend the conference 
on the understanding that its task would be to draft a 
Dominion constitution. Irwin was in no position to give 
such an assurance with the result that when the Congress
2. Hailey to Goschen (acting Viceroy), 8 August 1929* 
Hailey Collection, No.156. Irwin discussed his 
strategy at length with Hailey shortly beforehis 
departure for England.
assembled at Lahore on 31 December 1929 it opted for 
civil disobedience and declared its goal to be complete 
independence.^
For the princes of the Standing Committee, 
however, the October statement represented a possible 
solution to their dilemma. The obdurance of Gandhi 
and Motilal had not doomed the London conference. On 
the contrary it was now more than ever essential that it 
should be a success. Moreover, as the princes were seen 
as an integral part of the conference, its success was in 
no small measure dependent upon the attitude that they 
would adopt. The Standing Committee princes therefore 
considered that they were in an exceptionally strong 
bargaining position. They would make their co-operation 
in any constitutional scheme that might result from the 
conference conditional upon a satisfactory settlement of 
paramountcy. Thus when these princes expressed readiness 
to reconsider their relationship with British India they 
did so purely with the intention of subverting paramountcy.
This became apparent at the Chamber session of 
February 1930. The proceedings were monopolised by a 
deliberate assault upon paramountcy. In his opening 
speech as Chancellor, Patiala welcomed the conference 
invitation but quickly moved on to accuse the Indian 
States Committee of ’’having gone further than the most 
ardent champion of the Political Department.” He also 
declared that the ’’findings of the Committee,unless they
3. S.R. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, 1883-1929» 
London, 1965* p. 14-2.
are agreed to by the Chamber, should not be considered 
as authoritative pronouncements or interpreted as
L\.
political practice binding against the States.” Similar 
sentiments were voiced in speeches by Alwar, Bikaner,
Kashmir and the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar.
Irwin was surprised by the vehemence of the 
onslaught, particularly as this was the first occasion 
upon which the proceedings of the Chamber had been made 
public. He considered that the princes had committed a 
"tactical error” in attacking paramountcy in this manner 
because he believed that in the absence of popular 
government in the states many people in British India 
regarded the protection afforded by paramountcy as the 
sole refuge for the subjects of the princes. The Viceroy 
subsequently asked for authority to meet the princes in the 
near future in order to dissuade them from disputing 
paramountcy any further.^
It was evident from Irwin's reaction to the 
Chamber session that he was unaware of the Standing 
Committee's motives. This was not the case with the more 
astute Sir Robert Holland in the India Office. Holland 
realized that the princes were not concerned with con­
ciliating British Indian opinion because they were convinced 
that paragraph 58 of the Butler Report [which declared that 
the states should not be transferred to a responsible Indian 
government} would be accepted. Holland argued that from 
this starting point the Committee's tactics were to divide
4. Chamber of Princes, February 1930*
5. PIC. 1931-50, Coll. 11, File 12, No. 1848/1930, 
Viceroy to S/S, telg. 15 March 1930.
sovereignty between themselves and the Crown, thus 
restricting the paramount power's intervention in their 
internal affairs and eliminating its discretionary 
element: "They regard this as the bargain issue upon
which their co-operation in a Federal scheme depends."
This analysis led the former A.G.G. to believe that the 
only way of countering the Committee's "carefully thought 
out strategical plan" was to inform them that just as the 
question of paramountcy was sub judice so the same applied 
to paragraph 58 of the Butler Report. Wedgwood Benn, 
the Labour Secretary of State, accepted this conclusion 
and advised Irwin to communicate it to the princes.*'7
Holland's analysis, though undoubtedly correct, 
was slightly premature in its assumption that the Standing 
Committee was contemplating federation. In May 1950 the 
Statutory Commission reported that the evolution of a 
federal association "will be slow and cannot be rashly 
pressed." The Commission therefore limited its recommen­
dation to the establishment of a Council of Greater India 
with consultative and deliberative functions on matters
o
of common concern to the states and British India.
It was upon the basis of this recommendation 
that the Standing Committee initially approached the 
subject of constitutional reform. During an informal 
conference held at Simla in July 1950, members of the 
Committee, together with representatives from Baroda, 
Hyderabad and Mysore, told Irwin that although the princes
6. ibid., Holland's note, 20 March 1930. Holland had been
knighted in 1925 upon the expiry of his term of office
as A.G.G. in Rajputana and his appointment to the 
Secretary of State's India Council.
7. ibid., S/S to Viceroy, telg., 26 March 1930.
8. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, Cmd. 3569 * 1930
11, paras, 228 and 568.
realized that an "All-India Federation may possibly prove 
the most satisfactory solution of India's problem", they 
considered that the offer of a "Council of Greater India 
should be accepted without hesitation, subject to safe­
guards ... dealing with matters of concern."^ Reference 
was also made to the need for a satisfactory settlement 
of the paramountcy question which, according to the 
Standing Committee, would be essential even if the
forth co ming round table conference left the position of
10the central government unchanged.
Irwin's role at the July conference was based 
upon the assumption that the princes were not contemplating 
immediate federation. Despite the reference to paramountcy 
the Viceroy did not therefore consider that the Standing 
Committee was in a bargaining position. Moreover, this 
being the case, he saw no need to inform the princes that 
paragraph 58 of the Butler report was still sub judice. 
Instead Irwin virtually assured them on this point by 
indicating that in future the Viceroy would act apart from 
his council on matters concerning the states. He also 
agreed to discuss questions relating to paramountcy with 
the Standing Committee upon their return from the round 
table conference; an agreement which convinced Irwin that 
there was no danger of paramountcy being raised at the
9. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 12, No.1848/1930, Minutes 
of the proceedings of an informal conference held at 
Simla, 14 and 15 July 1930.
10. ibid.
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conference.11
The Viceroy maintained his belief that neither
federation, nor consequently paramountcy, would be discussed
at the round table conference throughout the remainder of
the summer and the autumn of 1930. In a Reforms Despatch
of September 1930, theGovernment of India endorsed the
Statutory Commission^ "distant ideal of an All-India
Federation" but recognized that "the time had not yet come
when the general body of Indian states would be prepared to
take a step so far-reaching in its character as to enter
12any federal relations with British India." On 1 October
Irwin wrote of the princes: "Whatever lip-service [they]
may pay to the federal idea, they will, when it comes to
the point, want to begin through some consultative machinery
13before they burn any boats."  ^ Within a month it was
11. ibid., No. 4592A/1930, Viceroy to S/S, telg. 17 July 
1930. The Political Department of the India Office 
was unpleasantly surprised by the proceedings of the 
July Conference. It was felt that Irwin had gone too 
far in committing the government, particular disquiet 
being expressed that he had not informed the princes 
that paragraph 58 of the Butler report was still sub 
judice. A departmental minute commented: "The 
general impression left by the proceedings is that 
the princes have on the whole scored." ibid.,
No. P5189/1930, minute dated 19 August 1930. Nor 
was the India Office as confident as the Viceroy that 
paramountcy would not be raised at the round table 
conference. The Political Secretary, Paul J. Patrick, 
believed that it would be raised, if not by the princes, 
then by the British Indian delegates when discussing 
the future relationship between the states and the 
central government, ibid. NO.4-592A/1930, Patrick*s 
note, 24- July 1930.
12. Government of India Despatch on Proposals for Consti­
tutional Reform, 20 September I950» Cmd.5700> 193&* para.16.
13. Irwin to Fisher, 1 October 1930, Halifax Collection,
No. 19.
evident that Irwin had miscalculated. From London,
Sapru explained why tohis son: "The only organized party 
here is that of the Princes and they are taking very 
progressive lines. They are ready to join the All-
_  1 ZL
India Federation ... at once."
The initiative for an immediate All-India 
Federation came from Hyderabad. Responsibility for it 
lay with Lieutenant-Oolonel Terence H. Keyes who became 
Resident in the state in February 1930. Keyes was 
disturbed by that part of the Statutory Commission's 
report which dealt with British Indian reform. The prospect 
of autonomous provinces growing into a powerful British- 
Indian Federation was not one that could be recommended 
to the princes, particularly to the Nizam. According to 
Keyes this type of political development would strengthen 
the regional movements in Maharashtra, Andhra and Berar 
and enable them to seize the first available opportunity 
of attacking the Muslim oligarchy in Hyderabad. Further­
more, Hyderabad had to consider its economic interests. 
Unlike the states of Rajputana and Central and Western 
India, Hyderabad in common with Mysore, the other major 
southern state, was landlocked. Whereas the former 
category of states could maintain their economic survival 
upon the basis of the ports of the Kathiawar peninsula, 
Hyderabad and Mysore were totally dependent for their 
economic existence upon the goodwill of the neighbouring 
provinces. Keyes concluded that the only salvation for
14. Sapru to Ranjit, 14 November 1930, Sapru Collection, 
10L Microfilm, 1st series, R. 66.
Hyderabad lay in its recognition of British paramountcy
and its immediate entry into an organic all-India
federation. By so doing, the Nizam would not only be
able to prevent "plots" being "hatched" against Hyderabad
but also to secure a more favourable economic future for
the state.^
The Nizam was impressed by these arguments for
two reasons. First, by 1930 he was beginning to realize
the implications of the fact that his state was landlocked.
When Keyes arrived as Resident he found the Nizam busily
re-examining Hyderabad's commercial treaty of 1802 with
its promise of a free port at Masulipatam on the Madras 
16coast. Secondly, it made a pleasant change for the 
Nizam to have a Resident more interested in securing a 
stable future for Hyderabad than in condemning his personal 
conduct. Keyes subsequently assumed that the Nizam had 
agreed to favour all-Indian federation and to admit British 
paramountcy. His first assumption was correct but his 
second required an important qualification. The precarious 
position of his state made the Nizam realize that it would 
be impracticable to impose general restrictions upon the 
exercise of paramountcy. At the same time, however, his 
determination to rid himself of the restrictions upon his 
own ruling powers remained unchanged. The result was an 
ambiguous situation in which the Nizam approved the 
principles of an omnipotent paramountcy provided that 
they were not applied within his state.
15* Keyes to Nizam, 30 June 1930, Keyes Collection, 
No.28.
16. Keyes to Watson, 13 April 1930, Keyes Collection, 
No.28.
Evidently Keyes, who was quite taken with the
Nizam,^ did not realize this. In the month preceding
the Simla conference he continually petitioned both
Viceroy and Political Department to lend their support to
his proposals. He was also anxious to be present at Simla
because he was deeply concerned at the calibre of the
in
delegation Hyderabad was sending to the/formal Conference.
It was to be led by Sir Akbar Hydari, Finance Member of
Hyderabad*s executive council. Keyes had nothing but
contempt for Hydari. He confided to Sir George Cunningham,
Irwin*s private secretary, that although Hydari had
originally been in favour of federation, he had changed
his mind as a result of Congress threats to his mill-owning
interests, in Bombay. According to Keyes these had
’’frightened the wits out of that chicken-hearted little
creature” with the result that the Hyderabad delegation
at Simla would pursue ”a timorous course of wait and see
in the hope that an opportunity will occur of bargaining
18in the true baniah spirit.”
Much to his annoyance, Keyes was refused 
permission to be present at Simla although on the eve of 
the conference he was able to persuade the Nizam to 
telegraph instructions to his delegation that he was 
prepared to enter an all-India federation under due
17* Keyes wrote to Irwin of the Nizam: ”... the queer
little creature - he’s so pathetically anxious to be 
liked; he never seems to tear malice; takes every 
setback with good humour and, within his limitations,
I believe, really means to do well.” Keyes to Irwin, 
4 May 1930, Keyes Collection, No.28.
18. Keyes to Cunningham, 5 July 1930, Keyes Collection,
No.28.
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19safeguards. y The telegram, however, arrived too late 
to influence the conference proceedings. On hearing of 
this, Keyes was furious. He subsequently attributed 
the fact that he had not been allowed to attend to an 
attempt by the Political Department to sabotage the 
idea of a federation before it got off the ground. Of 
an equally serious nature, he also accused the department 
of deliberately misrepresenting Irwin's views. In a 
letter to Sir Denys Bray, Foreign Secretary to the 
Government of India, Keyes declared that the department 
was so obsessed by the picture of an Indian India and a 
British India portayed in the report of the Indian States 
Committee that they were working in a way that would make 
an all-India federation impossible:
"To me this is the madness that the gods send 
before destruction... What Butler calls British 
India is Just that part of India that is trying 
to repudiate all that is British.•• What he calls 
Indian India is that part that wants to retain 
the British connection. Swaraj India and 
Maharaja's India are mixed up like the bits 
of a jigsaw puzzle, and everywhere they touch 
there will be continued friction.”
In the same letter, Keyes restated his belief in 
federation as the only means to avoid such friction and 
expressed his disquiet that Irwin was being unwittingly
"manoeuvred” into accepting the Political Department's
POpoint of view.
The idea that an attempt had been made to 
sabotage the federal idea in the summer of 1950 re-
19* Nizam to Hyderabad delegation, 9 July 1950, Keyes
Collection, No.20.
20. Keyes to Bray, 21 July 1950, Keyes Collection, No.28.
appeared six years later in the India Office. In April 
1936 the Political Department of the India Office was 
astonished to read the following extract from the 
appendix to an Administration Report from Hyderabad for 
the year October 1932 to October 1933:
"Rightly anticipating in the light of the 
discussions with certain Princes and repre­
sentatives of other States that took place 
in Simla in July 1930 that Federation was 
likely to become an immediate issue, Sir 
Akbar Hydari, in consultation with his 
colleagues, drew on the voyage to England 
a federal scheme in broad outline.
Paul J. Patrick, the Political Secretary at the India 
Office, commented that this was the first time his
department had heard of any reference to federation at
22the Simla Conference. Sir Findlater Stewart, a member
of the Secretary of State’s India Council, remarked that
it was the first time any department in London had heard
23mention of it. y The Under-Secretary of State,
R.A. Butler, summed up the general impression in the 
India Office: "Presumably there were persons in official
circles in India at the time who hoped to see the idea 
overlaid at birth. Evidently the Government of India
had not seen fit to inform the India Office in July 1930 
that the Nizam was prepared to contemplate federation.
21. PIC, 1931-50, Coll.11, File 57(2), NO.PY564/1936, 
Appendix to Hyderabad Administration Report, 6 
October 1932 -5 October 1933* "Note on the Round 
Table Conference."
22. ibid., Patrick's note, 9 April 1936.
23* ibid., Findlater Stewart's note, 20 April 1936.
24. ibid., Butler's note, 19 April 1936.
However, the accusations made by Keyes cannot 
be accepted at face-value. His claim that the Political 
Department was "manoeuvering" Irwin was certainly false.
The Viceroy was just as much impressed by the notion of 
"two Indias" as was the Political Department. He was 
quite content with the recommendation for a Council of 
Greater India because this accorded with the conclusions 
reached by the sub-committee of his council in 1926. In 
the meantime Irwin wanted to deal with the more pressing 
problem of the British Indian centre. Hence the recommen­
dation in the Government of India's Reforms Despatch to 
make the government "responsive" to the central legislature 
except on matters such as defence, foreign relations, 
internal security, finance, protection of minorities and
the protection of services recruited by the Secretary of 
25State. ^ As for the Political Department itself, Watson 
had already recorded his views on federation at the time 
of Holland's warning about the paramountcy strategy of 
the Standing Committee. Although the Political Secretary 
realized that the princes would welcome, and indeed press, 
for "any federation with British India which would leave 
the internal administration of the states unchanged and 
intact", he doubted if any, with the possible exceptions 
of the Maharajas of Mysore and Travancore, would agree to 
a federation which involved the grant of constitutional 
government to their subjects. Moreover, according to
25. Government of India Reforms Despatch, para. 116.
Watson: Mwithout such a grant true Federation scheme
with British India seems impracticable,** It would 
appear therefore that the Political Department was not 
going to lend any encouragement to federation while the 
paramountcy issue remained unsettled. Finally it is 
significant that Irwin and the Political Department shared 
a profound mistrust of both Keyes and the Nizam, The 
Resident was not liked in official circles. Irwin*s 
successor, Lord Willingdon described him as ,fone of 
those people who rather likes spreading themselves and 
has to be watched pretty closely.*1^  Statements 
emanating jointly from Keyes and the Nizam were thus 
inevitably suspect to Irwin and Watson. Indeed it 
appears that in July 1930 both Viceroy and Political 
Department had preconceived ideas on federation which 
they saw no need to change in view of the opinion expressed 
by the general body of princes and ministers present at 
Simla. They therefore dismissed the recommendation for 
an immediate federation as the work of two misfits.
Between the Simla conference and the opening in 
November of the first round table conference in London, 
certain representatives of the states began to reconsider 
their attitude towards federation. The first to do were 
Haksar and Panikkar on behalf of the Special Organization 
of the Chamber. In August 1930 they completed the first
26. Watson's memo, 28 March 1930, cited in R.J. Moore,
The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940, Oxford, 1974, 
p;"'i29:------ ---------------  -----------
27* Willingdon to Hoare, 19 March 1934, Templewood
Collection No.7 (Samuel Hoare was created Viscount 
Templewood in 1944).
draft of a book, later to appear on the opening day of 
the London conference with the title "Federal India", 
which contemplated the grant of complete responsible 
government to British India save for the transfer to a 
federal council of matters of common concern to the 
states and British India. This conception of federation 
was precisely that which Holland had warned against. A 
large part of Federal India was devoted to describing 
how, in return for British India achieving central 
responsibility, the states would obtain complete internal
po
autonomy safeguarded by a supreme court. The scheme . 
therefore had obvious attractions to the Standing 
Committee princes.
In late August 1930 a similar scheme of 
federation was evinced by Sir Mirza Ismail, Dewan of 
Mysore. At a conference of South Indian states held 
in Bangalore, Ismail declared himself to be at variance 
with the way the Statutory Commission had surrounded 
their vision of a federal India "with the misty twilight 
of a distant future." In his concluding remarks at the 
conference Ismail recommended "a constitution which 
provides full autonomy in the Provinces, responsibility 
at the Centre (subject to such transitional safeguards 
as may be unavoidable) and a closer association between 
British India and the States in matters of common concern." 
Ismail, however, was not influenced by paramountcy
28. K.N. Haksar and K.M. Panikkar, Federal India, 
London, 1930.
29* Madras Mail, 22 August 1930.
considerations. He was concerned at the growth of
vocal opinion among the subjects of the states against
the continuation of autocracy and his suggestion was
largely inspired by a States’ People’s Conference which
had met simultaneously with that of the South Indian
■50states at Bangalore.^ Ismail was also influenced by 
the consideration that if Mysore entered a federation it 
might gain relief from the heavy burden of tribute which 
it paid to the British Government.
In September of 1930 a yet further scheme of 
federation appeared from Hyderabad. The initiative this 
time rested with Sir Akbar Hydari who had real cause to 
reconsider his previous attitude. The responsible 
British Indian centre envisaged in the Haksar-Panikkar 
and Ismail schemes was, as Keyes had indicated, a serious 
threat to Hyderabad’s existence and the autocracy of the 
Nizam. Hydari therefore sketched a plan for federation 
which involved the abolition of the British Indian centre 
and its replacement by a small ’’aristocratic” federal 
assembly consisting of 36 provincial representatives,
24 state representatives and 12 Crown nominees. All 
matters of common concern would come under federal juri­
sdiction, while all remaining British Indian subjects 
would be completely provincialized. Reserved subjects, 
particularly foreign affairs, political relations with 
the states, defence, finance and law and order would
30. ibid., see also PIC. 1931-50, Coll. 11, File 5,
fto.7639/1930, Departmental note on impression gained 
in conversation with representatives of Indian States 
at the approaching Round Table Conference,
31 October 1930.
203
remain as such under the jurisdiction of the Crown.^
Hydari explained his scheme to Sir George Schuster,
Finance Member of the Government of India, on the 
voyage to London for the opening of the conference.
Schuster, though appreciate of Hydari’s concern to 
eliminate ’’the popular demagogues from British India”, 
pointed out that British Indian politicians would never 
accept the abolition of their ’’central political stage. 
Hydari therefore revised his scheme to accommodate a 
British Indian centre. However, he was emphatic that 
the activities of this centre were in no way to influence 
those of the federal assembly. Thus the British Indian 
representatives in the assembly were not to be indirectly 
elected from those who held seats in the British Indian 
centre but directly from the individual provinces.^
Despite the varying motives which had produced
these schemes, the delegation of princes and their advisers
arrived in London in late October 1930 and appointed a
committee to consider the attitude that they should adopt
34-towards federation. On 2 November they reached agreement
31. Hydari*s note, 2 October 1930, Reading Collection, No.56e.
32. Schuster to Irwin, 9 October 1930, Halifax Collection, No.19.
33* Hydari's undated later supplement, Reading Collection,
No•56e.
34-. The Indian States delegation included all members of the 
Standing Committee - the Maharajas of Alwar, Bhopal,
Bikaner, Kashmir, Patiala and the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar; 
Manubhai Mehta and Kailas Haksar from the Chamber*s 
Special Organisation plus seven other members chosen 
by Irwin. Four of the premier states were represented - 
Hyderabad by SirAkbar Hydari, Mysore by Sir Mirza Ismail, 
Gwalior by Sahibzada Ahmed -^ han and Baroda by the Gaekwar, 
Prabhashankar Pattani represented those states under 
minority administrations, Gulab Singh, the Maharaja of 
[contd. overj.
that the states should join with British India in a 
federal structure for joint control of matters of common 
concern. ^ This attitude had a marked effect upon the 
other delegations to the Conference, both British and 
Indian.
Sir Malcolm Hailey had been sent to London as 
a constitutional adviser. On 14 November he wrote back 
to Irwin:
"If the movement of the Princes can be guided 
on to really useful lines, there is something 
of real substance behind it, because if we 
could obtain a Federal Assembly in which they 
were well represented, and in which the Viceroy 
would have a wide nomination in order to dis­
charge his responsibilities to Parliament, then 
we should all of us be prepared to go further in 
the way of responsible Government than we should 
if matters took their ordinary line in develop­
ment of the proposals of Simon or the Government 
of India. As I suggested to a friend the other 
day, the proposal may possibly be merely a good 
red herring but, if we are lucky, it may actually 
turn out to be a good 'fishable salmon'."^
This was an accurate appraisal of the official British 
mind. The Conservative and Liberal parties in partic­
ular were agreed that the princes' initiative had given 
them the basis for a twofold strategy to pursue at the 
conference. During the preliminary stages of the 
conference spokesmen for these two parties had been
34. [contdQ. Rewa, represented the so-called conservative 
states and the Chief of Sangli was chosen to 
represent the smaller states.
35* Barbara Nell Ramusack, "Indian Princes as Imperial 
Politicians, 1924-1939% unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Michigan, p. 256.
36. Hailey to Irwin, 14 November 1930, Halifax Collection, 
No.19 (Lord Simon chaired the Statutory Commission].
obsessed with the fear that when discussion commenced 
the British Government would be confronted with a united 
demand for Dominion Status. Now,however, the princes'
federal initiative could be used on the one hand to 
divert attention from Dominion Status, while on the 
other it could prove of more lasting value in dealing 
with the vexed problem of how much power should be 
transferred to Indian control in the central government. 
Lord Reading, Liberal spokesman on India remarked: "If
the Simon Commission and the Government of India had 
known what we now know they'd have written very different 
r e p o r t s . F o r  the Conservatives, Samuel Hoare 
subsequently submitted a memorandum for the consideration 
of his party's Business Committee in which he spoke of 
federation extricating British India "from the morass 
into which the doctrinaire liberalism of Montagu had 
plunged it." Moreover, with a federal constitution 
Britain could "yield a semblance of responsible government
and yet retain ... the realities and verities of ...
38control."^ Clearly for the Conservatives federation 
was indeed to become another "good red herring."
The final link in the federal chain was Sapru, 
head of the Indian Liberal delegation. According to 
Hailey, Sapru had in fact arrived in London with the 
intention of demanding a declaration in favour of Dominion
37. Minutes of Liberal Delegation meeting, 19 November 
1930, Reading Collection, No.56g.
38. Hoare's memorandum, "Conservative Policy at the 
Round Table Conference", 12 December 1930, Templewood 
Collection, No.52(1).
Status. He did not succeed because the Muslim delegates
refused to contemplate such action without corresponding
guarantees for their own position.^ Sapru was therefore
obliged to consider federation with the states as the
only means of acquiring some form of central responsibility.
At the end of November he wrote to a colleague in India:
"if we leave the States out, we shall get nothing, and
certainly responsibility at the Centre, with a unitary
4-0form of Government is not going to come to us.,f Indeed
it was Sapru who helped Bikaner write his speech agreeing
to join a federation which the Maharaja delivered on
behalf of the princes when the conference opened on
17 November 1930.^
Irwin was astonished when he received news of
events in London. He wrote to his father that he doubted
42if the princes realized what they were doing. Certainly 
in the case of Hyderabad it was clear that when the 
conference closed in January 1931> Hydari had been 
manoeuvred into a position which he had not intended.
Largely at the insistence of Sapru and the Hindu Liberals, 
the Federal Structure Committee which had been appointed 
by the conference recommended that the federal authority 
should ultimately inherit such central subjects as income 
tax,'civil and criminal law, and law and order from the 
Government of India. Sapru and his colleagues sought a
39. Hailey to Irwin, 14 November 1930, Halifax Collection, 
No.19.
40. Sapru to Setalvad, 29 November 1930, Sapru Collection, 
IOL Microfilm, 1st series, S. 131•
41. Ramusack, op.cit., p.239*
42. Irwin to Viscount Halifax, 23 November 1930, Halifax 
Collection, No.2?.
strong federal authority with a wide range of powers 
in order to make a reality of central responsibility.
The Muslim delegates objected to this because they wanted 
to avoid a Hindu dominated centre and preferred that 
these subjects should be devolved upon the provinces.
Having previously envisaged that the federal authority 
would only discuss a limited number of subjects of common 
concern, Hydari had similar misgivings. Furthermore, 
the Federal Structure Committee recommended a bicameral 
federal legislature with representatives from British 
India and the states in both houses to replace the 
existing central legislature. Hydari was thus confronted 
with a much closer association with British India than he 
had originally intended. In India, the Nizam responded 
to this situation by insisting that his accession to 
Federation would be conditional upon receipt of a written 
assurance that the Crown would possess the "moral and 
material means" of protecting his state in accordance 
with the terms of his treaties.  ^ Whether or not Britain 
could give the Nizam such an assurance subsequently became 
a key factor in determining Hyderabad's attitude towards 
federation.
Hydari's misgivings did not influence the princes 
of the Standing Committee. Federation for them was 
primarily a means to gain autonomy in their internal 
affairs. This was just beginning to dawn upon Irwin:
43. PIC. 1931-30, Coll.11, File 6, No.PY706(1931), The 
Nizam's instruction to the Hyderabad delegation 
before the Second Round Table Conference, 9 August 
1931.
"I am not sure... that they may not have some ideas
in their minds of using federation to get rid of the
exercise of paramountcy.1 Hailey confirmed the
impression: ’They seem to he out for the extinction
of the Political Department, rather than the creation
of a Federal constitution.”^  The princes of the
Committee revealed their true colours at meetings they
held with the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, on
3 December 1950 and 9 January 1951. At the first
Bikaner threatened that the princes would be unable to
federate until they knew what their position was regarding 
46paramountcy. At the second Bikaner, supported by
Alwar and Patiala, declared that the princes were "up 
against a stone-wall of departmental prejudice” in India 
and that a "high legal luminary" from Britain was required 
to supplement the personnel of the Political Department.^
From India, Watson's response to these discussions 
was truly remarkable. The Political Secretary declared 
that he might even be prepared to abandon non-interference 
in order to counter the Standing Committee's assault upon 
paramount cy. Moreover, in stark contrast to his previous 
utterances, Watson now considered that the policy of non­
interference had resulted in "an increase of irresponsible 
autocracy and lessened protection and benefit to the
44. Irwin to Lawrence, 17 November 1950, Halifax 
Collection, No.19.
45. Hailey to Irwin, 20 November 1950, Halifax Collection, 
No..19.
46. PIC. 1951-50, Coll.11, File 3, No.6590/1950, Note on 
Proceedings at a meeting in the Prime Minister's room,
3 December 1930.
47. PIC. 1951-50, Coll.11, File 7, pt.l. No.6590/1950,
Note on Proceedings at a meeting in the Prime Minister's 
room, 9 January 1951*
states subjects." He concluded: "The more the
Paramountcy presses upon the States, forcing them to
improve the conditions of their subjects, the more ready
they will be to welcome a Federation on really effective
terms as an alternative or to escape the rigours of
intervention by granting their people some effective
48voice m  the administration*" This was not the first
occasion upon which the Political Department had used
the truth about non-interference merely to justify its
own authority in the states.
Irwin's reaction to the discussions was
essentially to repeat the foreboding expressed three
years previously by Birkenhead when he had authorized
the appointment of an Indian States Committee. It was
only now that the Viceroy became fully conversant with
the tactics of the Standing Committee. He realized that
if, in addition to an assurance being given that the
states would never be transferred to a responsible Indian
government, large concessions were made over paramountcy,
49then the princes would have no need for federation.
Irwin anticipated difficulties during the paramountcy 
discussions he had promised the Standing Committee when 
they returned from London. However, at the Committee's 
own request, these discussions were postponed.
One of the reasons for this postponement was 
that Irwin's term of office would expire in April 1951
48. GOI. FPD. No.3 - Special (Secret), 1951» Watson*s 
note, 5 January 1951.
49. PIC. 1951-50, Coll.11, File 3, No.8576/1950, 
Viceroy to S/S, telg. 8 December 1950.
and the Committee felt that the issue could not he 
fully discussed in the short time before he was due to 
leave. The main reason, however, was that personal 
rivalries were beginning to disrupt the Committee.
Bikaner and Patiala had always felt a mutual antipathy. 
Their close co-operation for a decade could not conceal 
the fact that Patiala greatly resented Bikaner's 
reputation as a more capable and experienced statesman. 
Friction between the two came to a head in March 1951 
when Bikaner's support for the Nawab of Bhopal enabled 
the latter to defeat Patiala by a narrow margin in the 
elections for the Chancellorship of the Chamber of Princes.
Patiala's reaction to his defeat took the form 
of an attack upon the federal scheme adopted at the first 
round table conference. On 15 June 1951 he published a 
pamphlet entitled "Federation and the Indian States." 
Denouncing federation as a "radical innovation" which 
"subverts the very basis of the well-tried and time- 
honoured political institutions of the states", Patiala 
suggested instead that the Chamber of Princes should be 
enlarged into a "Union of States" from which a Standing 
Committee would confer with a Standing Committee of the
51British Indian legislature on matters of common concern. 
Patiala was undeterred when a meeting of princes in Bombay 
in July rejected his scheme. In August he joined forces 
with his cousin, the Maharaja of Dholpur, to produce a
50. Ramusack, op.cit., pp. 268-270.
51. PIC. 1951-50, Coll.11, File 44, No.1055/1951, 
Patiala's "Note on Federation and the Indian States", 
released to the press, 15 June 1951.
further scheme for a confederation of states. This
envisaged that an enlarged Chamber of Princes would 
operate as an electoral college for the purpose of 
electing state representatives to the federal legis­
latures. Provision was made for responsibility to be 
exercised in a federal executive but only in respect of 
matters which were strictly of common concern to the 
states and British India.^
Neither Patiala nor Dholpur could claim to 
have originated the confederation scheme. This honour 
rested with Sir Prabhashankar Pattani, regent to the
Maharaja of Bhavnagar, ruler of one of the Kathiawar
con
states. Pattani had recommended/federation at the first 
round table conference on the grounds that it would enable 
the states to "perpetuate their existence, for, standing 
together as a collective body, they can induce British 
India to take account of their united strength." For 
the states to federate individually would "only result 
in the individual state being swallowed up."^
Pattani's ideas appealed particularly to the 
smaller states and to their principal spokesmen, the 
Chief of Sangli and the Raja of Sarila. Their size 
and collective number meant that the small states would 
never gain individual representation in an all-Indian 
federation. Confederation, however, would provide them 
with an opportunity of influencing the election of state 
delegates to the federal legislatures. The attractions
52. ibid., No.1657/1951» The Dholpur-Patiala scheme for 
a Confederation of States.
53* Sir P. Pattani, "The Indian States: A letter on their
relations with British India", September 1950, Templewood 
Collection, No.53a (2A).
that confederation held for the smaller states was
primarily responsible for Patiala's support for the
confederate cause. By championing the interests of
the smaller states he hoped to strengthen his chances
of regaining the Chancellorship of the Chamber. Patiala's
manoeuvres infuriated Bikaner and Bhopal who found
themselves bombarded with demands from the smaller
states that they were entitled to individual representation
in an enlarged Chamber of Princes. Bikaner spent a
large part of the summer of 1951 threatening the smaller
states that if they persisted their larger brethren would
have to "seek protection by securing a plurality of votes
for themselves in the Chamber, and also in both Federal
Houses and elsewhere, which might be more proportionate
54to their size and importance."^
Confederation also appealed to those states 
whose geographical location made them particularly 
susceptible to agitation directed from British India.
Indeed this was Dholpur's main reason for supporting 
confederation. The Maharaja was said to stand in "great 
dread" of the influx of democratic propaganda from the 
contiguous district of Agra.^ In this respect confed­
eration had attractions for a conservative prince like 
Gulab Singh, the Maharaja of Rewa. The state of Rewa 
was less than one hundred miles from Allahabad in the 
United Provinces, a point which Gulab Singh had stressed
54. GOI• FPD. No. 5(5) Special, 1951> Nos.1-3, Bikaner's 
circular letter to princes, 11 July 1951*
55* "Attitude of the Indian States Delegation towards 
Federation", memorandum by Sir Reginald Glancy, a 
member of the Secretary of State's India Council,
1 September 1950, Templewood Collection, No.55A.
to Watson in 1930 when some of his more recalcitrant 
thakurs had attempted to settle a dispute by securing 
the mediation of Jawaharlal Nehru.^ However, Rewa 
could never become firmly entrenched in the Patiala- 
Dholpur camp. As a conservative prince he greatly 
resented the domination of the Chamber princes and the 
facilities they enjoyed for appearing to represent the 
states as a whole. He would never tolerate dictation 
from the Chamber princes which the electoral college 
implied. Moreover Rewa did not share Patiala's 
paramountcy views which had remained unchanged by his 
support for confederation. Unlike Patiala, Rewa 
believed that an unrestricted paramountcy would still 
be necessary to protect the states from British Indian 
agitation whatever form the future Government of India 
might take. Rewa was therefore prepared to accept that 
he could never be completely independent in the conduct 
of his internal affairs.-^ On paper confederation
56. GOI. FPD. No. 148 - Political (Secret), 1930, Gulab 
Singh to Watson, 15 July 1930.
57* Rewa had expressed these opinions to Irwin Just 
before the Viceroy initiated his first informal 
discussions with the princes in 1927* see GOI. FPD, 
No. 654 - Political, 1927» Nos.1-5» Rewa to Irwin,
2 February 1927* Rewa also privately disassociated 
himself from the views of the Standing Committee at 
the meeting with MacDonald in December 1930, see 
PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 5, No. 8576/1930, S/S 
to Viceroy, telg., 4 December 1930.
should also have held attractions for Hyderabad, 
particularly in view of the recommendation to limit 
discussion at the responsible centre to matters of common 
concern. Yet like Rewa, the Nizam would not submit to 
Chamber dictation nor did he subscribe to the Chamber 
version of paramountcy. Rewa and the Nizam differed 
only in respect of the latter's belief that he could 
still be internally independent.
In reality therefore confederation could never 
be considered as a viable alternative to federation.
Other important states like Mysore, Baroda and Travancore 
would never accept an electoral college. The three 
premier states of Rajputana, Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur 
had always maintained their distance from the Chamber 
and moreover accepted the Rewa version of paramountcy. 
Confederation therefore served not only to emphasize 
the bitterness and divisions within the Standing Committee, 
but also to show how unrepresentative the Committee was 
of the princes as a whole. It was, however, also 
significant in that it represented the first recoil 
among the princes from the federal ideal.
In August 1931 > Ramsay Macdonald formed a 
National Government with a 'doctor's mandate' to deal 
with the economic crisis in Britain. His cabinet 
consisted of only ten members - four Conservatives, four 
Labour and two Liberals. Among the Conservatives was 
Samuel Hoare who became the new Secretary of State for 
India. Within a month of the opening of the second 
round table conference in September 1931> Hoare recorded
the following impression of the princely mind:
"I have been terribly depressed by the 
individual talks I have had with almost 
all the members of the Conference, and 
particularly with the Princes, for I have 
found that we have scarcely a friend amongst 
them. This makes me think that however the 
Conference ends, we must somehow keep the 
princes happy ... the princes talk to me as 
if it were certain that we were.leaving India 
in the next five years.1 ^
This latter remark was a reference to the 
Gandhi-Irwin pact of the previous April which had brought 
a temporary cessation to civil disobedience. The new 
Viceroy, Lord Willingdon confirmed that he had spent 
the first five months of office disabusing the princes 
of the idea that a "Gandhi Raj" was i m m i n e n t . I n  
August, the Nawab of Bhopal had written to Willingdon:
"The people of British India, as a result 
of intense agitation, are being given and 
promised powers which they never possessed, 
whilst the princes cannot get ratification 
even in regard to their rights which 
'inviolate and inviolable' Treaties had 
secured for them more than a century &go."gQ
In order to go some way towards removing the anxieties 
of the princes Hoare suggested to Willingdon:
"Would it not.... be practicable at once to 
refer to arbitration some question of fact 
that may be outstanding between the Government 
of India and one of the princes."
Hoare was sure that the effect this would have upon the
princes would be "out of all proportion to the magnitude
58. Hoare to Willingdon, 2 October 1931 > Templewood 
Collection, No.l.
59* Willingdon to Hoare, 12 October 1931> Templewood 
Collection, No*5«
60. PIC, 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7 pt.l, No.1653/1931 * 
Bhopal to Willingdon, 6 August 1931*
61of the question referred to arbitration." It was 
obvious that the Secretary of State had in mind the 
customs dispute of the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar.
The Jam was in dispute with the Government of 
India over the reimposition of a customs barrier known 
as the Viramgam Line in 1927. Between 1917, when the 
line had ceased to operate, and 1927, the Jam had been 
permitted to retain all customs receipts on goods, 
including those on goods destined for British India, 
which were imported through his port at Bedi Bander.
During these ten years, however, extensions to the port 
had resulted in an enormous increase in the Jam’s customs 
receipts. From Bs. 10.49 lakhs in 1922-23, they had 
risen to Rs. 78*90 lakhs in 1926-27* In 1927 the 
Government of India therefore reimposed the Viramgam 
Line allowing the Jam to retain only Rs. 2 lakhs of duty 
on goods passing into British India in any one year.
The Jam protested on the grounds that in 1917 he had 
received an assurance that nothing would be done to 
hinder the capacity of his port at Bedi Bander. The 
Government of India however considered that this assurance 
had been given on condition that the position would\ be 
reconsidered should any one of the Kathiawar states 
develop a port capable of attracting a greater quantity
CO
of sea-borne traffic than British Indian ports. It 
was because of this dispute that the Jam became the keenest
61. Hoare to Willingdon, 2 October 1931, Templewood 
Collection, No.l.
62. For a history of this dispute, see PIC. 1931-50, 
Coll.13, File 45, No.1305/1932, memorandum by 
J.C.C. Davidson, 27 July 1932.
exponent of a paramountcy settlement involving the use 
of arbitrational procedures to decide upon Justiciable 
disputes between the Government of India and the states 
in which the former acted as both Judge and party.
At the end of 1931 the Government of India 
acted upon Hoare’s advice and appointed a Court of 
Arbitration under Lord Dunedin to determine the Nawanagar 
customs dispute. This gesture, however, did not prevent 
the Jam using the dispute to create yet further difficulties 
over federation. In February 1932 he denounced federation 
as being dangerous to the states and advocated instead a 
return to the Statutory Commission’s idea of a Council of 
Greater India. His views were endorsed by a conference 
of some fifty Kathiawar princes who assembled at Rajkot 
in the same month. According to Rushbrook-Williams, who 
was now acting as the Jam's legal adviser, the reason for 
the conference decision was that many of the smaller states 
had only Just begun to realise that princes like Bikaner 
and Bhopal were committing them to accepting arrangements 
over their heads. Moreover the smaller states were 
becoming convinced that federation would lead to their 
extinction and therefore they were recoiling from an 
"embrace which they feared might be octopus like in its 
effect on them."^
This second volte face meant that Bikaner and 
Bhopal were forced to come to terms with the Chamber 
dissidents. In March 1932 the princes agreed that their
63* Private Office Papers, 1/P0/58, Williams to Hoare, 
3 March and 1 April 1932.
ministers should meet in committee with the object of
reconciling the different schemes "for associating the
States with the proposals for all-India constitutional 
64-reforms." On the personal level, Bikaner and Patiala 
agreed that neither they, nor Bhopal and Dholpur, their 
respective understudies, should contest the Chancellorship 
of the Chamber of Princes for the coming year. The 
result of this particular arrangement was to leave the 
way open for the Jam, by now the most dedicated opponent
of federation, to assume the office of Chancellor for the
period March 1932 to March 1933.
This series of princely defections from the 
federal ideal was also highly disturbing to Hoare. In 
October 1931 the National Government had emerged triumphant 
from a general election with an overwhelming majority of 
Conservative M.P's. who were not prepared to contemplate 
any changes in the central government of India unless by 
federation with a strong princely content. Moreover 
since the first round table conference there had been no 
further commitment by any of the princes to federation.
With another Chamber session due at the end of March 1932, 
Hoare impressed the gravity of the situation upon Lord 
Lothian who had been sent to India as Chairman of the 
Franchise Committee:
M0n no account must the Princes be allowed to
give a negative to All-India Federation. If
they are in a negative mood at the forthcoming 
meeting of the Chamber of Princes they must 
almost at any price be induced to adjoumand
64-. Cited in U. Phadnis, Towards the Integration of the 
Indian States, 1919-1947, London, I9 6 0, p. 6$.
not definitely to say 'No1. If they say 
'No1, all the fat in the world will he in 
the fire here. Nine out of ten members 
of the House of Commons will then go straight 
back to the unadulterated Simon Report.
Hoare also wrote in a similar vein to Willingdon and to 
members of the Indian States (Financial) Enquiry Committee 
which had accompanied Lothian's Committee to India. In 
fact it was the chairman of the Financial Committee, Sir 
John Davidson, together with his colleague, Lord Hastings, 
who intervened in the manner suggested by Hoare. In the 
evening of 30 March Davidson wrote letters-to the Jam and 
Bikaner arranging for them to be delivered during the 
afternoon of the following day when the Standing Committee 
was discussing what its resolution on federation would say. 
Bikaner was informed that "nothing could be more disastrous 
than that the Princes should, however innocently, convey 
to their friends in England the impression that on the 
one hand they were dilatory or on the other that agreement 
between themselves is never likely to be reached."
As a result of this warning the Chamber passed 
a resolution on 1 April 1932 to the effect that the states 
would Join an all-India federation on condition that the 
Crown would give them the following guarantees:
"(a) that the necessary safeguards will be 
embodied in the constitution;
(b) that under the constitution the rights 
arising from Treaties, or Sanads or
65* Hoare to Lothian, 3 March 1932, Templewood Collection, 
No. 14-.
66. Davidson to Bikaner, 30 March 1932, enclosed with 
Davidson to Hoare, 31 March 1932, Templewood 
Collection, No. 14-.
Engagements, remain inviolate and 
inviolable;
(c) that the sovereignty and internal 
independence of the States remain 
intact and are preserved and fully 
respected and that the obligations of 
the Crown to the States remain unaltered."^
On 2 April Hastings confided to Hoare: "What
the official view may be of the really rather dreadful 
intrusion of J.C.D. and self at this critical moment is 
perhaps best not enquired into." Davidson in fact 
never told Willingdon about his letters to Bikaner and 
the Jam. He believed the Viceroy*s attitude to be 
primarily responsible for the difficulties encountered 
with the states. He described Willingdon as "perfectly 
charming from the ceremonial point of view", but "he has 
been out of touch with British politics for so long that 
he really knows very little about the situation at home." 
Davidson's overall impression was that the Government of 
India was totally opposed to federation: "The fact is
that there is not a politically minded individual in India 
among the British officials, and of course Willingdon is 
hopeless."^ Lord Lothian had a different view. He 
considered that while the Government of India had never 
been "friendly" towards federation because the idea had 
been'the child of the Round Table Conference, and not of
67* Chamber of Princes, April 1952.
68. Hastings to Hoare, 2 April 1932, Templewood 
Collection, No.14.
69. Davidson to Hoare, 51 March and 1 April 1932, 
Templewood Collection, No.14.
its own initiative,” opinion was now coming round to
70accept that federation was inevitable.f When challenged
71by Hoare on the point in March 1932, Willingdon replied 
that although officials in India, himself included, had 
originally thought it unwise for the princes to "tumble 
into federation", they had always considered that once 
the princes had committed themselves it would be impossible 
for them to keep out.*^ However, like Irwin before him, 
Willingdon would have preferred, and indeed had been 
preparing, to proceed first with reform at the British 
Indian centre. In November 1931 be had informed Hoare 
that to insist upon federation as a condition of central 
responsibility was both "unnecessary and dangerous, 
particularly as it leaves the fate of India at the 
discretion of the states,”^  Yet in his response to 
Hoare*s challenge, the Viceroy now expressed his full 
commitment to federation because he realized that political 
opinion in Britain would not tolerate central responsibility 
without federation and moreover that without this respons­
ibility "probably the whole of British India would go
74over to the Congress side."r
It would indeed appear therefore that it was not 
until 1932 that the Government of India appreciated the
70. Lothian to Hoare, 27 March 1932, Templewood Collection 
No.14.
71. Hoare to Willingdon, 
Collection, No.l.
18 March 1932, Templewood
72. Willingdon to Hoare, 
Collection, No.5*
27 March 1932, Templewood
73. Viceroy to S/S, telg. 
Collection, No.11.
,, 29 November 1931* Templewood
74. Willingdon to Hoare, 
Collection, No.5.
27 March 1932, Templewood
extent to which any meaningful reform was dependent upon 
the accession of the princes to a federation. Consequently, 
while it wa3 legitimate to argue, as Willingdon had done, 
that the future of India should not he left to the 
discretion of the princes, the conclusion to he drawn 
is that it was also not until 1932 that the Government 
of India began considering the actual framework of a 
federal constitution in earnest.
Despite his belated appreciation of political 
realities in Britain, the Viceroy was optimistic about 
the princes in view of the recent Chamber resolution:
"... the Princes as a whole now feel that Federation, in 
some form is inevitable, and that if a reasonable scheme 
emerges, it must be accepted, even if they are not 
altogether satisfied with the d e t a i l s . H o a r e * s  
advisers in the India Office did not share this optimism.
They were concerned at the implications of the second 
guarantee which had been included in the princes* 
resolution, particularly in view of the long awaited 
paramountcy discussions which had taken place between 
Willingdon and the Standing Committee just before the 
formal Chamber session. During the discussions Bhopal 
had put forward a formula intended to reassure the princes 
as to the inviolability of their treaties. It stated 
that if, in any matter affecting the interests of both 
the states and British India, the former claimed that a 
proposed policy infringed their treaty rights, the
75* Viceroy to S/S, telg., 29 November 1932, Templewood 
Collection, No.11.
Viceroy, after attempting to secure agreement by 
negotiation would appoint an ad hoc impartial tribunal 
whose decision would be f i n a l . W h e n  Hoare*s advisers 
compared this formula with the second guarantee in the 
Chamber resolution they reached the conclusion that what 
the Standing Committee really wanted was "provision 
whereby the protection of the Crown secured to them by 
their treaties and engagements, would remain operative 
even within the field of Federal subjects, in other 
words, potential protection against the action of the 
federal administration itself. Bhopal*s formula, 
however, represented the price which he and Bikaner had 
been obliged to pay in order to effect a reconciliation 
with the Standing Committee. These two princes were 
really more interested in securing protection against 
infringements of their sovereignty by the paramount 
power than protection against the actions of a federal 
administration.*'7® Yet for the Jam, who was motivated 
primarily by experience of his customs dispute, both 
these types of protection were to be treated as essential 
preconditions if he was ever to contemplate accession to 
a federation.
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10 March 1932.
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office in a future federal ministry. Bikaner was
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Hoare subsequently instructed Willingdon to
hold a further and more representative conference with
the princes. Clearly a stand had now to be taken against
the pretensions of the Standing Committee. The princes
were to be informed that under no circumstances would the
protection of the paramount power be available to them in
the field of federal subjects. Cases of disputes between
the states and British India would, once the federation
had become operative, be referred to a Federal Court from
which there would be a right of appeal to the Privy 
79Council.( J
The more representative conference with the 
princes took place in September 1932. In the two months 
preceding it the Jam attempted to prevent any further 
discussion of federation until he had gained acceptance 
of his paramountcy views. In July he addressed a letter 
to the other members of the Standing Committee in which 
he stated that "the authorities in England" should be told 
that the princes would not be able to federate until their 
views "regarding the false doctrine of paramountcy" were 
effectively met. In August he wrote to Hoare requesting 
that the paramountcy discussions be transferred to London 
where he believed he would receive a more sympathetic 
hearing. The Jam also told the Secretary of State that 
the Standing Committee now regarded a satisfactory settle­
ment of the paramountcy question not only as a condition
79. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7 pt.2, No.1740/1932, 
Committee on India, No.14.
of their accession to federation but also of their 
willingness to continue negotiations regarding the 
federal scheme in the interval. Hoare's India Committee 
construed the Jam's letter to be "nothing short of a 
concerted attempt to blackmail [the government] into 
making concessions, hitherto regarded as outside 
practical politics, in order to secure an untertaking
/ QQ
from the princes to federate." However, the Jam was 
unable to carry his colleagues on the Standing Committee 
with him. He had written to Hoare without consulting 
either Bikaner, Bhopal or Patiala. These three 
subsequently issued a statement declaring that:
"It is not our position that we decline to 
discuss further the federation scheme, 
although it is our position that we shall 
not enter Federation unless Government 
settles the Paramountcy question to our 
satisfaction.
The Jam had therefore failed in his attempt to 
use the paramountcy issue to delay negotiations over 
federation. He was a conspicuous absentee when Willingdon 
met representatives from twenty-five states in conference 
at Simla from the 20th to the 22nd of September.®^ 
Discussion at the conference focussed upon the relationship 
between the paramount power and the states in the federal
80. ibid.
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82. The following states were represented: Dholpur, Panna,
Bikaner, Bhopal, Sangli, Alwar, Dungarpur, Rewa, 
Bahawalapur, Cutch, Rampur, Malerkotla, Sarila, 
Hyderabad, Udaipur, Mysore, Kolhapur, Jhalawar, 
Travancore, Kashmir, Indore, Baroda, Jodhpur,
Jaipur and Cochin.
and non-federal fields. As regards the former, the 
Jam's absence meant that the conference unanimously 
accepted the position which Hoare had described to 
Willingdon: disputes between the states and British
India would be subject to interpretation by a Federal 
Court. Discussion on the latter was much more contro­
versial and protracted. Bikaner and Bhopal argued 
strongly for a formula whereby alleged infractions of 
treaty rights by the paramount power would be submitted 
for arbitration to an ad hoc tribunal whose decision 
would be final. However, this attempt to restrict the 
discretionary authority of the paramount power was 
equally strongly opposed by Gulab Singh of Rewa and 
Sir Akbar Hydari. They argued that it would be suicidal 
for the princes themselves to .weaken the protective 
function of the paramount power at a time when "autocratic 
systems of government are being openly challenged in 
British Indian circles." To this Willingdon added that 
it was improbable that the British Government would ever 
"consent to the subordination of the Crown's representative 
and the Crown itself to the ruling of an outside authority." 
In the face of this opposition Bikaner and Bhopal were 
forced to submit to revision of their formula. In future 
it would be obligatory to submit disputes of a Justiciable 
nature to a tribunal but the decision reached would only 
be of an advisory character and not binding upon the 
paramount power. ^
83. PIC. 1951-50, Coll.11, File 7 pt.2, No.1740/1952, 
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The Simla Conference of September 1932 was 
not only a defeat for the Standing Committee but also 
a turning point in princely politics. After the conference 
the princes of the committee began to lose that monopoly 
of influence which they had maintained unchallenged for 
the past decade. Willingdon observed:
"It seems to me that there is a great deal 
of feeling among the greater number of 
Princes owing to the fact that the Standing 
Committee of the Chamber of Princes has for 
long years been a very close corporation, 
largely controlled by Bikaner, Bhopal and 
Patiala.
The reluctance of Hyderabad in particular to impose 
restrictions upon the exercise of paramountcy had come 
as an unwelcome surprise to members of the committee. They 
had always assumed that the Nizam would be the first to 
want to impose restrictions. Evidently it was only now 
that they realized that the Nizam's sole concern was to 
prevent his state "from being swallowed up ... by the 
monster of British I n d i a . T h i s  did not, however, 
indicate a smooth passage for the government with the 
Nizam. On the contrary, it was precisely because of this 
concern to gain protection from British India that the 
Nizam was beginning to raise the price for his accession 
to federation. In addition to requesting a written 
guarantee that Britain would protect Hyderabad in accordance 
with the terms of his treaties, the Nizam now wanted to
84. Willingdon to Hoare, 26 September 1952, Templewood 
Collection, No.6.
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see Berar, a potential spring-board for attacks on 
Hyderabad from the Central Provinces, separated from 
that province and constituted as a federal unit in its 
own right.®®
On 17 November 1932 the third and final round­
table conference opened in London. The only prince 
present was the Raja of Sarila on behalf of the smaller 
states. The reason for this was that Patiala, who had 
not attended the second conference because his own extra­
vagance had brought his state to the verge of financial
collapse, was again obliged to remain in India. For the 
his
sake of/reputation, Patiala requested Bikaner and Bhopal 
to do the same. When they agreed the Government of India 
decided that the princes would be represented by their 
ministers at the conference.®*'7 Hoare's first impression 
of these ministers was that they had "explicit instructions
00
not to commit their rulers too far."
Discussion relating to the states centred on the 
complex problems of their representation in the federal 
legislatures and their contributions towards federal 
finance. It proved impossible to make any substantial 
headway on either issue. On the first, representatives 
of the larger states advocated an upper house of less than 
200 members with the states being represented in accordance
86. GOI. FPD. No.27 - Special, 1931, Nos.1-17, Question 
of the future Administration of the Berars: 
Representations made by the Nizam's Government on the 
subject•
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88. Hoare to Willingdon, 18 November 1932, Templewood
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with their importance and population. Hydari was
particularly anxious to reduce as far as possible the
number of British Indian politicians in both legislatures.
The medium sized states, however, wanted an upper house
with something in excess of 250 members in order that
each of the 108 Chamber princes could be individually
represented. Without agreement on the size of the
Chambers, nothing could be done to decide the allocation
of seats between the states themselves and between the
gq
states and British India. ' An important decision was 
however taken during the conference. This concerned the 
number of accessions by the states which would be required 
to inaugurate the federation. The formula arrived at 
was basically a compromise between the positions of the 
large and medium sized states. Federation would thus be 
dependent upon the accession of "States with an aggregate 
of over fifty per cent of [the] total States' population, 
provided that they include not less than half of [the] 
States individually represented in the Upper [Federal] 
Chamber."^®
The problem of federal finance involved those 
states which paid tributes and those which enjoyed certain 
immunities. Contributions in the form of tributes amounted 
to Rs. 74- lakhs in 1932. Mysore, with its tribute of
89. In the final Government of India Act of 1933, the 
Upper House was to consist of 260 seats: 156 for
British India and 104- for the states. The Lower 
House was to consist of 373 seats: 25^ for British
India and 125 for the states.
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Rs. 24*j lakhs, contributed one-third of this total* The 
states concerned claimed immediate relief from these 
payments but were disappointed by the gloomy predictions 
being made about the prospective stability of federal 
finance* In order to maintain adequate reserves in the 
federal exchequer the government in London considered that 
it would only be possible to remit the tributes at the 
same time as the British Indian provinces were allowed 
to keep the proceeds of their income tax.^ The Indian 
States [Financial] Enquiry Committee, which reported in 
July 1932, had calculated that upon this basis it would 
take twenty years before the tributes could be remitted 
in full. The only concession that the Committee had felt 
able to make was that immediate relief should be given by 
the remission of the amount of any contribution which was 
in excess of five per cent of the total revenues of the
QP 1
state. This would reduce Mysore’s tribute to Rs.17^
lakhs, but it was by no means certain that this would
prove acceptable. In February 1932 Willingdon had
reported that Ismail had virtually ”put a pistol at our
heads” by saying that Mysore would refuse to federate
93unless relieved of its tribute payment in full.
Immunities constituted financial advantages 
which individual states enjoyed, by Treaty or Agreement,
91. Committee on India, No.17: Federal Finance,
November 1932, Templewood Collection, No.56(S).
92. Report of the Indian States CFinanciaij Enquiry 
Committee, July 1932, Cmd. 4i03> 1932, paras. 88-90•
93. Willingdon to Hoare, 5 February 1932, Templewood 
Collection, No.3*
in respect of certain sources of revenue which under
Federation would normally lie at the disposal of the
federal administration. The largest immunity was in
respect of customs receipts. In 1932 the amount of
customs receipts retained by the states totalled just
over Rs. 182 lakhs. Bhavnagar, Nawanagar, Kashmiri,
Travancore and Cochin were the major beneficiaries of
this arrangement and were therefore loathe to yield such
qzi.
a large part of their income. In its report, the
Indian States Uinancial} Enquiry Committee recognized
that such immunities were important to the states, not
only because of their financial value, but also because
they represented the outward symbol of their cherished
sovereignty. However, the Committee also considered
that the retention of customs receipts by any federal
unit would be ’’hard to reconcile with the ideal of a true
F e d e r a t i o n . H o a r e ' s  India Committee agreed and thought
that it might be necessary to exclude these states from
the federation rather than admit them on such highly
96privileged terms.J
The third round-table conference closed in 
December 1932. Such conclusions as the government in 
London had been able to reach were embodied in a White 
Paper which was published in March 1933* Here it was 
explained that when the new Government of India Act had
94. Of the total Rs. 182 lakhs, Bhavnagar accounted for 
Rs. 30 lakhs, Nawanagar Rs. 44 lakhs, Kashmir Rs. 23 
lakhs, Travancore and Cochin, Rs. 12 lakhs each.
95* Report of the Indian States (Financial) Enquiry 
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been passed, each individual prince would be asked to 
sign an Instrument of Accession specifying those subjects 
which could be transferred from his own sovereignty to 
that of the federal administration. The princes would 
also be allowed to make certain ”limitations1 upon the 
extent to which they agreed to any particular subject 
becoming federal and it would fj£ll to the British Govern­
ment to decide whether or not these limitations were 
reconcilable with the federal p r i n c i p l e I n  the 
cases of the major tribute and customs states, it was 
already evident that the period after the Act had been 
passed would be one of prolonged bargaining and negotiation.
If therefore federation was to become a reality,
time was of the essence. However, a further two years
elapsed before the Government of India Act was passed.
During this period the attitude of the princes hardly
ensured a smooth passage for the government bill containing
details of the federal proposals. A week before the
appearance of the White Paper, Willingdon attempted to
explain its contents to a gathering of some fifty princes
and ministers at Delhi. The Viceroy subsequently regretted
that he had bothered for he found the princes hopelessly
98divided by personal rivalries and jealousies. The 
formal Chamber session at the end of March fared no better. 
Animosity between the princes resulted in Bhopal, Kashmir,
97. Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform, Cmd. 4268, 
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Kolhapur and Travancore serving notice of their intention
to quit the Chamber. The absence of Bhopal and Kashmir,
and the death in April 1933 of the Jam Sahib, meant that
when Patiala was elected Chancellor for the coming year
he was given a Standing Committee which, with the exception
princely
of Bikaner, consisted largely of/non-entities. Willingdon
consoled himself with the thought that the defections 
indicated that the Chamber "as an organized and represent­
ative body of princely opinion, is moribund for the time
qq
being at any r a t e . " H o a r e  was not satisfied with this 
sentiment. Princely intransigence provided the diehard 
faction within the Conservative party with ample justi­
fication for condemning federation. The Secretary of 
State persistently badgered Willingdon to give him some 
assurance that the princes would federate. It was cold 
comfort for him to learn from the Viceroy that it was 
impossible to "get any assurance from any of them until 
the Bill is an Act, and they see exactly what their position 
is going to be. This really is reasonable, and I don't see 
any other way out of it."^^
In these circumstances it was inevitable that 
nothing would come of a suggestion made by Hoare that 
political officers should be instructed to commend the 
federal scheme to the princes. Moreover, the Political 
Department was not the most reliable agency to use for 
the task. During his investigation in India, Sir John
99. Viceroy to S/S, telg., 26 March 1933? Templewood 
Collection, No.11.
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Davidson had been as critical of the Political Department 
as he had of Willingdon. He reached the conclusion that 
although political officers in general were of a very 
poor calibre, the main problem was that the department 
had failed to give them any lead. Thus when the Jam and 
his adviser, Rushbrook-Williams, had been hatching their 
"absurd" scheme at Rajkot, the A.G.G., E.H. Kealy, formerly 
A.G.G. in Central India, had received no word from Delhi 
as to whether or not he was to intervene.
Throughout the period of the round-table 
conferences, the Political Department had in fact remained 
committed to the position it had adopted in 1930. There 
could be no open encouragement for federation while the 
paramountcy issue remained unsettled. Federation, with 
federal agents operating in the states, would not only 
result in a loss of sovereignty for the princes, but also 
diminution of the authority of political officers. This 
was accepted by the department. However, if the Standing 
Committee had gained acceptance of their paramountcy views, 
then the role of the individual political officer would 
have been reduced to that of a mere dignatory. This line 
of argument had of course an essential weakness. Most 
political officers were already mere dignatories because 
of the non-interference policy. For the Political 
Department, however, it was a matter of principle: the
principle that political officers should not be made 
completely redundant.
101. Davidson to Hoare, 6 March 1932, Templewood 
Collection, No.14.
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The recent defeat of the Standing Committee
made the Political Department more amenable than it
might otherwise have been to Hoare's suggestion. A
conference of political officers was held in March 1933*
Willingdon briefed the officers and emphasized that the
princes should be made fully aware of the consequences
if they did not federate. The Viceroy would be unable
to act independently of his council on matters concerning
the states. Moreover it was inevitable that the Viceroy's
council would become more responsive to the views of the
British India legislature in which the states had no say.
In sum, if the princes did not federate, they would be
"exposed in many ways to the pressure of ideas against
1 OPwhich defence may be difficult."
In one instance, however, action taken upon the 
basis of this brief had an unfortunate consequence.
Colonel Wilberforce-Bell, the A.G.G. of the Deccan states, 
chose to place his own interpretation on the consequences 
for the princes if they did not federate. He told the 
princes in his charge:
"If the Federal scheme breaks down because 
of the refusal of the States to adhere to 
it, it will inevitably be said that they 
are reactionary and not in tune with modern 
ideas of constitutional progress."
The Colonel was subsequently reprimanded not only because
he had been over-zealous but also because his remarks came
to the attention of two conservative M.P's. who were
102. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 58 pt.l, No.PY816/1953,
Memorandum prepared for the use of Political Officers 
at the Informal Conference, 7 March 1933*
visiting India. When news of this reached England it 
was used by the diehards as evidence that the Government 
of India was applying undue pressure on the states to 
federate
It was largely because of diehard opposition
that a further two years elapsed before Parliament approved
the India Bill. Patiala gave every encouragement to the
diehards. In February 1935 a meeting of princes and
ministers at Bombay declared that the bill and a draft
Instrument of Accession which had been prepared were
unacceptable without fundamental modification. Through
the offices of Madhava Rao, the editor of the Morning Post,
Patiala was able to inform Churchill of the princes'
decision before official confirmation reached the India 
104Office. The result was highly embarrassing for Hoare.
On 26 February, Churchill informed an astonished House of 
Commons that the decision represented an outright rejection 
of federation by the p r i n c e s . H o a r e  was furious. In
order to satisfy Parliament that the princes had not 
vetoed federation he had to produce an additional White 
Paper explaining the basis of the princes' objections and
detailing the extent to which the government was prepared
106to modify the bill and draft Instrument of Accession.
Willingdon had long suspected that Patiala's 
intrigue with the diehards was based upon the belief that
103. Private Office Papers, L/P/0/88, Allegations of pressure 
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104. Butler to Brabourne, 4 March 1935» Brabourne 
Collection, No.20A.
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106. The Government of India Bill: Views of Indian States,
Cmd'. im3TT935" '(Harch) .
that he would "receive all the honours he was inclined
107to ask for so long as he came out against the reforms." ' 
Patiala was certainly vain enough to he persuaded in this 
manner hut his action at the time of the Bombay meeting 
was much more politically motivated. In the formal 
Chamber session of January 1935 > Patiala had delivered 
a vehement assault on democracy. With an obvious 
reference to recent political developments in Germany he 
declared:
"While the princes of India have always been 
willing to do what was best for their peoples 
and ready to accommodate themselves and their 
constitutions to the spirit of the times, we 
must frankly say, that if British India is 
hoping to compel us to wear on our healthy body 
politic the Ressus shift of a discredited 
political theory, they are living in a world 
of unreality."^qq
This outburst had been inspired by certain 
remarks made by Rajendra Prasad, the President of the 
Indian Rational Congress, on the attitude of the Congress 
towards federation and the role that the states would play 
in it. Throughout the period of the round-table conferences 
the Congress had shown a marked reluctance to become 
involved with the problems of the states. This did not 
mean that the Congress was oblivious to these problems but 
rather that it intended to deal with them at a later and 
more convenient Juncture. This is clearly illustrated 
by the brief prepared by the Congress Working Committee
107. Willingdon to Hoare, 30 April 1934, Templewood 
Collection, R0 .7 .
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for Gandhi's use at the second round table conference. 
Here it was explained that the accession of the states 
to a federation should be made conditional first upon a 
guarantee being given of the fundamental rights of their 
subjects, safeguarded by a Supreme Court, and secondly, 
representation of the states in the federal legislatures 
on an elective basis. However, if the princes did not 
accept these terms:
"... we suggest that the consideration of 
the question of the States be postponed for 
the moment and the future of what is known 
as British India may be discussed with the 
British Government... In case a settlement 
is reached as between British India and the 
British Government the question of the 
States can be taken up afresh.
When therefore at the second round table conference the 
princes refused to contemplate either of the aforesaid 
conditions, Gandhi did not attempt to make an issue of 
them. This apparent indifference to the problems of the 
states disturbed the leaders of the All-India States' 
People's Conference as N.C. Kelkar indicated to Gandhi 
in June 1934:
"... it will be well to refer to the 
apprehensions that have arisen in the 
minds of the Indian States people by 
passages in your speeches at the Round 
Table Conference. You pleaded earnestly 
in this Conference with the rulers of the 
Indian States for allowing the States' 
representatives in the federal legislature 
to be chosen by election and for allowing 
the fundamental rights of the States people 
to be written into the federal constitution 
and placed under the protection of the 
federal court. But your pleadings on this
109* Working Committee instructions to Gandhi, 11 September 
1931, sent by J. Nehru to Gandhi in London, Gandhi 
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occasion have given rise to an impression 
that if the Princes did not agree, as they 
did not and do not agree, you would accept 
a constitution in which provisions of the 
kind that you suggested did not find a place.
If this impression is well founded, we cannot 
help saying, and saying it straight out, that 
you have done a grave wrong to the States 
people. "-QQ
Kelkar asked for a categorical assurance that the Congress 
would not accept a federal constitution which did not 
include provision for the election of state representatives 
and a guarantee of fundamental rights. He also appealed 
for a clear statement of policy to the effect that the 
Congress supported "all legitimate movements for the 
establishment of popular government in the Indian States 
under the aegis of their rulers."**''1''1' It was because of 
these attempts to commit the Congress that Prasad included 
a reference to the states in his presidential address to 
the Congress at Bombay in December 1934. Prasad was 
severely critical of the role assigned to the states in 
the government's White Paper. On the one hand the federal 
representatives of the states were to be nominated, while 
on the other, the princes would be able to continue their 
autocratic rule without any guarantee of fundamental rights 
"which are, or rather ought to be, the basis and foundation 
of any allegiance which the people may be required to bear 
to the state.
It was this address which occasioned Patiala's 
outburst in the Chamber. Willingdon thought the Maharaja's
110. N.C. Kelkar to Gandhi, 22 June 1934, Gandhi Collection, 
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remarks indiscreet but agreed with the opinion of his
new Political Secretary, Sir Bertrand Glancy,"*"^ that
they were "not of any serious account" as Patiala "feels
himself peculiarly exposed to attack and is more vulnerable
than most." With a view to the prospects for federation
Glancy further believed that "unless considerably more
serious developments occur in this respect in British
India, it is unlikely that the Princes will make any
114actual use of these attacks as a breaking-point."
Opinion in the India Office was more cautious. Glancy’s 
namesake, Sir Reginald, a member of the Secretary of 
State's Indian Council who had had a distinguished career 
as a political officer in Hyderabad, Baroda and Jaipur, 
believed that Patiala's remarks indicated that the 
"ultimate decision of the princes will be largely influenced 
by the reactions of British India to the new bill."^^
Thus although the Government of India Act 
reached the statute book in August 1935? the prospect of 
its federal provisions becoming operative were extremely
113. Glancy succeeded Watson as Political Secretary in 
July 1933.
114. Private Office Papers, L/PO/88, note by B.J. Glancy
on the Chamber session of January 1935* Patiala's
financial extravagance and dubious personal conduct
had been the subject of severe condemnation in a 
document entitled "Indictment of Patiala", published 
by the All-India States' People's Conference in 
February 1930. After this date, special arrange­
ments had to be made for Patiala to avoid hostile 
demonstrations whenever he left his state. Ramusack, 
op.cit., pp. 247 and 255*
115. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.3 Pile 1, No.126/19359 Sir 
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uncertain. Among those princes who had originally 
sponsored the federal idea, none could claim to have 
seen the fulfilment of the ambitions which had prompted 
them to act. Moreover, once the Act had been passed it 
soon became apparent that the princes in general had 
little conception of what federation actually involved. 
Sir Walter Monckton, who became legal adviser to the 
Nizam, observed in October 1935 that few princes 
recognized even the most basi^ principle that federation 
implied a loss of sovereignty. According to Monckton 
the princes would therefore attempt to preserve as much 
of their sovereignty intact when it came to negotiating 
their Instruments of Accession.*1'1*^  When to this is 
added the unpredictability of the Congress attitude to 
both the states and federation, the enormity of the task 
confronting Willingdon's successor, Lord Linlithgow, can 
readily be appreciated.
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CHAPTER 6
THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND 
THE ABANDONMENT OF THE NON-INTERFERENCE 
POLICY, 1935-1939.
(1) The failure of federal negotiations.
The outstanding feature of the scheme for an 
All-India Federation was that it was never implemented.
Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939 federation was 
put in cold storage and thereafter could never seriously 
be considered as a solution to the problem of India's 
political future. In 1954, eight years after the 
country's future had been settled by partition, Viscount 
Templewood, formerly Samuel Hoare, reflected on the 
reasons why the federation had never been established.
He was convinced that it could have been established 
before the outbreak of war if the Government of India Act 
had reached the statute book in 1933 instead of 1935*
That it was not passed in 1933 he attributed to the 
delaying and obstructionist tactics pursued by the diehards 
in Britain. Templewood was also aware that federation 
never became operative because an insufficient number of 
princes had agreed to join it by the outbreak of war.
This he attributed to the Government of India. He
believed that "if greater efforts had been made in Delhi 
to explain the advantages of Federation* we could have 
obtained the voluntary assent of a sufficient number £of
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1princesj for starting the Federation before the war.” 
Similar sentiments were expressed in 1957 by the Earl 
of Halifax, formerly Lord Irwin. He considered that 
the authorities in India could have done more to push
the princes had they not been so overawed by the strong
tradition of respect for their treaty rights. Halifax 
also sav/ fit to exonerate the India Office:
"It was no longer a case of the India Office
acting in restraint of the Government of India, 
for the India Office was working night and day 
to get the scheme for Federation adopted with 
the least possible delay.''^
In private correspondence with Templewood, Halifax laid 
the blame for the delay at the feet of Willingdon and Lord 
Linlithgow who succeeded him as Viceroy in April 1956:
"I have often thought, though this was after 
my time and I may have been wrong about it, 
that a good part of the trouble and delay came 
from the fact that Freeman (WillingdonD liked 
the Princes and really disliked the British 
Indian leaders and Hopie (Li^l^thgow) had not 
much use for the Princes and did not really 
get on in human terms with anybody... If they 
had really been willing to push the Federal 
idea and had not been inhibited by one cause 
or another, either in approach to Princes or 
Congress, you would have been able to get the 
Cabinet and Party to move more quickly.
In that Linlithgow was specifically charged with inaugur­
ating federation, Halifax presumably thought that he was 
the more culpable of the two. Indeed his opinion of
1. Viscount Temp}swood, Nine Troubled Years, London, 1954. 
pp. 102-105 (brackets mine).
2. Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days, London, 1957» p.124.
5. Halifax to Templewood, 15 July 1955» Templewood
Collection, No.76.
Linlithgow was the conventional one - a distant and aloof 
individual who was dilatory in his approach to Indian 
problems, particularly federation.
However, the validity of the assumption that
delay caused the failure of federation has recently been
authoritatively challenged. It has been suggested that
to see the failure in terms of delay is to ignore the fact 
the
that/federal constitution itself was unworkable because it 
failed to satisfy the minimum demands of either the Indian 
National Congress or the Muslim League.^ It is true that 
both Congress and League were dissatisfied with the 1955 
Act. The Congress objected largely because of the reserve 
powers concentrated in the hands of the Viceroy while the 
Muslims feared the ultimate prospect of a Hindu dominated 
federal centre against which they would have inadequate 
protection. Yet because they both had strong reservations 
does not necessarily mean that they would have refused to 
work the federation. A recent survey of Congress politics 
in the pre-war years has concluded that its attitude towards 
federation was one of "rejection in theory and a readiness 
to come to terms in practice."^ The Muslim attitude was 
rather more significant. Lord Zetland, Hoare's successor 
at the India Office, confided to Linlithgow in January 1959 
that when the time came to decide over federation he would 
not be surprised if Muslim opposition to the scheme was 
even more embarrassing than that of Congress.^ His
4. R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940, 
Oxford, 1974“
5. B.R. Tomlinson, "Nationalism and Indian Politics: The 
Indian National Congress, 1954-1942," Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1975? p. 408.
6. Zetland to Linlithgow, 24 January 1959? Linlithgow 
Collection, No.7*
intuition proved correct for on 5 November 1939 Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah, leader of a revived Muslim League, met 
Linlithgow and demanded assurances that the 1933 Act
7
would be wholly reconsidered. Yet this was only the 
position by November 1939? it cannot automatically be said 
to apply to the previous four years when for the most part 
Muslims were politically weak and divided. Moreover when 
Muslims contested the 1937 provincial elections they did 
so with the assumption that:
"... India would remain constitutionally 
united, albeit under a federation, and that 
Muslims would continue to live as fellow- 
citizens of non-Muslims all over the sub­
continent. Indeed, in many spheres of 
policy Muslim politicians went into the 
elections determined to prove how much 
Muslims shared with their fellow-countrymen.
In 1935 an individual and distinct Muslim 
political identity, yes; a separate 
independent state, no. Hg
If, therefore, the rejection of federation by 
the Congress and Muslim League cannot be taken for granted, 
the views of Halifax and Templewood require further 
investigation. After all, federation could only become 
operative if the requisite number of princes agteed to 
join and thus it is necessary to decide whether there was 
any possibility of this happening before the suspension of 
federal negotiations in September 1939• It should be 
emphasized that the intention is not to prove that the 
federation could have been established had the princes
7. P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge, 
1972, p. 2W.
8. ibid., p. 221
agreed but rather to examine the consequences of the 
time factor in deciding their attitude towards federation 
and also the argument that the Government of India was 
primarily responsible for the delay in negotiating with 
the princes.
In September 1935* Arthur G. Lothian, who had 
been appointed additional Political Secretary to the 
Government of India, asked the India Office to approve 
the following method of negotiating with the princes. 
Political officers would be instructed to communicate a 
draft Instrument of Accession to the princes upon receipt 
of the draft from the India Office. Upon the basis of 
this one draft the princes would be asked to federate.
They would be told that there was a minimum number of 
subjects for which they would be required to federate.
They would also be invited to specify any limitations 
they wished to impose on the extent to which particular 
subjects could be administered by the federal authority 
within their states. Once these limitations had been 
examined by the Secretary of State and Government of India, 
a formal Instrument of Accession would be presented to 
each prince for his signature.^ The intention of the 
Government of India was therefore to obtain an immediate 
commitment from the princes to federate and then to work 
out the details of what this would involve in the case of 
individual states.
9. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 45(6),.No.PY 1711/1935* 
Lothian to Patrick, 9 September 1935*
In London, Sir Richard Carter, the Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State, considered these proposals to 
he "a trifle c r u d e a n d  an alternative method of 
approach was devised by the India Office. Before a 
draft Instrument of Accession could be drawn up it would 
be necessary for the Secretary of State and Viceroy to 
reach an agreement on the extent to which limitations 
for the states would be acceptable. There would also 
have to be preliminary discussions in London with the 
legal advisers of the states on the technicalities of 
the draft Instrument. In the light of any observations 
made by these advisers the draft would be drawn up and 
sent to India for communication to the princes. The 
princes would have a fixed time in which to record their 
opinions of the draft, although it was envisaged that it 
might be necessary to allow some of them to send their 
ministers to London for further consultation with their 
advisers before they did so. By the spring of 1936 it 
would then be possible to produce a document embodying 
the standard limitations for various categories of states. 
This would be presented to the princes for further comment. 
Once these comments had been examined by the Secretary of 
State and the Government of India, political officers 
would go back to the princes with formal Instruments of 
Accession and for the first time ask them to federate on 
the terms offered. Exactly when this would be the India
10. ibid., Carter's note, 30 September 1935*
Office declined to predict* What it did say was that:
"It is considered that no specific enquiry 
as to the willingness of individual States 
to accede on the terms offered should be
addressed to any State until this very late
stage in negotiations had been reached and 
the prospects of achieving the proportion 
of accessions fixed in the Act seemed 
assured. "u
In India, Lothian was shocked by this procedure 
which he considered to be a ’’radical departure” from his 
own* He pointed out that it would serve no purpose and 
indeed would waste a great deal of time for the government 
to fix standard limitations before some idea had been 
gained of what limitations the states wanted. Lothian 
also emphasised the time factor. The longer the delay
the greater the possibility of the princes becoming more
lukewarm and critical in their attitude to federation.
He was of the opinion that even if some of the princes 
did not like federation, they all regarded it as 
inevitable:
"Psychologically therefore we consider that 
it is sound to take the federation as an 
inevitable development and to strike while 
the iron is hot, rather than to make 
tentative and doubtful approaches towards
In view of Lothian's objections the India Office 
did modify its position slightly. There would still be 
discussion with states' counsel but ministers from the 
states would not be allowed to come to London for further
11. ibid., Rumbold to Lothian, 18 October 1935»
12. ibid., Ho. PY 2081/1935, Lothian to Patrick 
2 December 1935*
consultation. Once the draft Instrument had been drawn
up the princes would be given six months to specify the
limitations they wanted on condition J'that nothing which
they might say at this stage would be held to prejudge
the question of their decision to executive an Instrument
of Accession." Once these limitations had been classified
by the government formal Instruments of Accession would be
drawn up and presented to the princes by political officers.
Although the princes would at this stage be asked to
federate, the India Office thought it inevitable that in
many cases a further period of bargaining and negotiation
would take place before the states actually committed 
1-5themselves.  ^ In February 1936 Lothian was obliged to 
accept these proposals which had taken over five months 
to formulate.
Two points emerge from this lengthy corres­
pondence. First, Lothian, on behalf of the Government 
of India, had undoubtedly been optimistic in assuming that 
the princes would commit themselves to Federation before 
they knew the terms for so doing. Secondly, it is clear 
that at the outset it was the India Office and not the 
Government of India that applied the brake to federal 
negotiations with the princes. As early as September 
1935 Patrick confessed to Lothian that the India Office 
wanted "to postpone early action on the accession problem."- 
He explained that the view in London was that "... we need 
not lay outselves open to any criticism of forcing
13. ibid., Patrick to Lothian, 10 January 1936.
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Federation on the princes and, if we exhibit a little
patience ..• the Princes may swim into the net of their 
14own accord,” Zetland reiterated the argument to 
Willingdon when he said that the India Office wanted 
to "avoid any risk of the Government being accused of
15having unduly hurried their decision about federating," ^
The comments of Patrick and Zetland indicate the 
two considerations which weighed most with the India 
Office throughout the period of federal: negotiations 
with the princes. On the one hand it was anxious to 
avoid any charge of applying pressure on the princes to 
federate. On the other, and perhaps more important, it 
was convinced that a leisurely approach to the princes 
would have the desired effect. The princes would of 
their own accord agree to federate once they realised their 
disadvantageous position. With no voice in matters of 
all-India concern and with the executive, though not 
responsible certainly more responsive to the views of 
the central legislature, the princes would have no 
alternative but to federate.
It is not surprising that in the post-war period 
Lothian made attempts to absolve the Government of India 
of the charge that it had delayed federal negotiations 
with the princes. In October 1957 he was able to convince 
Halifax who confessed that had he known of the corres­
pondence between Delhi and London when he published his
14. Patrick to Lothian, 12 September 1935* Lothian 
Collection, No.l.
15. Zetland to Willingdon, 18 January 1936, Zetland 
Collection, No.6.
memoirs he would not have implied so complete an
16exoneration of the India Office. What most concerned 
Lothian, however, were the observations made by Templewood 
in his book Nine Troubled Years. In a note written in 
1962 Lothian explained how he had once spent an afternoon 
with Hailey in the House of Lords showing the former 
Secretary of State copies of the relevant correspondence. 
This part of the note is somewhat confusing in that it 
does not indicate whether the meeting took place before 
or after the publication of Templewood's book. Either 
way it would appear that Lothian did not gain from 
Templewood an admission similar to the one made by 
Halifax and this encouraged him to dig deeper. The 
subsequent evidence that he uncovered led him to accuse 
Templewood of being "Altogether dishonest" in Nine Troubled 
Years. Zetland, in writing a first draft of his own 
memoirs Essayez, had included a reference to how Templewood, 
who was then Foreign Secretary, had been responsible for 
vetoing the Government of India suggestions for negotiating 
with the princes. Zetland was later persuaded by Sir 
Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet between 194-7 and 
1962, to drop this reference as it was too controversial. 
From this Lothian concluded that in Nine Troubled Years 
Templewood was trying to blame others for a failure which 
had been of his own making. ^  It seems likely, therefore, 
that Templewood was himself the originator of the India
16. Halifax to Lothian, 4 October 1957* Lothian 
Collection, No.l.
17. Sir Arthur Lothian's "Note on the Foreign and Political 
Department of the Government of India", 1962, Lothian 
Collection, No.6.
Office hypothesis that less haste more speed would 
produce the necessary results with the princes. One 
can only assume that the former Secretary of State, , 
having spent four exhausting and often frustrating 
years bringing the 1935 Act into existence, was now 
anxious to avoid further controversy within his own 
Conservative party which he feared would be the case 
if there was the slightest hint of the princes being 
subject to pressure to secure their accession to the 
federation.
When Lord Linlithgow assumed office in April
1936 the procedure for negotiating with the princes had
already been established. From the start the new
Viceroy sought ways to shorten it. In June 1936 he
was appalled when he received a time-table from the
Political Department which envisaged six month intervals
between each stage of the negotiations. He immediately
issued revised instructions to the effect that the
princes would only have six months to consider the final
offer, all other stages of the negotiations were to be
1 ftreduced to three months. The Political Department 
subsequently informed the Viceroy that it would be difficult 
to meet his requirements when so much time was spent in 
consultation between London and Delhi and between various 
departments of the Government of India. Linlithgow was 
impressed by this latter argument and commented himself
18. Linlithgow to Zetland, 29 June 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.5*
on the extent to which "the energy and experience of
even the highest officials is absorbed to the detriment
of the handling and control of major issues of policy,
in the disposal or the pursuit of relatively minor 
iq
side-issues.” y Undoubtedly, however, the main cause
of delay lay in London. Originally it had been intended
to forward the draft Instrument of Accession to India in
the spring of 1936. By the beginning of July it had
still not arrived. Patrick admitted to Lothian that
he was Mdisturbed” by the delay for which the India Office
had been responsible. Indeed he feared that because the
India Office was so dependent for constitutional advice
on the Parliamentary counsels' office and the princes'
lawyers "who are up to their eyes in court work and only
deal with these knotty problems in their spare time,"
POfederation might be indefinitely delayed. The draft
eventually arrived at the beginning of August.
Linlithgow was able to make one major alteration 
in the procedure for negotiating with the princes. His 
first idea had been to convene a conference of as many 
princes as possible to explain federation to them. He 
changed his mind when he realised that this would involve 
a risk of "one or two voluble individuals" creating a
sense of "apprehension out of all proportion to the real
21importance of the issues involved." However, having
19. Linlithgow to Zetland, 4- July 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.3 .
20. Patrick to Lothian, 1 July 1936, Lothian Collection, No.
21. Linlithgow to Zetland, 1 June 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.3.
opted for an individual approach, the Viceroy decided 
that it should be made, not by political officers, but 
by three emissaries he would appoint. The reason
for this was that Linlithgow had already gained the 
impression that most political officers were very 
ignorant about federation. He wrote to Zetland: "I
am sending Agents to the Governor-General a little reading 
for the monsoon in the shape of the Act of 1935 with a 
guide thereto written from the point of view of the Indian 
States]
The three emissaries were Courtenay Latimer,
A.G.G. for the Western India states, who was to tour
Baroda, the Gujarat and the Deccan states; Prances Wylie,
a political officer holding an ex-cadre appointment, who
was to tour Kashmir and the states in Rajput ana and the
Punjab, and Lothian who was to tour Hyderabad, Mysore,
23Cochin, Travancore and the states in Central India.
There was controversy before the emissaries embarked on 
their tours. Zetland was disturbed by reports received 
from Delhi which indicated that the emissaries had been 
briefed to inform the princes "authoritatively and without 
the necessity of reference back to the Government of India" 
the maximum limitations in respect of certain financial 
matters that the government would be prepared to accept.
The Secretary of State pointed out to Linlithgow that it 
had already been decided that the first approach to the
22. Linlithgow to Zetland, 22 June 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.3.
23. Linlithgow to Zetland, telg., 24- July 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.15.
princes would only be one of an "exploratory and
elucidatory" nature. He did not wish to "act as a
drag on the wheel of the coach which you are driving
with so much skill" but felt that the princes were
"shy birds" who might easily take fright if they thought
they were being pushed.^ In reply Linlithgow explained
that he had hoped to reach agreement on the type of
limitations which would be applicable to all the states
25before the emissaries departed.  ^ This never material­
ised; the emissaries were restricted to a mere fact­
finding mission. Linlithgow's last word to them when
they departed in October 1936 was that he hoped to see
P6federation in operation by 1 April 1938.
The tours by the emissaries lasted until January
1937* Their first reports reached Delhi in November 1936.
Wylie observed that none of the princes he had visited
"had displayed any practical appreciation of the contents
of the Government of India Act." All appeared obsessed
by the fear that thej/ would be "flooded" with federal
27officials over whom they would have no control. Wylie 
encountered formidable opposition from some of the princes. 
During the discussions he held in Patiala, Bhupinder Singh 
left the room on more than one occasion leaving Wylie to 
deal with his legal adviser. When the Maharaja did 
decide to participate Wylie observed that he "allowed a 
bitterness to come into his tone which betrayed how much
24-. Zetland to Linlithgow, 25 September 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.3*
25* Linlithgow to Zetland, 11 October 1936, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.3.
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27. Wylie to Glancy, 27 November 1936, enclosed with Linlithgow 
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28he hates the whole thing." Bikaner was even more
obstructive. He not only suggested some 116 limitations,
in contrast to Patiala's 40, but also greeted Wylie's
every remark with "scorn and derision." Wylie, however,
did not attach too much importance to Bikaner's opposition.
He considered that most of the other Rajputana princes
regarded Bikaner as "an out-of-date windbag whose capacity
29for self-advertisement is very nearly exhausted.” J 
Despite the difficulties, therefore, Wylie felt generally 
optimistic about the prospects for federation. He 
recognised that there would have to be concessions to 
the princes but felt that the limitations they had 
suggested were "not excessively serious or numerous and 
provide a fairly reasonable basis for negotiation of a 
genuine Instrument of Accession."^
From Mysore, Lothian reported that Sir Mirza 
Ismail was concerned more with the financial rather than 
the political aspects of federation. Ismail was of the 
opinion that Mysore would have no difficulty in federating 
if its tribute was fully remitted. In fact while Lothian 
was in Mysore, J. Raisman, his assistant from the finance 
department of the Government of India, suggested to Ismail 
that it might be possible to remit the tribute if in 
return Mysore would agree to surrender its postal immunity
28. Wylie to Glancy, 4 January 1957» enclosed with
Linlithgow to Zetland, 17 January 1957 > Linlithgow 
Collection, No.4.
29* Wylie to Glancy, .9 January 1957? enclosed with
Linlithgow to Zetland, 17 January 1957» Linlithgow 
Collection, No.4.
50. Wylie to Glancy, 27 November 1956, enclosed with
Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 January 1957? Linlithgow 
Collection, No.3-
257.
and the revenue it derived from match and sugar excises
The suggestion caused a stir in London because it
obviously contravened the terms of reference for the
emissaries. Zetland expressed concern to Linlithgow
that the suggestion, however informal and non-committal,
might be seized upon by the other states as an indication
that the government was prepared to entertain similar
32bargaining arrangements with them.
Of all the states Hyderabad presented the 
greatest difficulty. Not only were the Nizam's conditions 
for federation extensive, some of them were of a blatantly 
anti-federal character. He demanded that he should be 
allowed to retain his own currency and postal system and 
also substantial control over Hyderabad's railway network. 
He also sought guarantees that Britain would protect the 
Osmania dynasty and that any forces used to implement 
this guarantee would always be composed of races not 
politically hostile to the government of Hyderabad. In 
this respect he also demanded an assurance that he would 
still be able to employ Arabs and Africans in his own 
military and police forces. The Nizam's advisers frankly 
admitted that the princes, in considering their attitude 
towards federation, were faced by a conflict between the 
desire for unity and the desire for autonomy:
51. Lothian to Glancy, 26 November 1936, enclosed with 
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’’Where the urge to unity is dominant, the 
interests of the units must naturally give 
way before the dominant motive. With the 
Indian States the urge to unity is not 
dominant. The States cannot, in the 
interest of unity, submerge their separate 
identities, and this means that any 
conceptions familiar in other Federations 
cannot be readily accepted by them.”^
Clearly in the case of Hyderabad the dominant motive was
to preserve the internal autonomy of the state'. There
was strong opposition to federation from the Mulki
population. Ths Mulkis, with their slogan ’’Hyderabad
for the Hyderabadis”, demanded that the state should
enjoy complete internal autonomy. They already resented
the operation of paramountcy in Hyderabad, not only
because it infringed the sovereignty of the state, but
also because it militated against the development of
indigenous talent. The Mulkis appreciated the need to
supervise the Nizam’s government but argued that this
should be done internally by Hyderabadis, not by an
external force. For the Mulkis it was not therefore
simply a question of imposing limitations on the extent
to which Hyderabad federated. Any form of federation
would mean a yet further sacrifice of sovereignty in
addition to that sacrificed through the exercise of 
34-paramountcy. As an outsider and one who had supported 
the federal idea at the round table conference, Sir Akbar 
Hydari was particularly vulnerable to Mulki attack. 
Lothian observed how uncertain Hydari was about, his own
33. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 57(3), No.PT1906/1937, 
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position and doubted whether he would be able to 
’’deliver the goods” as far as federation was concerned. ^
By the end of February 1937 the final reports
of the emissaries had been received and the Government
of India began the process of classifying the limitations
required by the states. In August 1937 Linlithgow
informed Zetland that the results of this classification
had convinced him that concessions were needed to persuade
the states to federate and that in order to make them the
Government of India Act would have to be amended. He
suggested that with regard to those states which derived
revenue from corporation tax, salt duties, match and sugar
excises and also the customs duties collected by the
maritime states, the Act would have to be amended upon
36the basis of the ’’status quo” principle. What this
meant in practice was that even though the states concerned 
would agree to federate on these subjects, they would 
retain what revenue they derived from them.
With regard to customs duties, the report of 
the Joint Select Committee in 1934- had indicated that 
the maritime states should only be allowed to retain the 
duty on goods which were consumed within their own 
territories. However in 1936, following negotiations 
with the states concerned, the Government of India 
concluded agreements by which the states would retain 
the duty on goods entering British India provided that
35. PIC. 1931-50, Coll 11, File 57(3), No.PY 2095/1936, 
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this did not exceed specified annual totals (in the case
of Nawanagar Rs. 5 lakhs and Rs. 2 lakhs for the others).
As part of the agreements the states undertook to offer
no improper inducements to shippers with a view to
stimulating trade at their ports at the expense of those
in British India and also agreed that the Government of
India had the right of inspection to satisfy itself that
these conditions were being observed. Linlithgow
appreciated that the agreements were contrary to the
recommendations of the Joint Select Committee but felt
that they would have to stand in order to secure the
37accession of the maritime states. '
The Viceroy was even more convinced of the 
necessity of adopting the status quo principle for match 
and sugar excises. Following the imposition of these 
excises in 1934-, the Government of India had made agree­
ments with states manufacturing matches and sugar in 
order to prevent them flooding British India with untaxed 
or lightly taxed products in the absence of effective 
customs barriers. The agreement on matches provided 
for the states to impose excise duty at the rate applicable 
in British India. It also provided for all proceeds of 
the match excise in British India and the states to be 
paid into a common pool and divided between them on a 
consumption basis calculated by reference to population.
The agreement on sugar provided for the states to impose 
excise duty at the British Indian rate but allowed them
37* PIP. 1931-50, File 1135/1938, NO.PY1135/1938, 
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to retain the proceeds. As most states benefited 
from these agreements Linlithgow was emphatic that none 
of them would federate unless guaranteed as a maximum 
the amount which they had derived from match and sugar 
excises for the year 1936-1937
The Viceroy was fully aware of the dangers 
implicit in his recommendations. He recognised that 
an amendment might revive the controversy in Parliament 
which had surrounded the 1935 Act. He also recognised 
that the British Indian reaction would be one of hostility 
and thus intensify the already strong feeling that the 
federal scheme was biased in favour of the princes. At 
the same time, however, he was certain that the alternatives 
to making the concessions would be much worse. The 
government would either have to drop federation altogether 
or postpone it. If the latter course was adopted the 
time would inevitably come when the government would 
again have to face the question of concessions to the 
states. In all probability these would be the same as 
the Viceroy was now contemplating, but the princes "having 
seen the first scheme successfully rejected, would 
undoubtedly pitch their demands for amendments much 
higher than they would dare now.f,^ y Finally in support 
of his proposals Linlithgow revealed that he did not 
accept the India Office view that the government could 
afford to wait for the princes themselves to realise that 
it was in their interests to federate:
$8. ibid.
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"If federation means an immediate sacrifice 
of revenue!, it will have no attraction whatever 
to the states. The only thing which could 
make them take a different view would be fear 
of the consequences if they did not federate.
It may be that if the Rulers were as enlightened 
as they should be, that fear would be widespread 
among them. There is however no indication of 
its existence in fact, and I know of no reason 
for anticipating that it will emerge in the 
near future."^
In view of his reaction to the suggestion
regarding Mysore's tribute it is not surprising that
Zetland took strong exception to Linlithgow's proposals.
In October 1937 he informed the Viceroy that the Prime
Minister, Neville Chamberlain, would be very unwilling
to contemplate a bill which would be likely to revive
4-1former divisions within the Conservative Party. He 
was emphatic that no concessions could be allowed for 
salt and customs duties or for corporation tax. However 
he could not ignore Linlithgow's opinion that the states 
in general would refuse to federate -unless ensured of 
some major concession over the match and sugar excises. 
Accordingly in November 1937 he suggested a compromise 
upon the basis of a "sliding-scale" principle. The 
amount of match and sugar excises retained by the states 
would diminish over a fixed period of time until eventually 
they would be entirely at the disposal of the federal 
administration. Zetland justified this compromise on 
the grounds that it would be more acceptable to Parliament 
as it did not alter the principle or substance of the 1935
4-0. ibid.
4-1. Zetland to Linlithgow, 6 October 1937, Linlithgow
Collection, No.4-.
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42Act. Linlithgow, however, did not feel that this
would he acceptable to the princes and continued to
43press for the status quo principle. ^ There followed
a prolonged controversy between London and Delhi over
the nature of the concessions which could be accorded
to the princes. The controversy was not finally resolved
until the summer of 1938, some two months after the Viceroy
had anticipated that federation would be in operation.
In June 1938 Zetland relented and agreed to the
status quo principle for the match and sugar excises.
This was the only concession he was prepared to make.
He considered that it would be improper for the maritime
states to federate on such privileged terms. Instead the
1936 agreements would remain in force in the hope that
eventually the states concerned would agree to federate
44on the terms laid down by the Joint Select Committee.
A similar position was adopted with regard to salt duties 
and corporation tax. Zetland's agreement to the status 
quo principle for the match and sugar excises was made 
on the condition that "the offer [to the princes] will 
be final and that there should be no concessions afterwards 
on any major i s s u e . I n  the event the concession to 
be made did not require an amendment to the 1935 Act. 
Linlithgow suggested and Zetland agreed that the status 
quo principle for the match and sugar excises could be
42. Zetland to Linlithgow, telg., 1 November 1937r. 
Linlithgow Collection, No,26.
43. Linlithgow to Zetland, 11 November 1937? Linlithgow 
Collection, No.4.
44. PIE. 1931-50, File 1135/1938, Cabinet Memorandum: 
The Negotiations with the Indian States as to the 
Terms of their Accession, 21 July 1938.
43. Zetland to Linlithgow, 12 June 1938, Linlithgow
Collection, No.3*
incorporated as a limitation for federal excises in 
the individual Instruments of Accession.
What emerges from this controversy over the 
terms on which the states would he required to federate 
is that Linlithgow, in his anxiety to inaugurate 
federation, was moving steadily away from the principles 
of the 1935 Act. Yet it is equally clear that it was 
not simply a question of whether or not the princes 
should he allowed to retain the proceeds of their match 
and sugar excises hut also one of how best to approach 
the princes to secure their accession. From when 
Linlithgow became Viceroy in April 1936 until the summer 
of 1938 when the terms of the federal offer to the princes 
were agreed upon, Zetland and his advisers in the India 
Office firmly believed that the princes would recognise 
the need to federate of their own accord and that it was 
therefore unnecessary and indeed dangerous to pressure 
them. Linlithgow could never reconcile himself to this 
view and constantly sought authority to apply more 
pressure on the princes. In January 1937? upon receipt 
of the first reports from his emissaries, the Viceroy had 
asked Zetland to allow him "to take a few risks provided 
that I avoid saying anything which might fairly be inter­
preted as amounting to a threat to Their Highnesses or to
47the exercise of unfair pressure upon them." ' Beyond
48saying that he wanted to "push hard and very directly" 
Linlithgow never indicated what these risks would entail.
46. Linlithgow to Zetland, telg., 9 February 1938, 
Linlithgow Collection, No.26.
47. Linlithgow to Zetland, 4 January 1937? Linlithgow 
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48. ibid.
Zetland, however, advised caution. Churchill was "on 
the look out" for indications of pressure on the princes 
while influential pressure groups such as the Lancashire 
cotton merchants and the Chamber of Shipping were becoming 
increasingly opposed to federation for fear that it would 
lead to the rapid disintegration of their trade with India.' 
It is in the light of these considerations that the subject 
of concessions to the princes must be seen. Linlithgow 
was convinced that there would have to be some inducement 
to the princes to federate yet the suggestions he made in 
this respect irritated the India Office because they 
represented a marked departure from the principles of the
0
1935 Act. In reality, however, it is clear that the 
India Office had left Linlithgow very little room for 
manoeuvre.
Once the details of the offer to the princes 
had been finalised Linlithgow wanted to leave them alone 
to consider it in an atmosphere conducive to calm and 
thoughtful deliberation. For this reason he persuaded 
Zetland to withhold a White Paper which the Secretary of 
State had contemplated publishing at the same time as the 
offer was made known to the princes. Zetland had frankly 
admitted that the White Paper would have the advantage of 
"placing on princes publicly the onus of rejecting our 
proposals and of removing grounds for charge that 
progressive concessions were being made to them at the 
expense of British I n d i a . T h u s  it was intended as a
49. Zetland to Linlithgow, 25 January 1937? Linlithgow 
Collection, No.4.
50. Zetland to Linlithgow, telg., 21 February 1938, 
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safeguard to ensure that if the princes did reject the 
offer they and not the government would be blamed. 
Linlithgow objected on the grounds that if the White Paper
did result in hostile criticism of the princes they would
have a ready made excuse to decline the federal offer 
before they had even considered its details.^ It was 
therefore decided to indicate the terms of the offer 
informally to a few of the leading princes and then to
present it to them all to consider in seclusion for a
period of six months.^ Unfortunately the conducive 
atmosphere sought by Linlithgow never materialised. The 
princes found themselves subject to external pressure 
conducted in the name of the Indian National Congress.
The Congress agitation began in Mysore in 
October 1937 and culminated in 1939 with two civil 
disobedience campaigns conducted by Gandhi and Jamnalal 
Bajaj in Rajkot and Jaipur respectively. Most British 
observers, and the princes themselves, were convinced that 
the agitation was part of a deliberate campaign to force 
democracy on the states in order that elected state 
representatives could be used by Congress to secure a 
majority in the federal legislature and thus power in 
the federal ministry.^ This was a mistaken analysis of 
Congress policy towards the states, the principles of which
51. Linlithgow to Zetland, telg., 18 March 1938, 
Linlithgow Collection, No.26.
52. Linlithgow to Zetland, telg., 3 May 1938, 
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53. Private Office Papers, L/PO/89, Cabinet Memorandum: 
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had been declared by the Congress Working Committee when 
it met at Wardha in August 1935* While supporting the 
establishment of responsible government in the states 
the Working Committee had emphasised that:
”... the responsibility and the burden of 
carrying on that struggle must necessarily 
fall on the States people themselves. The 
Congress can exercise moral and friendly 
influence upon the States and this it is 
bound to do wherever possible. The Congress 
has no other power under existing circumstances 
... In the heat of the controversy the 
limitation of the Congress is often forgotten. 
Indeed any other policy will defeat the common 
purpose."^
Implicit in this statement was the recognition that 
Congress was not strong enough to wage a dual struggle 
against the British in British India and the British and 
the princes in the Indian States. In this respect the 
Working Committee's statement confirmed the tenor of 
Gandhi's instructions at the second round table 
conferenceCongress would deal with the states from 
a position of strength once it had won the struggle in 
British India. This attitude continued to irritate 
leaders of the All-India States' People1s Conference 
CAISPCJ and also dissident Congressmen and women who 
resented the controlling influence exercised by right­
wingers such as Rajendra Prasad and Vallabhbhai Patel 
in the formulation of Congress policy. Once such 
dissident from the Karnatak, Shrimati Kamaladevi,
54-. Indian Annual Register, July - December 1935* 
Vol.11, p. 224.
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sarcastically described the Working Committee's statement 
as an "appeal to nobody" and an "expression of helpful­
ness" which had been "colouring their imagination far 
too much and far too long."^
After April 1936, when Jawaharlal Nehru had 
been elected Congress President, dissident Congressmen 
attempted to exploit the discontent of AISPC leaders and 
also to strengthen their own position vis A vis the 
Congress establishment by organising Congress committees 
and civil disobedience campaigns in the states.
N.S. Hardiker, the Bombay Karnataka Congress leader was 
anxious to boost the voice of the Karnataka Provincial 
Congress Committee in all-India Congress circles by 
recruiting members from Mysore. He met with considerable 
success when, in September 1936, he persuaded Nehru to 
write a letter of endorsement for his efforts:
"It is entirely wrong to say that the Congress 
or its leaders are not interested in the future 
of the Indian States subjects ... Therefore it 
is desirable and necessary that Congress work 
should be carried on in the Indian States and 
Congress Committees organised there.
Hardiker*s success led to a civil disobedience campaign 
in Mysore in October 1937 and encouraged other dissidents 
such as K.F. Nariman and Yusuf Meherally to support the 
agitation in order to strengthen their own power bases 
in Bombay.^® In the same month leaders of the Congress
56. Indian Annual Register, July-December 1935» Vol.11, 
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Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1973» p. 337*
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Socialist Party, with Nehru's assistance, managed to
get a resolution passed during a meeting of the All-
India Congress Committee to the effect that all
Congressmen should give moral and material support to
civil disobedience campaigns in the states.^ These
activities alarmed the right wing Congress leaders and
also Gandhi who feared that the resolution would lead
to demands for civil disobedience campaigns in British
India in support of the Mysore agitation. This was the
background to the Haripura Congress session in February
1938 when as a compromise it was decided that existing
Congress committees in the states would be allowed to
continue but not conduct work in the name of Congress
60without Working Committee authorisation.
It is clear therefore that Congress agitation 
in the states was not part of a campaign to promote 
democracy in them, but a by-product of political in­
fighting between Congress dissidents and the Congress 
establishment. Nevertheless the Haripura resolution 
was subject to varying interpretations. AISPC leaders 
assumed that it only imposed restrictions upon the 
activities of existing Congress committees in the states 
but not on the establishment of new ones. In the period 
after Haripura there was a marked increase in Congress 
activities in the states as AISPC leaders encouraged
59* Rajendra Prasad to Nehru, 24 December 1937» Rajendra 
Prasad Collection, by courtesy of Dr.B.N. Pandey.
60. Indian Annual Register, January-June 1938, Vol.l,
PP* 299-366* For further details on Congress policy
towards the states, see B.R. Tomlinson, op.cit.pp,336-
their followers to set up new Congress organisations.
Although agitation was conducted in large states such
as Hyderabad, Kashmir and Travancore, the most vulnerable
were the smaller Deccan and Orissa states which were
embedded in neighbouring British Indian provinces. In
one of the Orissa states, Ranpur, the agitation was
accompanied by violence which culminated in January 1939
61in the murder of Major Bazalgette the political agent. 
Consequently during the first half of 1939» Congress 
leaders found that they could only control activities 
in the states by direct personal supervision. Nehru 
became President of the AISPC while Gandhi and Bajaj 
conducted model agitations in their respective native
6p
states of Rajkot and Jaipur.
According to India Office calculations, the 
onset of Congress inspired agitation was just the 
situation in which the princes would realise that they 
could best protect themselves by agreeing to federate.
In fact it had precisely the opposite effect.
In September and October 1938» ministers from 
the states of Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Gwalior, 
Travancore, Cochin, Patiala and Kolhapur were informed 
of the federal offer, the contents of which had been 
agreed by Linlithgow and Zetland in the preceding summer.
61. Private Officer Papers, L/PO/89* Cabinet Memorandum: 
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Only D.A. Surve, the prime minister of Kolhapur, claimed
63to he fully satisfied, y the others all voiced dissat­
isfaction with specific points of detail. Ismail for 
instance agreed to Mysore’s tribute arrangement but 
wanted it translated into practice before federation
f j L
became operative. Hydari explained that it would
come as a ’’profound shock” to the Nizam to find that
federal subjects were to be administered by federal
officers within his state rather than by Hyderabad
officials.^ however, with the exception of Surve, one
fundamental objection was voiced by all the ministers?
the terms offered contained inadequate protection for
those treaty rights of the states which would remain
outside federal jurisdiction. Hydari in particular was
dismayed that the necessary defence guarantees for Hyderabad
66had not been included in the Instrument.
Under the terms of the 1935 Act all treaty 
rights not affected by federation were to be protected 
by the Governor-General through the use of his reserve 
powers. Consequently it had been considered unnecessary 
to include in each individual Instrument of Accession a 
comprehensive schedule or list of such rights. Only
63. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 45/10(5), No.PY1590/
1938, Informal discussions with D.A. Surve, 21 
and 22 October 1938.
64-* ibid. No.PY1410/1938, Informal discussion with Sir
Hirza Ismail, 20 September 1938. It had been agreed 
that Mysore would abandon its postal and salt 
immunities in return for the remission of its tribute.
65. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 57(3), No.PY 1371/1938, 
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federal subjects would be included in the Instrument.
There would be a list of such subjects and under each 
heading the ruler would specify one of the following 
three alternatives: non-accession; federation without
limitations, which meant that the federal government 
would have unrestricted authority to make laws for a 
particular subject within the state; federation with 
limitations, which meant that the federal government 
would have authority to make laws for a particular 
subject upon certain conditions. Hence, as far as 
the match and sugar excises were concerned, the states 
would become subject to federal administration on 
condition that they were allowed to retain the proceeds 
of these excises derived in the year 1936-37* the
federal government infringed these arrangements, the 
states would have the right of appeal to the Federal 
Court. However, for protection on subjects from which 
the federal administration was to be excluded, for 
example the customs rights of the maritime states and 
Hyderabad’s defence guarantees, the states concerned 
would have to rely on the reserve powers of the 
Governor-General •
Recent experience had taught the princes that 
this was inadequate protection. They noted how reluctant 
provincial governors had been to invoke the special 
powers accorded to them under the 1935 Act to prevent 
incursions into the states from the provinces on the 
grounds that this would precipitate the resignations of
275.
the Congress ministries.^ From this the princes 
deduced that the Governor-General might likewise he 
reluctant to invoke his reserve powers to protect their 
treaty rights should the occasion demand it. The 
princes therefore demanded the inclusion of a compre­
hensive schedule of these rights in their Instruments 
of Accession. These rights would thus become part of 
the federal constitution. If subsequently the federal 
administration infringed them, the states would not have 
to rely on the reserve powers of the Governor-General but 
could appeal to the Federal Court, the decision of which 
the paramount power would be found to enforce.
Although the fallacy of India Office thinking 
had now been exposed, there was no modification of the 
terms of the federal offer before it was communicated to 
the general body of princes in January 1939* They were 
informed that they had six months in which to reach a 
decision. The Chamber of Princes appointed a Committee 
of Ministers, chaired by Sir Akbar Hydari, to examine a 
standard Instrument of Accession. In April the Committee 
reported that in the absence of adequate protection for
67. In the provincial elections of 195? the Congress 
secured a clear majority in six out of the eleven 
British Indian provinces. The governors of five 
of these provinces were convinced that if they used 
their special powers to protect the states the Congress 
ministries would resign. Haig [United Provinces3 to 
Linlithgow, 21 October 1938, Linlithgow Collection,
No. 101; Lumley ^Bombay} to Linlithgow, 16 February 
1938, Linlithgow Collection, No.51; Erskine (Madras!) 
to Linlithgow, 15 November 1938, Linlithgow Collection 
No.66; Vylie (Central Provinces and Berar3 to Brabourne 
CActing Viceroy] 11 October 1938, Linlithgow Collection, 
No.59; Boag (Orissa} to Brabourne, 1*9 October 1938, 
Linlithgow Collection, No.80.
non-federal treaty rights, the standard Instrument was 
unacceptable. In June 1939 a larger and more 
representative gathering of princes met at Bombay and 
passed a resolution endorsing the verdict of the Hydari 
Committee. The resolution concluded;
”... At the same time the conference records 
its belief that it could not be the intention 
of His Majesty1 s Government to close the door 
on an All-India Federation.”^
Although the princes had rejected the offer they clearly 
now expected the government to make it more acceptable.
In view of the comments of those ministers 
consulted on the terms of the federal offer in the autumn 
of 1938i the Bombay decision did not come as a surprise 
to either Zetland or Linlithgow. The former was now 
anxious to publish a Vhite Paper in order to prove how 
favourable the offer was and how unreasonable the princes 
had been in rejecting it. The Secretary of State had 
already been informed that it would be impossible to 
safeguard the non-federal treaty rights of the princes 
in the manner they desired. In March 19391 Sir Findlater 
Stewart, the Permanent Under Secretary of State, recorded 
the view that Britain was not in a position to give 
Hyderabad the necessary defence guarantees. The Nizam 
could only be guaranteed that Britain would fulfil its 
treaty obligations ”if it could”, ^  the implication being 
that the time would come when the paramount power would
68. Cabinet Memorandum: The Indian Federation - 
Negotiations with the Indian States as to the terms 
of their Accession, 27 July 1939$ Zetland Collection, 
N0.25B.
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be unable to maintain the treaties it had concluded
with the states. Findlater-Stewart was of the opinion
that because it would be regarded as a "confession of
weakness1' to make such a declaration and also because
the Nizam would in any case regard it as an "empty
promise", it would be better to say nothing about non-
71federal treaty rights.( In this respect the British 
had been less than honest with the princes as Zetland 
admitted to Linlithgow in July 1939:
"It must be admitted that we share their 
doubts, even if we do not say so in so 
many words; yet we tell them that their 
only possible safeguard is to be found in 
the exercise by the Governor-General of 
the special responsibility vested in him 
and we say that they must rely upon the 
good faith and the ability of Great 
Britain to honour the treaties and 
engagements into which in the past she 
entered with them."^
Such observations foreshadowed what happened to the 
princes at the end of the second world war when the 
British did depart from India leaving the princes to 
negotiate their fate with British Indian politicians.
They also shed new light upon Britain*s obligations 
towards the states: paramountcy might have been para­
mount but it was also impermanent.
The Bombay decision in April 1939 represented 
the end of serious federal negotiations with the princes. 
In July 1939 Linlithgow did attempt to break the deadlock
71. ibid.
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Collection, No.8.
by suggesting that the customs rights of the maritime 
states should be safeguarded in the desired manner. He 
felt that this might persuade the maritime states to 
change their minds and thus "turn the tide strongly in 
favour of federation. However he could not guarantee
that this would be the case and consequently Zetland 
rejected the idea.^ On 11 September 1939 the Viceroy 
announced the suspension of federal negotiations for the 
duration of the war. He was at pains to point out that 
suspension was the operative word and that his announce - 
ment did not mean the abandonment of federation:
"We shall have to keep the threads in our hands, 
and if the situation admits of our doing so, be 
prepared to move without the least hesitation 
in the direction of Federation under the Act if 
that is still practicable at the end of the war."^^
However, in March 194-0 the Muslim League meeting at Lahore 
passed the famous "Pakistan" resolution to the effect that 
the north-western and eastern zones of India, where Muslims 
predominated, should become independent states.^ For all 
practical purposes, federation was now a dead letter.
The princes had rejected the federal scheme in 
April 1939 on the grounds that it afforded inadequate 
protection for their non-fdderal treaty rights. The 
Congress campaign had made them aware of this deficiency
73. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 45/10(8), No.PY 1871/1939, 
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76. For the full text of the resolution, see, C.H. Philips,
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Select^lfoocumenbs, London, 1962, pp. 354-355.
in the 1935 Act. One is left to ponder how they would 
have reacted had they been asked to federate before the 
onset of the Congress campaign. This is of course a 
hypothetical question but one point is certain; they 
would not have been able to reject federation on the 
grounds that they did in April 1939* Indeed the offer 
was so favourable in most other respects that they would 
have been hard pressed to find an alternative reason for 
refusing to federate. It seems not unreasonable to 
suggest therefore that with the exception of Hyderabad, 
most states, including the other major ones, would have 
given their consent. In retrospect it is apparent that 
Hyderabad was a hopeless case. The Nizam was already 
working on the idea that if he could secure an outlet to 
the sea at the port of Masulipatam in the Madras Presidency 
then he would be able to claim a viable existence for his 
state as an independent unit.^ Federation could only 
become operative if those states whose aggregate 
population was over half that of the states as a whole 
acceded and not less than half of the states individually 
represented in the Upper Chamber did likewise. In this 
respect Hyderabad's loss would have been damaging but not 
fatal to the federal cause. Upon the basis of this 
formula federation could still have been established had 
all the twenty-one gun salute states, with the exception 
of Hyderabad and all the nineteen and seventeen gun salute
77. G-OI• Political Branch, No. 241 - Political (Secret), 
1945, Nos.1-15, Desire of Hyderabad for an outlet 
to the sea.
states accepted the of f e r . M o r e o v e r ,  it is wrong 
to assume, as many British observers did, that without 
Hyderabad federation was unthinkable because many of 
the smaller states looked to this premier ranking state 
for a lead. The Nizam was a far from popular figure 
among his princely brethren and it is just as likely 
that the smaller states would have followed a lead given 
by either Mysore of Baroda.
Where then does the responsibility lie for 
the fact that the princes were asked to federate in 1939 
instead of 1937 or even some earlier date before the 
Congress campaign? Obviously the princes themselves 
must share some of the responsibility. They were never 
particularly enthusiastic about federation, an attitude 
which they never concealed throughout the negotiating 
period. However, in fairness the princes were no less 
entitled to bargain for what they regarded as necessary 
amendments to the 1935 Act than were the Congress or 
Muslim League. Undoubtedly the major responsibility 
for the delay in presenting the federal offer to the  ^
princes rests with the British authorities. It seems 
after all that there might be justification in Templewood's 
assertion that had the 1935 Act been passed in 1933 the 
princes would have agreed to federate. However, it is
78. Twenty-one gun salute states - Mysore, Kashmir, Baroda, 
Gwalior: Nineteen gun salute states - Travancore,
Udaipur, Indore, Kolhapur, Bhopal, Kalat: Seventeen
gun salute states - Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala, Rewa, 
Cochin, Bahawalapur, Bikaner, Kotah, Cutch, Bharatpur, 
Tonk, Bundi, Karauli. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 
46(3), No. PY 263/1934, Ho are's memorandum, "The 
proposed distribution of seats among Indian States 
in the Federal Legislature", 22 February 1934.
equally clear that once the Act had been passed it was 
the India Office and not the Government of India that 
was responsible for the delay. It is ironic that 
Templewood appears to have originated the idea of 
approaching the princes in a leisurely fashion. Zetland 
often confided to Linlithgow that although time was not 
on the side of the princes they themselves would eventually 
realise this and agree to federate. In one respect 
Zetland was right. Time was not on the side of the 
princes, it was soon to catch up with them and bring their 
existence as rulers of independent states to an end. Yet 
what the Secretary of State and his advisers failed to 
realise was that if federation was ever to be established 
then time was not on the side of the government either. 
Linlithgow appreciated this more than most, but all his 
warnings fell on deaf ears in the India Office.
2. The abandonment of the non-interference policy.
The Congress agitation also served to highlight 
the second major aspect of the states problem - the nature 
of their internal administrations. It had not taken 
Linlithgow long to realise that all was not well in this 
respect. In June 1936 he wrote to Zetland:
"I cannot help feeling very definitely that 
for whatever reason, certain of the Princes 
have been allowed to have too much of their 
own head in the recent past, and that whether
because of uncertainty as to the degree to 
which they would find support from higher 
authority, or for some other reason, our 
local representatives have not always taken 
as firm a line with them as was desirable.",-^
However, it was not until the onset of Congress agitation 
that the authorities both in Delhi and London began to 
reappraise the policy of non-interference. They were 
prompted to do so by a memorandum written by the Chief 
of Sangli in the summer of 1938. Sangli was of the 
opinion that the smaller states were incapable of coping 
with the "sweeping character" of demands being made for 
constitutional, revenue and financial changes within their 
states. He considered that the policy of transferring the 
states to direct relations with the Government of India had 
been a mistake, particularly for the smaller ones like 
his own which were enmeshed in neighbouring British Indian 
provinces. Previously the governors of the provinces 
could ensure that the interests of the states were 
safeguarded but since the inauguration of provincial 
autonomy in 1937 the transfer now meant that legislation 
was frequently passed in the provinces without due 
consideration for these interests. The reluctance of 
the governors to exercise their special powers to protect 
the states only made the problem worse. As a possible 
solution Sangli suggested that groups of small states 
should pool their resources in matters such as public 
health, education and justice in order to raise admini­
strative standards and thus "anticipate criticism and
79* Linlithgow to Zetland, 22 June 1936, Linlithgow
Collection, No.3-
80and disarm attack.” Sangli*s views are exceptional
in that they represent the only recognition hy an Indian 
prince that at least one aspect of the policy of non­
interference had been misguided in its conception. In 
1918 Sangli had petitioned for his state to be taken into 
direct relations with the Government of India, now his 
arguments served to vindicate the opinions of the Bombay 
and Punjab governments when they had opposed such a policy.
The problems confronting the smaller states
were indeed serious. Their resources were totally
inadequate to maintain reasonable administrative standards.
Most of what little they did have was used to support the
ruling family. They were an obvious target for external
attack and criticism and it is not surprising that most
of the Congress activities were directed against the petty
states of the Western India, Deccan and Eastern states
agencies. In 1938* the ruler of Aundh, a small state
in the Deccan agency agreed to grant his subjects a
constitution in order to stave off external pressure. The
constitution, which was introduced in January 1939»
provided for a Legislative Assembly with the power to
dismiss a ministry chosen from its members by the ruler
on a vote of confidence and also with the power to enforce
any measure which the ruler had previously rejected on
81three separate occasions. Linlithgow was horrified not
80. Memorandum by the Chiaf of Sangli, 1938, enclosed with 
Zetland to Brabourne, 15 September 1938, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.6.
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only because of wbat bad happened but also because of 
how it had happened: the ruler had been left to his own
devices to deal with his critics and had received no
Q O
advice or assistance from the Political Department.
The Viceroy now feared that unless the government took
some action what had happened in Aundh might act as a
catalyst with the smaller states scampering to come to
83terms with Congress.  ^ Linlithgow was made fully aware
that the initiative rested with the government as a result
of an interview he held with the Maharaja of Bhavnagar in
March 1939* The Maharaja wanted to introduce reforms
within his state but he was at a loss as to where to start
84and what to do. The interview was an awkward experience 
for Linlithgow as he was equally at a loss as to what 
advice he could give to the Maharaja. He confessed to 
Zetland:
"As you will see, he put me a somewhat 
embarrassing question and one which we 
will have to face up to without delay 
and which, I suspect, we shall get, in 
one form or another from a great many of 
the other Princes."^
Thus at the beginning of 1939» Linlithgow and 
Zetland began devising a new policy to be adopted with 
regard to conditions within the states. The evolution of 
this policy continued well into the second world war but
82. Linlithgow to Zetland, 1$ December 1938, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.6.
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84. Note of an interview with the Maharaja of Bhavnagar, 
24 March 1939i enclosed with Linlithgow to Zetland, 
28 March 1939» Linlithgow Collection, No.7*
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the main outlines had been established by the summer of 
1939* Its most important principle was the renunciation 
of the non-interference policy. The Viceroy wrote to 
Zetland in April 1939:
".... the policy of abstention from interference 
pursued for so many years can no longer be 
. defended and must be abandoned."gg
It should be noted, however, that the new policy was never 
made official. Neither Linlithgow or Zetland, nor any 
other senior government official, ever made a formal and 
public pronouncement to the effect that the principles 
outlined in Minto*s Udaipur speech no longer applied. To 
make such a pronouncement would not only be a confession 
of failure but would also run the considerable risk of 
stampeding the princes into the arms of the Congress. It 
is also significant that the new policy was designed 
primarily for the medium sized and smaller states. The 
larger ones, by virtue of their greater resources which 
enabled them to maintain adequate security forces, were 
more capable of looking after themselves and there was 
thus less risk of them surrendering to external pressure.
In revising previous policy towards the states, 
Linlithgow confessed that the dilemma in which the British 
now found themselves was one of their own making:
"The great mistake, I am now disposed to think, 
lay in the change of policy after Curzon•s 
retirement which led us to relax our control 
over individual princes and over happenings 
inside their States to the extent which we 
have (a tendency inevitably encouraged by
86. Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 April 1939* Linlithgow
Collection, No.13.
the transfer of control from provinces to 
the Centre); and we and the States have 
now, and will I suspect continue, to pay 
for thirty years of laissez-faire.*^
Zetland fully agreed:
"When Minto succeeded George Curzon he 
undoubtedly went to extremes in relaxing 
the control which Curzon had exercised 
over the Prince©. No doubt Curzon*s 
intervention was bitterly resented by the 
Princes themselves, but as you of course 
know well enough, tact in matters of this 
kind was not George Curzon*s strong suit, 
and while there was, I think, great 
justification for his policy, it was 
unfortunate that he pursued it in so 
dictatorial a manner. **gg
The new policy fell into three distinct parts: 
the question of constitutional advance in the states, 
suitable measures to raise administrative standards in 
the states and the problem of how to secure an adequate 
and competent political staff to implement the new policy.
With regard to the question of constitutional 
advance in the states, a written reply to a parliamentary 
question put down in December 1938 had stated that while 
the paramount power would not obstruct constitutional 
changes in the states it would not encourage them either. 
The initiative in this respect was to be left to 
individual princes. However the experience in Aundh 
and his interview with the Maharaja of Bhavnagar had 
convinced Linlithgow that something more than this was 
required. It would be embarrassing if a prince approached
87* Linlithgow to Zetland, 21 February 1939» Linlithgow 
Collection, No.7
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the government for advice on constitutional reform and
the government was not in a position to reply. Linlithgow
therefore suggested that a distinction should be drawn
between the larger states and the medium-sized and smaller
ones. For the former he advocated the creation of a small
expert committee {he did not give details of its
composition} which would devise constitutional schemes
for communication to those princes who wanted advice in
this respect. For the latter he advocated an ad hoc
committee which would meet in Delhi and be chaired by
the Political Adviser,®^ with the Reforms Commissioner
of the Government of India as one of the other members.
The committee would devise suitable constitutions for
different categories of medium and small states on the
understanding that the princes would not be bound to
90accept such advice as was offered.
89. Under the terms of the Government of India Act of 
1935» the relations of the princes were still with 
the Crown, not with the central government, and 
this position would continue until the federation 
came into being and the princes joined it. In 
order to make this clear the Viceroy was, in 1937» 
given a new title, that of Crown Representative.
To assist the Crown Representative in his relations 
with the states a new post of Political Adviser was 
created. The Political Adviser became the head 
of the Political Department, above the Political 
Secretary, and was given the status of a member of 
the Governor-General's Council. In this capacity 
he attended Council meetings to help the Crown 
Representative watch over the interests of the 
States•
90. Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 April 1939» Linlithgow 
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Zetland and Sir Bertrand Glancy, who became 
Linlithgow1s first Political Adviser, were opposed to 
these suggestions. The Secretary of State appreciated 
that there were risks in leaving the princes to their own 
devices, but felt that there were still graver dangers 
in Linlithgow’s proposals. Constitutional advance could 
not be regulated in the same manner as administrative 
reform. It was not inconceivable that constitutional 
advance could eventually result in full responsible 
government thus absolving the ruler of his obligations
towards the paramount power.^ Zetland and Glancy
/
proposed that princes contemplating reforms should 
approach the Chamber of Princes for advice Meven though 
its advice is unlikely to be on progressive lines.”
They were also of the opinion that any advice offered by 
political officers should be confined to such matters as 
reserve powers during emergency periods and how not to 
breach paramountcy obligations.^ In that the views of 
Zetland and Glancy ultimately prevailed it is not 
surprising that none of the states made significant 
constitutional advances during the war. In fairness, 
however, this was not because of the nature of advice 
given by the Chamber or political officers but more the
91 • In this respect the ruler of Aundh was subsequently 
informed that the government interpreted his consti­
tution as leaving him free to discharge his obligations 
towards the paramount power. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.13, 
File 105, No.pY 1351/1940, Political Department note, 
"Recent Constitutional Developments in Indian States”, 
July 1940.
92. Zetland to Linlithgow, 3 May 1939, Linlithgow 
Collection, No. 13 and Glancy’s memorandum, ’’The 
attitude of the Paramount Power to Constitutional 
Reforms in the States”, enclosed with Linlithgow to 
Zetland, 12 April 1939, Linlithgow Collection, No.13.
result of the cessation of Congress activities against 
the states when war broke out which meant that they were 
rarely consulted. With the pressure off most princes 
felt no need to consider constitutional reforms.
In considering measures to raise administrative 
standards in the medium and smaller states, Linlithgow 
and Zetland agreed on the following proposals. Groups 
of smaller states were to pool their resources in order 
to establish joint administrative services for police, 
justice, public health, education, rural development and 
transport. This would apply to all states whose revenue 
was less than Rs. 10 lakhs per annum. Compulsion would 
be used for states refusing to co-operate:
"If, however, their own financial and other 
resources cannot provide what is essential 
for good administration, we cannot be 
expected to defend them from the consequences 
of shortcomings or to supplement their 
individual resources at the expense of the 
Indian tax-payer, when the desired result 
could be achieved by co-operation with 
neighbouring States."^
The privy purses of the rulers of the medium and smaller 
states was to be fixed at 10 per cent. This had only
been a suggestion in Irwin's note on administration in
1927,^ now it was to be enforced. Each of the states 
would be required to publish an annual budget and also,
within six months of the end of each financial year, an
Administration Report containing details of all revenue
93* Zetland to Linlithgow, 3 May 1939, Linlithgow 
Collection, No.13.
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14 June 1927, enclosed with Irwin to Benn, 18
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expenditure and administrative improvements and 
constitutional changes. It was appreciated that these 
requirements would be beyond the competence of most of 
the princes. Zetland therefore suggested that more 
advice should be given to them when they appointed 
ministers and subordinate officials to ensure a minimum 
degree of competence.^ Linlithgow also recognised the 
need for a revision of government policy during minority 
periods. He was appalled to learn that many of the 
small Orissa states had been under minority for at least 
fifty years yet their administrative standards still left 
much to be desired.^ Finally, Viceroy and Secretary of 
State came to the conclusion that the host of petty 
estates and jagirs, third in the Butler Committee classi­
fication of the states,^7 could no longer survive as
individual entities and would therefore have to be merged
98into larger neighbouring states.
Linlithgow wa3 aware that the change in policy 
might antagonise many of the princes but he was convinced 
that it was in their own interests to co-operate. As he 
told Zetland in April 1939, it was not simply a question 
of ensuring that the states did not yield to Congress 
agitation but also one of their own survival!
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"But there, too, I feel that the risk is one 
that must be taken; and if in fact, as I 
believe to be the case unless the States are 
to disappear, administrative improvements 
(and, too, constitutional change) are bound 
to come, I would rather they came as a result 
of pressure from us than as a result of 
pressure from the Congress acquiesced in by 
the Ruler and by the Paramount Power."gg
The final aspect of the new policy, how to 
secure an adequate and competent political staff, was a 
constant nightmare for Linlithgow. Ever since his 
appointment as Viceroy he had had serious misgivings 
about the calibre of the Political Department; hence 
his use of personal emissaries instead of political 
officers to make the first approaches to the princes 
over federation. In fact he had been loathe to delegate 
any major responsibility to political officers throughout 
the period of federal negotiations. However, they could 
not be kept in the background.when a deliberate attempt 
was to be made to reform the states. It was essential, 
to ensure success for the new policy, that residents and 
political agents should make it their business to keep 
in far closer touch with the states within their charges. 
Their tours would have to be more regular and more 
frequent, they would have to advise on constitutional 
changes, administrative reforms and on the selection of 
ministers and officials. They would have to intervene 
to remedy delays in dealing with grievances and ensure 
that accurate budget accounts and administration reports 
were published. For years political officers had been
99* Linlithgow to Zetland, 5 April 1939, Linlithgow
Collection, No.13.
under the impression that, in the words of the Political 
Department Manual, they "should leave well alone: the
best work of a Political Officer is very often what he 
has left undone. Would they now be able to cope
with their new responsibilities?
Linlithgow had serious doubts. He considered 
that the Political Department contained a "large proportion 
of somewhat second-rate men" and even contemplated 
abolishing it altogether and transferring its responsi­
bilities to ordinary Indian Civil Service (j.C.S.} cadres:
"I feel sometimes that nothing short of a 
shake-up of this kind will purge the 
Political Service of their mediaevalism, 
the consequence of generations of experience 
in the Indian States.
Such sentiments were the result of Linlithgow's experience 
of the handling of Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign in 
Rajkot. An I.C.S. official, Reginald Maxwell, Home Member 
of the Viceroy's Executive Council, had intervened to 
assist Glancy and Courtenay Latimer, his assistant as 
additional secretary to the Political Department, in 
settling the dispute. For the Viceroy the contrast in 
approach between Maxwell on the one hand and Glancy and 
Latimer on the other, was poignant:
"It is the contrast of approach of the civil 
servant of ability who has for the last 20 
years been in British Indian politics, dealing 
with various ups and downs of our relations 
with Congress and with the development of
100. See above p. ¥3.
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institutions of a representative character 
in the Provinces, with the civil servant of 
equal ability who has lived in an entirely 
different atmosphere and inherited a 
different tradition, and who now for the 
first time hears the sound of the mob outside 
his own house."
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There were two inter-related problems to be 
confronted in overhauling the Political Department. The 
first was a problem of manpower; there were simply not 
enough officers to cope with the projected increase in 
work-load. This was a direct result of the amalgamation 
and retrenchment programme of the 1920's. That programme 
had been designed not only to save money but also to conform 
to the principles of the non-interference policy. Iron­
ically the grave consequences of implementing such a 
programme which had been illustrated so graphically by men 
like Blakeway, Holland and Kealy had now materialized.
The second problem concerned the qualifications of political 
officers. They had no experience of financial and revenue 
administration, the two subjects which were at the heart 
of the new policy. Zetland suggested that all political
officers above the rank of political agent should take a
104-course in these subjects, but Glancy pointed out that 
it would be extremely difficult to fill the temporary 
vacancies which would arise from the deputation of officers 
to such c o u r s e s . A s  a result it was decided that
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Collection, No.7»
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105- Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 July 1939, Linlithgow
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political officers should merely familiarize themselves
106with revenue manuals provided by neighbouring provinces.
Linlithgow did attempt to ease the burden by 
adding to the numbers in the Political Department. 
Recruiting more army officers to assist with purely 
administrative matters was one of his ideas, but it was 
cut short by the outbreak of war in 1939- The Viceroy 
was therefore forced to fall back on the conventional 
stand-by of seconding I.C.S. officers for service in the 
states. Even here there were grave difficulties as the 
case of the United Provinces illustrates. In October 
1938, H.G. Kaig, governor of the United Provinces, pointed 
out that although officially the province was supposed to 
maintain a staffing ratio of 45:30 between Europeans and 
Indians, from 1931 to 1936 the number of Indian recruits 
had been thirty compared with only fourteen Europeans.
This was largely due to an overall reducation in European 
levels of recruitment but the position in the United 
Provinces was not helped by the secondment of European 
officers for service in the states. Haig explained that 
his civil service was under a severe strain because the 
Congress ministry was encouraging the people of the
province to press for redress of every kind of grievance
1 ORor injustice, however petty. He considered that it
would be impossible for him to spare any more men and
106. ibid.
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indeed he was even contemplating requesting the return 
of a European finance officer who had been loaned to the 
state of Ranpur.^^ Linlithgow’s efforts to strengthen 
the Political Department therefore met with little success. 
To implement the new policy he was forced largely to 
rely on the existing cadre which was both undermanned 
and lacking in essential qualifications.
Given the circumstances and the magnitude of 
the task, it is hardly surprising that the new policy 
did not achieve a great deal. It was an attempt to 
reverse within two or three years the trends of the 
previous thirty. To stand even the remotest chance 
of success an air of urgency had to surround the new 
policy but this was lost upon the outbreak of war when 
the Congress agitation ceased and the Congress itself 
reverted to the priority of the struggle for powe.r in 
British India. Relieved of the external pressure the 
attitude of the princes towards administrative reform was 
the same as their attitude towards constitutional change - 
they simply lost interest.
Admittedly there were some achievements. The 
publication of a report in November 1940 by J.S.H. Shattock 
provided the basis whereby the smaller states and estates 
of the Gujarat and Kathiawar agencies were to be absorbed 
by the larger states in their neighbourhood. ^ Some
109. ibid.
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Estates of Gujarat and Kathiawar", by J.H.S. Shattock 
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groups of smaller states did manage to devise Joint 
services. By 194-3 states in the Bundelkhand and Malwa 
agencies in Central India had established a Joint High 
Court and a Joint Police Adviser. In the Eastern agency 
the states of Orissa and Chattisgarth had created a Joint' 
Armed Police Force. In the Punjab the tiny hill states 
had agreed to co-operate for police and Judicial services. 
In the Deccan a Joint Police Force had been established but 
this was serviced by detachments from the largest of the 
Deccani states, Kolhapur, and could hardly therefore be 
regarded as a co-operative measure. There was little
disposition to extend the co-operative principle to 
spheres other than the police and Judiciary. The princes 
that acted did so primarily from the point of view of 
defence in order to protect themselves should there be 
a repeat of the Congress campaign. Nothing was done to 
improve conditions for their subjects by devising Joint 
schemes for public health, education and transport.
It is also significant that none of the princes
submitted voluntarily to the establishment of Joint police
and Judicial services. They each resented the loss of
sovereignty and indeed it was only by inviting the
participation of the Maharaja of Kolhapur that the
112Deccan scheme was introduced. It was a similar story
111. For details of these schemes, see PIC. 1931-50,
Coll.11, File 7 pt. 4, No.POL.1053/1943, Note by 
the Political Department in the India Office, 
delations with the Indian States”, 26 July 1945, 
Annexu£e X(2), Circular letter from the Political 
Secretary, Sir Kenneth Fitze, to Residents, 20 May 1943*
112. GOI. FPD. No.14 (24) - I.A. (Secret), 1940, Nos.1-27, 
Creation of a Joint Police Force for the Deccan States.
with the Punjab Hill states where the Nawab of Loharu
was loathe to co-operate with the Nawab of Pataudi because
he was Jealous of Pataudi1s international reputation as 
113a cricketer.  ^ In May 1941 the Political Department 
of the India Office made the following summary of the 
efforts which had been made to encourage co-operative 
groupings of states:
"The present Viceroy ••• has done his utmost 
to impress upon the Rulers the importance 
of ‘collective security* through combining 
the appropriate administrative services of 
separate States. So far, however, thie 
doctrine has yielded as little result in 
the states as it did in the field of defence 
in the Europe of recent years. No ruler will 
willingly sink a portion of his separate 
sovereignty in a Joint stock concern. Rulers 
who are neighbours seem particularly prone 
to mutual Jealousy and suspicion, often 
increased by communal divergence. Vested 
interests in the official class are banded 
against reduction of posts. Court flatterers 
warn petty monarchs of the risk of parting 
with one Jot of their autonomy.”^ 14
It was not only the smaller states that created difficulties 
very little could be achieved in the medium-sized states.
It was often the rulers of these states who had vigorously 
campaigned for a policy of non-interference and they were 
determined that its principles should not be relinquished. 
Arthur Lothian, now A.G.G. in Rajputana, wrote after 
visiting Ganga Singh of Bikaner in 1939:
113. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.13, Pile 94, No.PY 732/1940, 
Pataudi, Loharu and Dujana Joint administrative scheme
114. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7 pt.4, No.POL 1053/1943. 
Note by the Political Department in the India Office, 
"Relations with the Indian States”, 26 July 1943, 
Annexure VTII, ”The future of the Indian States in 
relation to Constitutional Developments” (Memorandum 
sent to the Viceroy under cover of Secretary of 
State's letter dated 16 May 1941.
"Although His Highness showed me anything 
which I asked to see, and allowed me to talk 
to his officials, he was always present, and 
I could get no opportunity of seeing them 
alone. I do not, however, think this is so 
much a result of design as of inability to 
conceive of the State functioning apart from 
himself. For far more than in any other 
Indian State that I have visited 'l'etat 
c'est moi*
The problems created by the mentality of the princes
were compounded by the attitude of most political officers.
When asked in January 1939 to consider Joint services
between groups of small states, only Kenneth Fitze, A.G.G.
in Central India replied immediately and with practical
116suggestions of his own. Indeed it was Fitze's
perseverence in the face of persistent opposition from 
the rulers of Bundelkhand and Malwa that eventually led 
to the creation of the Joint police and Judicial services. 
Elsewhere political officers were leisurely and lukewarm 
in their response. Typical was Colonel Wilberforce-Bell,
A.G.G. for the Punjab states, whose first reaction was 
that it would be pointless to sound out the princes within 
his agency on Joint services. He considered that as the 
Punjab states were so lacking in indigenous administrative 
talent there was no alternative but to continue the 
existing policy of relying on the neighbouring government 
of the Punjab either to train state officials or to lend 
experts of their own to the s t a t e s . T o  this Glancy 
retorted:
115. GOI. Political Branch, No.40(17) - Political (Secret), 
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Fitze to Glancy, 19 January 1939.
117. ibid., No.PY 636/1939, Wilberforce-Bell to Glancy,
18 February 1939.
"Col. Wilberforce-Bell like so many political 
officers has not had sufficient experience of 
modern Indian administration to appreciate 
when the shoe pinches. I still think there 
should be an expert inspection staff for 
minor states to reveal the skeletons in the 
cupboard. Once the actual trouble has been 
diagnosed - it is no doubt easy to borrow 
specialists from a province like the Punjab.
To remain in ignorance of maladministration 
till the place blows up - is to court disaster 
and that is where Col. Wilberforce-Bell1s 
attitude would leave
No doubt what Glancy said was true. What he did not 
point out was that Wilberforce-Bell was a very experienced 
political officer having Joined the service in 1909 and 
having served as Deputy Political Secretary and A.G.G. 
for the Deccan states before his appointment to the Punjab 
in 1934. Like so many of his counterparts, Wilberforce- 
Bell lacked administrative experience because he had been 
nurtured under a policy of non-interference. When 
Harcourt Butler established that policy during Minto's 
day he had been of the opinion that the "leopard cannot 
change his spots" and that it would require a change of 
generation before political officers became fully reconciled 
to the principles of the policy.11^ By 1939 Wilberforce- 
Bell was a product of the change and it was equally un­
realistic now to assume that he had the ability or indeed 
the desire to change his spots. Unfortunately for the 
British and also for the princes, the damage done to the 
concept of Empire by the second world war would not allow 
them the luxury of another change of generation.
118. ibid., Glancy*s note, 8 March 1939.
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By 1939 the princes had conspicuously failed 
in their role as Imperial allies. Their refusal to 
embrace federation meant that the British had been denied 
the means of transplanting a conservative element into 
the Indian constitution which would support the 
maintenance of British rule in India. Future consti­
tutional negotiations were soon proceeded upon the basis 
of a British withdrawal from India. Moreover, it was 
apparent that the princes were not only reluctant to 
give the support that the British required of them, but 
also that they were actually incapable of so doing. In 
their review of the position of the states in 1918, the 
authors of the Joint Report on Constitutional Reforms 
had been of the opinion that democratic and nationalistic
"hopes and aspirations may overleap frontier lines like
IPOsparks across a street." By the late 1930's the
sparks had begun to fly and the princes were woefully 
unprepared to resist the challenge which appeared in the 
form of Congress agitation. They were losing the support 
of their subjects and many were incapable of maintaining 
law and order within their territories. This state of 
affairs was attributable to the non-interference policy 
which had stimulated a totally negative mentality in both 
princes and political officers. It enabled the princes 
to live a sheltered existence cut off from the main stream 
of developments in British Indian politics. It also gave 
them a false sense of security as it encouraged their
120. See above, p. 62.
continued belief in what in fact was the fallacious 
theory that the paramount power was duty bound to 
preserve their precarious existence whatever the circum­
stances. Similarly, as Linlithgow's comparison of 
Maxwell with Glancy and Latimer, and Glancy's own 
comment about Wilberforce-Bell indicate, the inability 
of most political officers to deal with novel situations, 
caused by the repercussions of British Indian politics 
within the states, was due to the fact that an equally 
sheltered existence had been imposed upon them by the 
principles of non-interference. In an administrative 
sense, the shortcomings of the princes and the decline 
in the calibre of political officers, were also directly 
attributable to the policy of non-interference. Having 
been released from constant checks and supervision, most 
princes allowed administrative standards in their states 
to either deteriorate or stagnate. For their part, 
political officers, having been given specific instructions 
that they were only to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of the states in exceptional circumstances, received no 
relevant administrative training whatsoever. By confessing 
in 1939 that the British were being forced to pay for the 
thirty years of laissez-faire which had elapsed since the 
end of Lord Curzon*s Viceroyalty, Linlithgow was under 
no illusions as to where the responsibility lay for the 
difficulties he was encountering in his dealings with the 
states. In this respect it is appropriate, and indeed 
ironic, to recall the remark which had been made by his 
illustrious predecessor to the Queen-Empress at the turn
of the century:
“There is not a day in my life in which 
I do not say to myself, 'What is going 
to happen in this country 20 years, or 
50 years hence?1 And I say with the 
proudest conviction that any Viceroy, 
or any Government that adopted the 
attitude of letting all these Princes 
and Chiefs run to their own ruin, would 
he heaping up immeasurable disaster in 
the future.”
121
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
It would not be possible to attribute the dis­
appearance of the Indian States system between the outbreak 
of the war in 1939 and the establishment of a republican 
constitution in India in 1950 entirely to the policy 
pursued by the British towards the states between 1905 and 
1939* With the consummation of Indian independence in 
194-7 it was inconceivable, unless the country was to become 
balkanised into five or six separate regions, that the 
autocratic tradition of the states could co-exist with the 
democratic structure of the new dominion. That the 
politicians of the new dominion would not countenance such 
a development had been made perfectly clear by Jawaharlal 
Nehru in April 194-7 when he declared that all those princes 
who refused to participate in the Constituent Assembly which 
had been summoned to devise a constitution for the new 
dominion “would be regarded as hostile States and they 
will have to bear the consequences of being so regarded.” *^ 
Moreover, as we have already seen, the vast majority of 
states were dependent for their very existence upon the 
protection of the paramount power. They were so small 
and their financial resources so limited that they could 
not possibly survive on their own once this protection had
1. Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech at the Gwalior session of 
the All India States* People’s Conference, April 194-7, 
cited in U. Phadnis, Towards the Integration of the 
Indian States, 1919-1947, London,196o, p. l72.
been withdrawn. It could be assumed therefore that, 
irrespective of British policy, the disappearance of the 
states was an inevitable development once India had been 
granted independence. However, we believe it can be 
asserted that British policy, which, by its very nature 
between 1905 and 1939* had enabled an outmoded system of 
autocracy to be perpetuated and had also served to sustain 
units which had no intrinsic qualifications for survival, 
was certainly a major factor in contributing to the 
inevitability of the ultimate demise of the Indian States.
By 194-7, the year of partition and the transfer 
of power, the princes were confronted with three options. 
They could join either India or Pa^kistan, the two new 
dominions that were to be created, they could become 
independent in their own right or they could combine to 
form independent unions of states. Most princes chose 
the first option because they realised that the lapse of 
paramountcy would leave them powerless to resist the 
demands for accession from the new successor governments 
and also their own subjects. In most cases geographical 
proximity and religious affinity meant accession to the 
Indian dominion. In view of Jawaharlal Nehru’s remarks 
in April 194-7 the second and third options were quite 
impracticable. Nevertheless some princes resolved to 
resist the demands for accession. Predictably the stiffest 
opposition came from the Nizam of Hyderabad who, upon being 
told that paramountcy would lapse, was reported to have
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said: “You mean I can then do as I like?” The Nizam's
stubborn resistance was finally overcome in September 194-8 
when units of the Indian army invaded Hyderabad. Similar 
action had been required in June of the preceding year to 
thwart the plans of the Muslim Nawab of Junagadh who had 
announced his intention to accede to Pakistan against the 
wishes of the majority of his subjects of whom approximately 
eighty per cent were Hindus. The bulk of the state of 
Kashmir was also captured by India. In October 194-7 
Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province 
invaded Kashmir. The Hindu Maharaja of this predominantly 
Muslim state appealed to the Indian government for armed 
support but had to agree to accede to the Indian dominion 
before this was forthcoming. It was not until January 
194-9, under the auspices of the United Nations, that a 
truce was established which left India in possession of 
three-fifths of Kashmir and Pakistan the rest.
Elsewhere, once power had been transferred in 
August 194-7, the new Congress government of the Indian 
dominion began the task of integrating the states. Many 
were absorbed into neighbouring provinces such as Baroda 
into Bombay and Pudokkottai into Madras. Most of the 
princes suffered a fate not dissimilar to that of the 
German Imperial princes at the hands of Napoleon when the 
latter abolished the defunct Holy Roman Empire in 1806 
and established the Confederation of the Rhine. While 
they retained their princely rank their authority was
2. Sir Conrad Corfield, The Princely India I knew: From
Reading to Mountbatten, Hadras, 1974-, p ."{?(&»
mediatized and their states merged to form larger unions 
over which one of their number presided with the purely 
honorific title of Rajpramukh* Thus the Maharaja of 
Jaipur became the Rajpramukh of the state of Rajasthan 
and the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar the Rajpramukh of the 
United State of Kathiawar, more commonly known as 
Saurashtra. During the initial stages of the integration 
process generous privy purse allowances were used to 
persuade the princes to accept the proposals. In most 
cases a ceiling of Rs. 10 lakhs was fixed although exceptions 
were made for the eleven most important princes. However, 
with the introduction of a uniform system of democracy, 
enshrined in the republican constitution of 1950, the 
ruling powers of the princes were effectively liquidated.
As an independent factor in Indian politics they had 
become extinct.
The introduction of a policy of non-interference 
during the viceroyalty of Lord Minto was a landmark in the 
development of Britain's relationship with the Indian 
States. This policy was a radical departure from the 
interventionist policy which had been pursued during the 
half century which had elapsed since the mutiny of 1857* 
British policy during this period had been specifically 
designed to mitigate the consequences of what in fact was 
an essential flaw within the Indian states system. Although
5. Full details of the integration process can be found 
in V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the 
Indian States, Calcutta, 1956.
many states were British creations those that existed 
before the British arrived in India were ruled by princes 
who derived their position and power from their ability 
to protect their charges and cater for the needs of their 
subjects. However, by guaranteeing them protection 
against either internal revolt or external attack in 
return for the surrender of their right to conduct 
external relations with foreign powers or each other, 
the British absolved the princes of their responsibilities 
towards their states. Many in fact relapsed into a life 
of frivolity and luxury content in the knowledge that the 
British were duty bound to safeguard them against the 
consequences of their follies. Successive Viceroys from 
Canning to Curzon recognised this essential flaw within 
the system. In 1879, when considering the restitution 
of Mysore to princely rule, Lord Lytton had remarked:
MIt is certain that this freedom from fear 
of the consequences of lax and injurious 
administration has been to some perceptible 
extent detrimental in its effects upon the 
Chiefs, upon their counsellors and officials 
and upon all those who are influential in the 
government of the States.”^
However, during the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the British were also of the opinion that despite this 
essential flu^the princes could serve some useful purposes. 
Besides providing revenue in the form of a tribute they 
could assist with the administration of the country and 
also retain the loyalty of the subjects of the states in
4. PSCI. 1875-1911, Vol.22, GOI. FPD. Secret Letter 
No. 124 to S/S, 22 May 1879.
a way that the British as aliens could not. There were 
thus two aspects to the Indian states system: the system
itself was far from perfect but there were advantages to 
be derived from it. During the second half of the 
nineteenth century the British pursued an interventionist 
policy in order to emphasise the advantages. Hence, 
despite Canning's adoption sanads which guaranteed the 
princely dynasties, the main features of British policy 
during this period were the deposition of miscreant rulers 
and the deliberate use of minority periods to raise 
administrative standards in the states. The inter­
ventionist policy reached its height between 1899 and 
1905 when Lord Curzon was Viceroy. Curzon's belief that 
the advantages of the system could not be maintained unless 
the princes were deprived of the symbolism of royalty did 
not meet with the approval of the government in London.
Yet with his departure in 1905 the framework of a new 
policy was devised which was ultimately to emphasise the 
flaw within the system at the complete expense of it3 
advantages.
The authors of the non-interference policy were 
Lord Minto, Viceroy between 1905 and 1910,' and Harcourt 
Butler, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India 
between 1908 and 1910. Both were convinced that during 
the first decade of the twentieth century British rule in 
India was under greater threat than at any time since the 
mutiny. Confronted with the rise of extreme nationalism 
following Curzon's partition of Bengal in 1905, Minto and 
Butler reached the conclusion that the princes were
Britain's only dependable allies in India. Their policy 
towards the states was based therefore upon the contention 
that the princes should be both capable and willing 
alliance partners. During the reform discussions which 
led to the Indian Councils Act of 1909, Minto suggested 
the creation of a Council of Princes to serve as a counter­
weight to the Indian National Congress, the vehicle for 
the nationalist movement. John Morley, the Secretary of 
State, doubted the wisdom of the suggestion on the grounds 
that if the princes were allowed to combine and confer 
they might conceivably use the opportunity to unite against 
the government. However, although Minto failed to secure 
constitutional recognition for the princes, he was deter­
mined that his viceroyalty would not leave them empty- 
handed. In a speech at Udaipur in November 1909 he 
unveiled the principles of a new non-interference policy, 
the precise details of which were subsequently formulated 
by Butler in the Political Department Manual. In sharp 
contrast to the policy of the previous fifty years political 
officers were now given specific instructions that they 
were not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
princes unless misrule reached a pitch which violated 
the "elementary laws of civilisation." A relaxation of 
British control over the conduct of their internal affairs 
was the bait that Minto and Butler dangled before the 
princes in order to persuade them to become willing 
alliance partners. They appear to have taken it for 
granted that the princes would also be capable alliance
partners if they were in receipt of the necessary British 
support♦
Minto and his Foreign Secretary were aware 
that the new policy could not become immediately 
applicable. They realised that the then generation of 
political officers could never reconcile themselves to 
these new guidelines and that the political service itself 
would only become amenable when it was staffed by a new 
generation of officers who had no ties with the old 
interventionist practices. However, a development of 
immediate significance was the emergence of princes who 
were ready to take advantage of the new spirit which was 
slowly being introduced within the government hierarchy. 
Although never representative of the princely order as a 
whole, these princes were educated men who were acutely 
aware of the arbitrary manner in which they had been 
treated while the British pursued interventionist policies. 
Although they welcomed the announcement of a change in 
policy they were disappointed that the government had not 
seen fit to grant them constitutional recognition by 
agreeing to the establishment of a Council of Princes. 
During the viceroyalties of Lord Hardinge and Lord 
Chelmsford, their leading spokesman, Ganga Singh of 
Bikaner, constantly reminded the Government of India that 
the princes could only become effective allies if they 
were allowed to meet to discuss important political issues 
and also matters of common concern to themselves. The 
First World War and the support of Edwin Montagu when 
Secretary of State between 1917 and 1922 eventually
enabled the princes to achieve constitutional recognition. 
The contribution that the princes made to the war effort 
seemed to confirm their alliance value. Montagu was 
anxious to consolidate this position. Resenting the 
bureaucratic obdurano^ which he encountered within the 
political cadres of the Government of India, the Secretary 
of State was prepared to embark upon a policy of wholesale 
concessions to a select group of princes of medium-sized 
states. As a result of such preferential treatment these 
princes began to assume that they could claim to represent 
the princely order as a whole. The establishment of a 
Chamber of Princes in February 1921 was, however, more 
than simply a triumph for princes such as Bikaner, Alwar, 
Patiala and the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar. It marked the 
end of an old isolationist tradition which for a century 
had precluded contact between the princes. It also 
coincided with the first determined effort to translate 
the principles of a non-interference policy into practice. 
In 1921 the princes were firmly acknowledged as Imperial 
allies. Between 1921 and 1939 their willingness and 
capacity to act as such were put to the test.
The conflict over paramountcy which was such a 
major feature of princely politics between 1921 and 1939 
soon raised doubts about the willingness of the princes 
to serve as allies. In that the government was pursuing 
a policy of non-interference it appears at first sight 
somewhat illogical that there should have been a conflict 
of this nature. For the princes who dominated the Chamber, 
however, the paramountcy issue was central to their
relationship with both the British Government and the 
growing democratic movement in British India. Seeking 
complete independence in the conduct of their domestic 
affairs these princes could never be satisfied while 
paramountcy remained vague and undefined and the 
paramount power retained a discretionary element of 
interference. Moreover they needed a strict inter­
pretation of paramountcy to safeguard themselves against 
the possibility of paramountcy rights being transferred to 
a successor government in British India. These princes 
were dismayed in 1926 by Reading's definition of paramountcy 
in his letter to the Nizam and positively shocked in 1929 
when the Indian States Committee recoifamended a further 
dimension to the discretionary element of paramountcy by 
suggesting that the princes could be required to implement 
changes in their systems of government should popular 
disturbances within their states be prompted by demands 
for such. They sought refuge in the proposal for an All- 
India Federation which emerged from Hyderabad in 1930.
They would only contemplate accession to a federation if 
paramountcy was defined to their satisfaction, an attitude 
which initially placed the paramount power in a dilemma.
The British could only stem the tide of nationalist advance 
in British India by conceding a degree of responsibility 
within the Government of India but the political situation 
in Britain itself dictated that central reform could not 
be contemplated unless by federation with a strong princely 
content. However, the British were fully aware that if 
they surrendered over paramountcy they would be placing
the princes in a position of complete internal 
independence. Moreover if the princes were internally 
independent they would have no need to federate as they 
would also have secured for themselves an unassailable 
position in regard to their relationship with their 
neighbours in British India. Although in 1932 the 
Government of India managed to defeat the views on 
paramountcy as represented by the Chamber princes there 
were other difficulties with which it had to contend.
The larger states, whose support was essential if 
federation was to become a reality, entered the negot­
iations in a similar bargaining frame of mind. Mysore 
required remission of its tribute, the maritime states 
demanded the retention in full of their customs receipts, 
while the Nizam of Hyderabad would not even contemplate 
federal officials operating within his state. In 
considering constitutional developments between 1921 
and 1939 one can only conclude therefore that the princes 
were not willing but wholly unreliable allies. However, 
the ultimate failure of the federal idea cannot be 
attributed entirely to princely intransigence. The 
attitude of the princes towards federation eventually 
turned on the crucial question of timing. They rejected 
federation in 1939 because the Congress campaign of the 
previous two years had convinced them that the scheme 
contained inadequate protection for their treaty rights. 
It is not inconceivable that sufficient numbers of them 
would have agreed to federate had they been asked to do 
so before the agitation which began in Mysore in 1937
spread to other states. That they were not asked to 
federate earlier was due to the obstructionist tactics 
of the diehards in London, which delayed by two years 
the 1955 Government of India Act, and also to the 
influence of Sir Samuel Hoare's ideas which meant that 
in the period after 1935 the India Office constantly 
urged restraint upon those in India responsible for 
federal negotiations with the princes.
If the princes were never particularly willing 
alliance partners, their capacity to act as such was 
completely destroyed by the non-interference policy. The 
policy became effective during the decade which followed 
the Reform Act of 1919* For the sake of establishing 
direct relations with the Government of India many states 
were detached from the supervisory control of neighbouring 
provincial governments. Similarly, within the large 
agencies of Central India and Rajputana, some of the more 
important states were removed from the influence of local 
political agents and placed in a position whereby they 
communicated with the Government of India through the 
distant figure of an A.G.G. Subsequent retrenchment 
proposals requiring the abolition of many political posts 
resulted in the remaining states being amalgamated into 
vast subordinate charges under the control of a single 
political officer. These measures were officially justified 
on the grounds that the princes would more willingly serve 
as allies if the control that the paramount power exercised 
over them was relaxed. This was an erroneous assumption 
for it was the capacity, not the willingness, of the princes
to serve as allies that was at stake. The princes could 
never he regarded as capable allies unless their authority 
was accepted by their own subjects. Yet in retrospect 
it can now be seen that the relaxation of control by the 
paramount power was followed by a rapid deterioration of 
administrative standards in the states which, together 
with the spread of democratic and nationalist ideas from 
British India, enabled the subjects of the states to first 
question and then to openly challenge the autocratic 
powers of their princes.
There had been frequent warnings about the 
possible consequences of a policy of non-interference.
During the 1920's these warnings came principally from 
provincial governments protesting about the establishment 
of direct relations and senior political officers complaining 
not only about the establishment of direct relations, but 
also about the implications of amalgamation and retrenchment 
proposals. Admittedly these protests had been originally 
inspired by concern for the prestige and status of 
provincial governments and political officers, but never­
theless the arguments actually used by Lloyd in Bombay, 
Holland in Rajputana and Blakeway in Central India were 
irrefutable. As Lloyd had indicated the establishment 
of direct relations with states which had previously been 
supervised by provincial governments militated against 
administrative standards in the states concerned keeping 
pace with the progress in neighbouring provinces. In the 
large agencies of Central India and Rajputana the situation 
was more serious because here the establishment of direct
relations and the amalgamation of subordinate charges 
meant that those political officers who survived the 
retrenchment measures were hard pressed to perform even 
the perfunctory tasks required of them by the dictates 
of the non-interference policy.
The adoption of a policy of non-interference 
did not, of course, completely rule out the possibility 
of intervention within a state by the paramount power.
The cases of Hyderabad, Udaipur and Alwar all bear 
testimony to this. However, as far as the intervention 
in Hyderabad was concerned, it soon became obvious that 
no successful reforms could be introduced while the Nizam 
remained in power. Fearful of the consequences if they 
deposed the premier Muslim prince of India the British 
reconciled themselves to the abuses that existed in 
Hyderabad in the vain hope that natural causes would 
remove the Nizam for them. Nor do the interventions in 
Udaipur and Alwar reflect any credit upon British policy. 
In both states misgovernment had not only existed but had 
also been Identified long before the paramount power 
decided to intervene. Moreover the cases of Udaipur and 
Alwar revealed that the theoretical reference to inter­
vention which appeared in the Political Department Manual 
was in practice a situation in which the subjects of the 
states were on the verge of open rebellion. Successive 
Viceroys were aware of this. In 1927 Lord Irwin summoned 
a conference of political officers after reading a note by 
a junior officer entitled: "British India is advancing
along the lines of Evolutions The Indian States are on
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the road to Revolution.11^  Yet despite being impressed 
by the arguments outlined in the note and also by the 
opinions expressed at the conference, which in general 
were very critical of the non-interference policy, Irwin 
did nothing to stop the drift. The lack of compulsion 
behind his subsequent note on administration was indicative 
of a reluctance on the part of the British to commit 
themselves in favour of reform in the states for fear 
that they would lose princely support. Yet what British 
policy makers never seemed to appreciate was that because 
of the policy of non-interference, princely support was 
not worth having.
The non-interference policy accentuated the 
basic flaw in the Indian States system. While it enabled 
the princes to become more despotic and irresponsible it 
also generated a stifling atmosphere of inertia within the 
Political Department. Above all it damaged beyond repair 
the justifications for the very existence of the states.
The Congress campaign of the late 1930*s revealed that 
most of the princes had forfeited the allegiance of their 
subjects and also that they were incapable of maintaining 
law and order , the most fundamental principle of government. 
In fact the onset of Congress agitation proved conclusively 
that the princes could no longer be considered as capable 
or dependable allies for the British: on the contrary the
non-interference policy had converted them into serious 
liabilities. If the Congress had no wish to embark upon
5. See above, p. 125.
a simultaneous war of attrition against the British in 
British India and the princes in the Indian States, the 
British for their part had no wish to embark upon a 
similar campaign against the Congress in both territories. 
Yet this was precisely the position in which the depleted 
administration of Lord Linlithgow found itself from 1937 
until the outbreak of war in 1939* Lord Linlithgow was 
the only Viceroy between 1905 and 1939 who made a serious 
effort to repair the damage caused by the non-interference 
policy. By attempting in 1939 to effect a return to the 
interventionist policies of Curzon*s day, Linlithgow had 
brought British policy towards the states full circle.
Indeed in 194-1 he even went so far as to authorise the 
communication of instructions to political officers 
concerning the preparation of Indian State administration 
reports which had been drawn up by the Curzon administration 
in 1904 and which had lain dormant in the Political 
Department archives since Curzon*s resignation in the 
following year. Yet as Linlithgow himself appreciated 
any attempt to turn back the clock in the hope of producing 
some tangible improvement could not possibly succeed.
Princes and political officers alike were not only reluctant 
but also incapable of changing their ways.
6. PIC. 1931-30, Coll.10, File 7, No.POL 3286/1941, 
circular letter from the Secretary to the Crown 
Representative to Residents, 16 June 1941, "Preparation 
and publication of administration reports of Indian 
States." The Residents were referred to GOI. Foreign 
Department, circular letter No. 4064-4067-1•A.,
2 November 1904.
In that there had been many warnings about 
the implications of a policy of non-interference perhaps 
the gravest indictment of British policy concerns an 
episode which occurred towards the end of the consti­
tutional negotiations in London. In June 1933» Ronald 
Wingate was appointed Joint Political Secretary to the 
Government of India. In Hay of the following year he 
became Officiating Secretary. Having served in the 
foreign branch of the Foreign and Political Department 
Wingate had no previous experience of the states. He 
was appointed to relieve the Political Department 
Secretariat which at the time was permanently occupied 
examining details of the federal scheme. Nevertheless, 
Wingate was soon able to identify the essential flaw within 
the Indian States system. In August 1934 he produced a 
note in which he wrote:
"In the India of the future the conservatism and 
loyalty of the States is to be the makeweight 
against the democracy and disloyalty of British 
India. In fact the White Paper scheme is based 
by implication upon this assumption."^
Wingate described this statement as the "theory of the 
balance of power in India." The remainder of the note 
was devoted to a penetrating analysis of how the non­
interference policy was destroying this balance of power. 
Writing in the aftermath of the tribal uprising and 
notorious revelations in Alwar and government intervention 
to suppress an uprising by the Muslim subjects of the Hindu
7. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7, pt.2, No.PY 1506/1934, 
Wingatefs note, 18 August 1934.
Maharaja of Kashmir, Wingate was of the opinion that the 
Government of India "must now face the fact that their 
policy of the last 30 years has failed." To reverse the 
trend he urged the restoration of interventionist 
policies:
"Advice must in future he given if it is not 
sought and it must he accepted, and if it is 
not we must compel acceptance."g
In conclusion Wingate suggested that the Viceroy, Lord
Willingdon, should immediately make a public pronouncement
to this effect and that new instructions should be issued
to political officers "enlarging the scope of their
q
responsibilities."y
In London, Wingate*s note met with varying 
responses. Patrick considered the problem to be one of 
political officers maintaining secrecy in communication 
when forwarding reports of maladministration to higher 
authority. Information sent through "ordinary office 
channels" too often proved to be a "timely indirect warning 
to the Ruler to prepare his defence."^ Sir Reginald 
Glancy considered that Wingate's note conveyed the 
impression that "things are worse than they actually are."^1 
He also pointed out that under rules which had been 
formulated in October 1920 a prince could not be suspended 
or deprived of his ruling powers without first being given 
the option of having the charges against him investigated
8. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. ibid., Patrick's note, 27 October 1934.
11. ibid., Sir Reginald Glancy's note, 29 October 1934.
by a Commission of Enquiry. The Government of India
could enlist the assistance of a panel of ruling princes
to hear the case. Glancy was of the opinion that the
presence of other princes, together with the fact that
the Commission required proof, as distinct from evidence,
of misconduct or maladministration, made it extremely
12difficult to take action against a prince. Neverthe­
less he admitted that political officers were seldom 
experts in finance or revenue. In view of the fact that 
the "majority of cases where intervention has been too 
long delayed are cases of extravagance or financial folly 
leading to bankruptcy," he recommended that this defect in 
the training of political officers should be remedied ,
12. (These rules had been formulated by the Chelmsford 
administration at the behest of those princes who 
became dominant in the Chamber. It should, however, 
be noted that an enquiry with other princes in 
attendance was never undertaken. In the cases of 
Udaipur, Hyderabad, Alwar and Kashmir, none of the 
princes concerned requested an enquiry. In Alwar 
and Kashmir independent enquiries were undertaken by 
officials of the Political Department. In 1926 the 
Maharaja of Indore, who was implicated in a murder 
which had been committed in British India, declined 
the offer of a Commission and proposed to abdicate 
provided an investigation into the crime was abandoned. 
This was accepted by the Government of India. In 1927 
a Commission was offered to the Maharaja of Bharatpur
whose state was bankrupt. The offer was declined and
the Maharaja was required to appoint a European Dewan 
selected by the government and to delegate full powers 
of administration to him. The Maharaja's subsequent
refusal to co-operate with this measure led to his
expulsion from the state. In 1922 a Special 
Commissioner was appointed to investigate serious 
allegations of misgovernment and oppression against 
the Maharaja of Nabha. As a result of the enquiry 
the Maharaja was required to reside outside Nabha and 
to hand over the administration of the state to the 
Government of India. The Maharaja was eventually 
deposed in 1928. GOI. FPD. No.19 - Special (Secret), 
1931, Nos.1-2, pp. 5-7i "Recent cases illustrative of 
the exercise of paramountcy."
320.
13without delay. ^
At this juncture Bertrand Glancy, the Political
Secretary in Delhi, intervened. Had he seen Wingate's
note before it was sent to London, he would certainly
have censored it. He was now faced with the awkward
task of explaining the contents of the note. This he
did by referring to the state of Wingate's health. In
December 1934 he wrote to Patrick that Wingate had been
"suffering from strain lately due to overwork" and thus
14his views were not to be taken seriously. He even 
reported that Wingate had changed his mind about the
15note just eleven days after it had been sent to London. ^
There was obviously friction between Glancy and his deputy.
As Wingate was due to take some leave as soon as his
services could be spared, Patrick suggested that the
work he had done within the Political Department should
receive a commendation from the Secretary of State. This
acknowledgement was never sent because in the words of
J.P. Gibson, a Principal in the Political Department of
the India Office, "this will only make matters worse with 
16Mr. Glancy." Needless to say no action was taken upon 
the basis of Wingate's note. Admittedly it would not 
have been an auspicious moment to act upon his advice.
The government was in the process of attempting to persuade 
the princes to accept the federal scheme embodied in the
13. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7, Pt.2, No.PY 1506/1934,
Sir Reginald Glancy's note, 29 October 1934.
14. PIC. 1931-50, Coll.11, File 7 pt.3i No.PY 1745/1934,
B.J. Glancy to Patrick, 3 December 1934.
15. ibid.
16. ibid., J.P. Gibson's note, 18 December 1934.
White Paper in the hope that their status as Imperial 
allies could he further consolidated* Yet as Wingate 
had been at pains to point out, the alliance value of 
the princes had been virtually destroyed by the policy 
of non-interference. A further five years elapsed 
before Wingate's views were officially endorsed and 
the non-interference policy abandoned. By then, however, 
it was far too late as the princes found to their cost in 
the post independence decade.
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GLOSSARY
Amir -
Arya Samaj - 
Begum -
Brahmin - 
Chauri Chaura
Crore -
Darhar (Durbar) -
In the thirteenth and fourteen centuries 
a rank of nobility. In the fifteenth 
century also a provincial governor.
Hindu reform movement founded in the 
Punjab in the late nineteenth century.
A princess, a Muslim lady of rank. In 
the context of the Indian States, a 
Muslim woman ruler or wife of a Muslim 
ruler•
A member of the first of the four hier­
archical castes of Hindu society.
A village in the Gorakhpur district of 
what used to be the United Provinces. 
Scene in February 1922 of the mob murder 
of twenty-one policemen. As a result 
of this incident Gandhi suspended his 
first non-co-operation movement.
One hundred lakhs or ten millions.
The court or lev6e of a ruler. It is 
also used to signify the executive 
government of an Indian State and 
various cermonial occasions such as the 
coronation of a ruler or the birth of 
an heir.
Desmukh -
Dewan (Diwan) - 
Firman (Farman) -
Gadi (Gaddi) - 
Gaekwar - 
Holkar - 
Izzat - 
Jagir -
Jagirdar - 
Jam Sahib -
Khalsa -
Under native government, an hereditary 
official with police and revenue 
authority in a district; under the 
British, a revenue official.
The Chief Minister of an Indian State.
A government mandate; a formal order 
issued by the ruler of an Indian State.
The throne.
The ruling family of the Baroda State.
The ruling family of the Holkar State.
Dignity, honour, reputation.
A tenure common under Mughal rule, in 
which the collection of the revenues of 
a given tract of land were made over to 
a servant of the State. The assignment 
was either conditional or unconditional.
In the former event, some public service 
such as the levy and maintenance of 
troops was engaged for.
The holder of a Jagir.
Title used by the rulers of the State 
of Nawanagar.
Land reserved for the State, as opposed 
to land assigned or granted to individuals.
Khilafat -
Lakh - 
Maharaja '-
Mahasabha (Great 
Assembly) -
Mulkte- ,
Nawab -
A movement organised by Indian Muslims 
after the First World War in defence of 
the office of Khalifa (Caliph), 
acknowledged by Sunnis to be the 
religious and temporal head of Islam.
One hundred thousand.
The Hindu ruler of an Indian State.
Other names include Maharana, Maharao 
and Maharawal.
The All-India Hindu Mahasabha was a 
communalist party founded in 1915*
Natives of Hyderabad, descendants of 
families who had migrated from north 
India upon the foundation of the Osmania 
dynasty. Although predominantly Hindu, 
they were isolated from the majority of 
Hyderabad's Hindu population by virtue 
of their Persian culture and use of Urdu. 
They made their presence felt by demanding 
the removal of foreign influences from 
Hyderabad, whether in the shape of 
British paramountcy or rival Muslim 
administrators from outside the state.
A viceroy or governor of a province under 
Mughal government, whence it became a 
mere title of any man of high rank upon 
whom it was conferred, without office
being attached to it. Many of the Muslim 
rulers of the Indian States assumed the 
title of Nawab.
Nazar - 
Nizam -
Osmania
Paigahs
Peshwa -
Phulkian
an offering or gift made to a ruler to 
signify the loyalty of the donor.
An administrator: the viceroy of the
Deccan, a title retained by the ruler 
of Hyderabad.
The ruling family of the Hyderabad State.
The most important jagirs in Hyderabad, 
created by Asaf Jah, the founder of the 
Osmania dynasty.
Originally the chief minister of the 
Maratha power: in the eighteenth century
becoming prince of an independent Maratha 
State. The Peshwa1s power ceased with 
the surrender of Baji Rao II, the last 
to hold the title, to the British in 
1817.
States -v The three principal states of the Punjab;
Patiala, Jind and Nabha. The ruling 
families of these states were descended 
from Phul, a Sikh official of the local 
Mughal governor during the first half of 
the seventeenth century.
Pindaris
Raj - 
Raja -
Ra jpramukb. - 
Rani -
Sanad - 
Scindia - 
Subahdar - 
Swaraj - 
Taluq - 
Taluqdar - 
Thakur -
Originally bodies of irregular horse 
allowed to attach themselves to Mughal 
armies, employed especially in collecting 
forage and permitted, in lieu of pay, to 
plunder. During the early years of the 
nineteenth century Pindaris were organised 
associations of mounted marauders in 
Central India, finally suppressed by 
the British in 1817*
A rule, sovereignty. 'The Raj' denotes 
British rule.
Hindu ruler of a small Indian State.
Other names include Chief, Rana and Rao. 
These terms were also used as titles by 
the nobility in certain states and by 
big landlords in British India.
First among rulers.
Wife of a Hindu ruler of a small Indian 
State.
A title deed or Charter.
The ruling family of the Gwalior State. 
Viceroy, governor of a province. 
Self-government, political independence.
A division of a province, an estate.
The holder of a taluq.
A minor Rajput Chief.
